Lessons from Operation Eagle Claw

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

The case study and presentation used for this Joint Operations paper was about Operation Odyssey Dawn (OOD). I will describe two operational-level successes and two failures experienced during the operation. I will offer clear proposals, that if implemented could have prevented those failures.

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The third error that happened was lack of tactical coordination for close air support. This error occurred because the lack of air integration capability between ground and air forces. The CJTF did not even have some of the proper equipment to call in close air support. According to the article an actual kill box was not generated until four days into the battle. This error could have been avoided if the CJTF would have complete step 3 of the MDMP process. Under step 3 it discusses generating options. Generating options is a good Course of Action (COAs) can defeat all feasible enemy COAs while accounting for essential stability tasks. Goal is to develop several possible COAs. (Battle Staff Page 2-13) The CTJF should have pushed for more air coordination with the corps-level Air Support Operations Center. By asking for more air

Iranian students rioting outside the embassy, jumped over the gates of the embassy and took over. Every news station was counting the days the U.S. diplomats were hostages, almost every day the newspaper cover showed the days since Americans were taken hostage. Never in history had the American people experienced a situation like this. If this fact was not embarrassing enough for the president, he had planned and executed a failed rescue mission to retrieve the hostages. Operation Eagle Claw was a dismal failure, and made the United States appear weak and shameful. On April 10, 1980, this public debacle damaged the United States’ reputation around the world. The operation had encountered many obstacles, and eventually had to be aborted. Eight helicopters were sent on the mission and were to meet at Desert One, however, only five helicopters had arrived. Not only had the mission been aborted, but one helicopter crashed in the desert and killed eight service men. This gave the American people a sense of post-Vietnam nostalgia. The American people have lost faith in their president and saw him as weak leader. Many historians believe this entire fiasco to be the main event that cost Carter reelection in

Many American hostage lives were on the line with just one military operation to save and bring them home. Yet, the failure of Operation Eagle Claw brought death to military personnel and shame to America. Operation Eagle Claw was a mission to end the hostage crisis in Iran which was in a political upraise against the United States. The planning of Operation Eagle Claw was too complex and planners over looked the military aviation doctrine to hastily get the hostages to safety. Operation Eagle Claw’s failure was due to prolonged American evacuation from Iran which led to a hasty complex plan that did not keep aviation doctrine in consideration which helped us learn how we need to rethink and conduct large scale military aviation

Then the unexpected happens while the mission is taking place, two of the black hawk helicopters are shot down. So, what does the US do now? The movie Black Hawk Down was created based on the events of this rescue mission.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Tragedy stuck America on November 4th of 1979, when 52 hostages were seized at the American Embassy in Iran during the midst of the Iranian Revolution. Different policy approaches prompted a vast range of potential actions, and ultimately “Operation Eagle Claw” was carried out between April 21st and 25th of 1980. The two primary executive divisions in dispute during decision process were the National Security Council (NCS) and its advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of the Department of State (DOS), Cyrus Vance. The decision for the use of military force, rather than continuing economic sanctions and diplomacy, was due to Carter’s attempt at re-election and a lack of resistance from Congress.

Unfortunately, the mission does not go as planned. One unit of Humvees and helicopters, led by Sargent Jeff Struecker, played by Brian Van Holt, successfully takes the hostages of advisors while Staff Sargent Matthew Eversmann’s, played by Josh Harnett, unit is dropped in by helicopter but, at the wrong drop zone a few blocks away. The operation then begins to fall apart when both units receive heavy gun fire. Each unit then to separates, complicating things further. In the midst of the gun fire and explosions, Black Hawk Super-Six One, piloted by Chief Warrant Officer Clifton “Elvis” Wolcott, played by Jeremy Piven, is hit with an RPG.

Delta give green light to the extraction force lead by LTC McKnight to extract the prisoners already capture. The mission at this point was great it was 1550 and it was supposed to last 30 minutes. While the convoy was waiting for Delta to wrap it up Black Hawk Super 61 piloted by CWO Cliff Wolcott was hit by an RPG. Only two soldiers were able to survive the crash, the pilots didn’t make it. Black Hawk Super 64 piloted by CWO Mike Durant was ordered to fill Super 61 position, then CWO Durant’s helicopter got hit by an