Essay Locke vs. Williams

This paper will demonstrate how Locke’s Memory criterion and Parfit’s account of psychological continuity and connectedness is more similar than you think. Is Parfit’s account of psychological continuity and connectedness just an abstract perspective of Lock’s memory criterion and personal identity theory?

In a series of relatively simple though complexly-worded (out of necessity) thought experiments regarding body-swapping and changes to memory and the mind, Bernard Williams attempts to demonstrate that identity should be identified with the body rather than with the mind when identity is extended into the future (and by extension during the present). That is, though it is typical for identity to be associated with the mind at any given moment, Williams argues that the logic that supports this intuitive association does not hold up over longer periods of time, and that anticipation of the future leads to an association of identity with the body rather than with the mind. Whether or not Williams is successful in this attempt is a matter of much debate, with this author finding some fundamental flaws in the very premise of the comparisons and thus the conclusions, however the argument is fairly elegant and persuasive and certainly worth of closer inspection. A careful reading of the argument might lead one to a conclusion opposite to that which was intended, but is no less rewarding for this unusual quirk.

In his paper “The Self and The Future”, Bernard Williams presented two thought experiment with a body swap theme. He first present a body swap in the same vein that Locke’s present his the Prince and the Cobbler thought experiment, that two people have seemingly switched psychological attributes after a certain time t. This example makes it seems apparent, as Williams suggested, that the two have switched bodies. He then presented a second thought experiment, this time employing a first person perspective of one of the people in the first experiment, illustrating, again, to his suggestion, that simply a switch of mental attributes are not at all sufficient to suppose a switch of personal identity. Given the premises and languages used in the setup of this thought experiment, I would argue that Williams second thought experiment is circular in that it presupposes its conclusion, and fail as a counterexample to the Lockean’s (or anyone subscribed to Locke’s idea of personal identity) theory in that it prematurely reject the important assumption of the memory’s theory: That psychological

It is the driving force of mankind that has delivered man from the age of stone to that of industry. This force is also the essential ingredient that produces the inescapable prison of the mind, a frightful disease that may be viewed as the greatest irony of life. Pain is a dreadful disease in which every individual has felt the everlasting effects. The grief of pain can become a crashing wave that leaves behind only a semblance of sanity in its wake. For in thinking there is both life and death. Trapped inside the prison of his mind, chained by a grief consciousness served only to torture him, Hamlet, the Prince of Denmark, reveals to the world his methods of dealing with pain.

Locke believes that we are who we are because of a “continuity of consciousness” or in a simpler term, we are who we are because of the memories that we have. Locke also believes that a change to your body doesn’t affect identity, so the tattoo and change of dominant hand aren’t even relevant in his argument. Things get a little more complicated when you consider the fact that some of Willis’ memories resurface later in the episode. However, Locke would still say that Dupre is the person alive as he believes that a person’s continuous consciousness is what makes them themselves. The resurfacing of Willis’ memories are just additions to Dupre’s

By reading Locke’s opinions and being able to understand his concept of life, I can say that I relate to Locke more than I do

Physical features do not define personnel. Characteristics such as facial features, height and skin color help us describe people yet, it does not define people. Jane, may have loss her physical body, however, she has not lost her true self, or identity. John Butler, a religious philosophers’ definition of identify helps support why Jane is still Jane. Jane is not dead, after her physical body is destroyed, the new body of Veatrice is still Jane, because Jane is whomever or however, she identifies herself as, this is explained using Butler’s definition of personal identity while also viewing John Locke’s potential counterfeit argument.

It is argued that we are defined by our experiences because Joel and Clementine’s attempts to redefine themselves by erasing memories were ultimately unsuccessful because they were able to replicate the experiences of which all recollection had been erased; they ultimately found themselves back in a relationship together. Part of the side plot also backs up this notion. Mary (the Lacuna receptionist) had her memory erased after an affair with Howard (the married doctor). Even though Mary had no recollection of their time together, she couldn’t help but be infatuated with him. This once again proves that a person cannot be redefined by altering their recollections because an individual will act in accordance to their feelings, which in turn will reproduce the experience(s) that the

He too believes in the idea of dualism just to a different extent. Locke argues that it is not the soul that defines someone’s personhood, but their essence or memories (Della Rocca M 2014). In this sence if Alphonse has memories of being a human then it would be considered logical under Locke’s view that he was the same person as he was before he lost his body and therefore is the same person. If it is both necessary and sufficient (Schiffman K 2014) to say that Alphonse sense of personhood through time continues to be constant through his memories it can be proven that Alphonse can be considered equally as human without his body as he was with

What is an idea? According to Oxford Dictionary, the exact definition of “Idea” is a thought or suggestion as to a possible course of action. But where exactly did the origins of ideas come from? A father of the modern western philosophy, Rene Descartes, and an English philosopher, John Locke both give their detailed accounts on where exactly the origins of accounts come from.

For a being to have a personal identity, they must have the characteristic of rationality, which involves having conscious awareness of sameness of the self or the person. However, even a conscious, rational, thinking person can have moments of forgetfulness, which may seem like a weakness in the ground of the argument considering that, if you have no memory of an experience, how can that experience be yours or how can you maintain continuity of self with chunks of missing information? Locke argues that this is not relevant to the argument concerns the sameness of personal identity. In an experience-to-be-forgotten at some time in the future, in that exact moment a person was almost definitely consciously aware that they, as their own personal identity consistent with the past, were experiencing that specific event. Even though as humans we forget information every day, that cannot necessarily point to the assumption that our moments of forgetfulness are separate from our personal

John Locke’s account of personal identity is founded on consciousness through memory instead of on the soul or the body. We are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of the past thoughts, future thoughts, and actions in the same way as we are conscious of present thoughts and actions. If consciousness is identified by this thought, then personal identity is solely founded on the repeated act of consciousness. Lock maintains that self-identity is neither founded on the body substance because the body may change while the person remains the same. Additionally, John Locke's notion of personal identity found that it is not on the substance or the body. In fact, it is in the same continued consciousness that distinct it from the soul since the soul may have no consciousness of itself. Souls have often been considered as thinking substances. Thus, thoughts would not be the same as the concept of consciousness. According to the soul theory, souls are not located in space, souls are not material, souls are not perceivable, and souls are not linked to any observable characteristics. This makes them ineligible as a part of the personal identity. Instead, John Locke explains the identity of a person over time in terms of autobiographical memories. According to John Locke’s memory theory of personal identity, you are identical to your past self only if you can remember your past self. Furthermore, if you lose all memory of some part of your life, then you are no longer

When it comes to personal identity and survival of the self, it is difficult to say what defines a person throughout time. The three arguments are for the body, soul, and brain. These theories argue that each respective component of a person, must remain the same throughout time in order for a person to be unchanged. The brain theory is more plausible than its counterparts. To prove this, first, I will describe the soul and body theories, which I oppose, and then present an argument based on the brain transplant theory. A criticism for this is Perry’s third night argument that states the body donor is the surviving factor. My rebuttal for his counterargument uses Cohen and Miller’s Conventionalist Argument to support my original statement.

Locke strongly believed that identity is to be connected with consciousness of a person, or a man. Thus, it is important to analyze the following passage from the Locke 's book,

Locke on the other hand, believes that personal identity is explained by mental continuity. He defines a person as someone who is intelligent and able to think, someone who has the same thinking in different locations and times. That being has to be able to reflect and reason who they