Lord Atkin 's Neighbor Principle

The Civil Liabilities Act 2002 defines negligence as a failure on the part of the defendant which results in the harm of the plaintiff which could have been prevented by taking reasonable care. The breach of duty must be foreseeable, Sullivan v Moody. The risk must be not insignificant, and a reasonable person under similar circumstances would have taken precaution against the harm. In this case

The tort of negligence was established with the leading case of Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) . Donoghue got sick from having a drink in a café after finding a snail in the bottle. Around this time, there was no route for litigation due to no contractual association. The only contractual commitment was with Donoghue’s friend who bought the drink and the café owner. Lord Atkin quoted the Bible’s principle of

In Caparo Industries plc v Dickman7, it was determined that courts had to test the duty by “whether the damage was reasonably foreseeable, whether there was a relationship of proximity between claimant and defendant, and whether it is just and reasonable to impose a duty.”8 If so, then a duty of care could arise.

In the case of Charlotte and Sam, sections 29-33 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (CLA) can be used to discover whether Sam owed a duty of care to Charlotte. Under S32 the proximity to the event, the relationship of the plaintiff, a sudden shock, and the reasonable foreseeability of the harm were included as circumstances of the case that the defendant could be liable for. The case of Tame v NSW; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) supports section 32 of the CLA in establishing that a duty of care is

Myra cannot be paid any damages by Candie Cardigans for the injuries caused in Easton Hotel in the Fashion City event since the occurrence of the accident was not negligence on the defendant’s part. Although her fall was the direct cause for injury, the event was unforeseeable and indirect and no statue or standards had been set before to prevent any kind of breach of duty. The circumstances are unique and the approach of this case should be balanced on practicalities on how Candie should have reacted during her fall. (Roe v Minister of Health,

Lucky’s parent, the Spencers want to know whether they can successfully sue the camp for Lucky’s injury under a theory of negligence. Negligence is a failure to act as a reasonably prudent and careful person is expected to act in a similar circumstances. The four basic elements of a negligence case are duty, breach of duty, causation, and harm. We will have to see if Lucky’s case meets any of these elements.

The duty of care that Scott would be required to ascertain before the courts for a successful suit were first described by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson 1932 AC 562. While presiding over the case and in a majority ruling, Lord Atkin states that a duty to use ordinary care and skill arises in circumstances where the conduct of another might put others in danger. Reasonable care must be taken in particular circumstances to avoid omissions or acts that can be reasonably foreseen to as likely causes of harm or injury to another person. Whenever a person is engaged in actions whose outcomes he or she can reasonably foresee will likely to cause harm or injury to another person, a duty of care is then owed to that other person. Two tests must therefore be met to ascertain the existence of a duty of care from Matt – determination of proximity and foreseeability of the circumstances that led to Scott’s injuries.

Nolan demonstrates the dangers of adopting policy considerations when the area of negligence is unclear using Everett v Comojo (UK) Ltd as a case in point. The case deals with third party conducts from the decisions of Mitchell v Glasgow CC. However, Nolan states that it is unfortunate that the judges fail to identify the relevant legal principle, and resorted to the Caparo test to establish a duty of care. This generalised test lead to the wrongful establishment of the duty of care owed by the defendant. The so called “policy considerations”, which Lord Bridge criticises as ‘indefinable’, were not able to identify the relevant legal principle to correctly determine the existence of the duty of care in Everett. Therefore, the significance of

Torts of negligence are breaches of duty that results to injury to another person to whom the duty breached is owed. Like all other torts, the requirements for this are duty, breach of duty by the defendant, causation and injury(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). However, this form of tort differs from intentional tort as regards the manner the duty is breached. In torts of negligence, duties are breached by negligence and not by intent. Negligence is conduct that falls below the standard of care established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm(Stuhmcke and Corporation.E 2001). The standard measure of negligence is the universal reasonable person standard. The assumption in this case is that a reasonable

It can be concluded that Mr. Prendergast was acting negligently whilst driving his car, above the national speed limit, as confirmed by his insurers. Therefore Contributory Negligence is the basic issue to be consulted with the insurers who are claiming that Steven’s claim ought to be ‘substantially reduced’ due to the negligence on his behalf.

In Gregg v Scott, Mr. Malcolm Gregg (‘the claimant’), the House of Lords examined the law of negligence in the area of personal injury. In order for the claimant to have a successful claim in court, the onus to shifts to the claimant to demonstrate that a duty of care owed by the doctor, there was a breach of that duty, an injury was sustained, and the negligence on behalf of the doctor Dr. Andrew Scott (‘defendant’) was a cause of the ‘injury’. If these elements are not satisfied, the claimant may lose its entitlement to full compensation.

The law has historically been reluctant to impose a general liability for omissions as opposed to positive acts. This means that there is no general duty of care in tort to act in order to prevent harm occurring to another. In Smith v Littlewoods Organisation, Lord Goff stated clearly that “the common law does not impose liability for what are called pure omissions”. Similarly, in Yuen Kun Yeu v A-G of Hong Kong, Lord Keith stated that people can ignore their moral responsibilities to prevent harm occurring to another, even when it is easily within their power to do so. He added that it would be unthinkable for there to be “liability in negligence on the part of one who sees another about to walk over a cliff

The purpose of this assignment is to discuss the creation and application the case law resulting from the decision in Donoghue v Stevenson . This decision is often cited in relation to the tort of negligence and a duty of care. As such it could be misunderstood as being the preeminent case for the principles of negligence or duty of care alone. It is however the landmark precedent case for the tort of negligence outside of a contract when taking into account ‘duty of care’ and the ‘neighbour priciple’.

Further to the general negligence position on public bodies, in instances of omissions the general principle is that there is no duty to act unless a special relationship exists. However, there is an exception, a duty is owed if proximity is established as demonstrated in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] UKHL 2.

The case of Donoghue versus Stevenson was a landmark case in Scottish and English tort law, establishing from that point forward a precedent for identification of negligence as a determination of liability. My colleague's posting provides some interesting insight into how this precedent was arrived at. The posting also leaves room for yet more extensive discussion on the legal implications of the 1932 decision.