Lord Toulson 's Case Of Aib Group ( Uk ) Plc V Mark Redler & Co Solicitors

On the one hand it is evident that terms implied at common law can be ‘implied in law’ or ‘implied in fact’. Terms implied as a matter of fact are said to give effect to unexpressed intentions of the

The appellant company (Youyang) was trustee of a discretionary trust formed in 1974 for the Hayward family. Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher’s (Minters) had been acting for EC Consolidated Capital Limited (ECCCL) since July 1991, all work in connection with the drafting of the documents relating to the subscription for preference shares in ECCCL was dealt with by Minters. As part of the subscription agreement Youyang deposited $500,000 in Minters trust account. Minters was entitled to release a section of the fund from the trust account to ECCCL for the purchase of a bearer deposit certificate to be issued by Dresdner International Financial Markets (Australia) Ltd (DAL), which could then be traded on the money market. When the certificate was obtained Minters then had the right to release the remainder of the funds to ECCCL based on the subscription agreement.

Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is a “legal bar preventing a (first) party from denying another (second) party's right in first party's property where the second party has incurred costs in that property to its detriment”. Proprietary estoppel, like other types of estoppel, is not a remedy in itself but a tool to raise “estoppel equity”, on the basis of which the court is able to decide on the type of remedy that this equity will satisfy. Similarly to the need for the element of common intention for the purpose of establishing a constructive trust, there is a need for the establishment of an active or passive assurance on the part of the defendant that leads to some form of consequential detriment on the part of the claimant when acting in reliance on that assurance. Thus, there must be a causal connection between the actions undertaken by the claimant and the initial assurance on the part of the defendant. The extent and the nature of the detriment suffered by the claimant, however, appears to be substantially more flexible than that necessary to find the existence of a constructive trust. For example, in Inwards v Baker [1965], such detriment amounted to the improvement of the defendant’s land, while in Gillett v Holt [2001] it was manifested in both financial and personal detriment. Yet unlike in most cases involving common intention constructive trusts, in neither of

Case Comment: John Michael Malins v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2017] EWHC 835 (Admin) 2017 WL 01339062

(2) Tamanaha, Brian. 2008. “Law”, Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, St. John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0095. Link in Course Readings and Available online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082436&rec=1&srcabs=1012051

This paper describes the impact of the decision made in the case of Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent LBC on the law and its effects on the corporate world, and the comparison between the doctrine of vicarious liability that it outlines and the doctrine of identification that was used earlier to determine the liability of corporations in cooperate crime.

Fall Commentary Assignment-LAWS 1000BProfessor: Stephen Tasson – TA: Noel Gondek Due Date: October 26, 2012

Barnes, separately, had commenced proceedings in the District Court of NSW. Both proceedings were transferred to the Federal Court and heard with the proceedings issued by the ACCC. The judgment on this case was delivered on February 27, 1998 six years after Australia passed a statutory code dealing with defective goods in 1992 sixty years after the verdict on the Donoghue v Stevenson’s case.

In Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio 1, an elderly couple (Mr. and Mrs. Amadio) migrated to Australia forty year ago, without formal education and without a mastery of English, were persuaded by their son, Vincenzo to guarantee and mortgage to the bank a property they owned as security for the overdraft of their son’s company to the bank. They were misled into thinking that the liability was limited to $50000 and for half a year. When their son’s company failed, the bank tried to exercise power of sale under mortgage. The liability eventually turned out to be significantly higher because the guarantee was a continuing “all monies” guarantee which was not limited in time. The couple claimed that they would not have entered into the contract if they had known about the dire financial position of their son’s company. Furthermore, the bank did not ask them to seek legal advice prior to the signing of the contract. The majority of the High Court held that the mortgage ought to be set aside due to unconscionable conduct on the part of the bank.

The following part in the improvement of Therapeutic Jurisprudence will give analysts, policymakers, and those included in the equity framework with a brilliant stage to consider the way we see the law, lawful elements, and the equity framework later

This essay will discuss the Supreme Court decision in FHR European Ventures LLP and others v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (Cedar) . The issue in this case was whether a bribe or secret commission accepted by an agent is held on constructive trust for his principal. This topic is a “relentless and seemingly endless debate” , as Sir Terence Etherton described, and that the “remedy awarded has vacillated for the last 200-odd years” . The major reason for the debate is because the principal will have propriety claim as opposed to a mere equitable compensation, if the bribe or commission is held on a constructive trust . The principal will be in a much more advantageous position if he was held to have propriety

Equity has been described as a ‘mysterious creature’ that lies distinctly alongside the common law. In considering the statement, there is an almost linear reversal in which the remedies in equity procure a type of right not necessarily available in the common law. This peculiar jurisdiction has created consistent controversy especially in regards to the fusion of the common law and equity. To understand further, this essay will consider the relationship between equity and the common law. The development of equity alongside the common law through its history and intention, and application in case law will be imperative in the discussion of the statement. In conjunction with an analysis of fusion, it will become apparent that equitable damages were enlivened, separate to, in unfair circumstances where no rights/damages existed within the common law. In trying to tread the murky waters of the distinction yet the procedural fusion of equity and common law, the contention of this essay becomes apparent. Effectively, this essay aims to highlight that the history, intention, application and fusion fallacies regarding equity, all which point to an assertion that rights in equity are indeed the product of its remedies. Whether they are merely ‘two streams of jurisdiction, though they run in the same channel, run side by side and do not mingle their waters’, is yet to be seen.

The impact of Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 on the doctrine of consideration.

In this course we have been learning a lot on the topic of legal pluralism and normative orders. The paragraphs below will illustrate legal pluralism by using the case of Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys. First of all, we will begin with defining what legal pluralism is then we will go more in depth into the case. We will be covering the essential background of the case, the decisions of the courts and schoolboard with justification and a short personal reflection on the subject.

If parties enter into a contract that is reflective or derives from a mistake, under common law the contract may be void or voidable. The basis of this decision depends on the type of mistake. Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson presented a unilateral mistake, in which only one party is mistaken, and in this case, a mistake as to the identity. The difficulty lies when judges must decide whether a contract is void or voidable, which will only protect one of the two arguably innocent parties, the original property owner or the bona fide purchaser. However, the approaches previously taken by the Courts have led to a lack of certainty and coherence in the interests of commercial transactions, and so the Shogun case presented an opportunity for clarification. I am going to raise the argument that the law of mistake is in need of a reform, by following Lord Millett’s proposal to no longer follow the cases Cundy v Lindsay and Ingram v Little. The reasoning within this argument will establish that the cases are inconsistent, lack support for third parties and fail to establish the authority of creditworthiness over identity in commercial contracts. Alternatively, the cases Phillips v Brooks and Lewis v Averay should be used to create a clear established line of case law which can be seen as a fair and practical approach towards mistake and protecting the bona fide purchaser.