Major General Burnside's Defeat

McClellan had proven throughout the Peninsula Campaign to be an incredibly timid opponent. He had been deceived time and again into believing that he was vastly outnumbered when the Southern forces were of similar size to his own. Lee's aggressiveness had proven successful against him in every previous engagement, and Malvern Hill looked to be no different. However, his opponent was not McClellan, who” rode to Haxall’s Landing.. and determined the site of the Army’s new base” (Santoro, 191). As a result, Fitz John Patrick commanded Union forces at Malvern Hill (Krick). He was not intimidated by the Confederate offensive. This confusion over the nature of the enemy commander proved to be another major blow to the Army of Northern Virginia's assault. Had the enemy commander been more timid, he may have failed to reinforce the lines under assault with the reserve because he believed the Southern attack is a feint, a mistake McClellan would make at Antietam. Had this occurred, the Confederate attack might have met with more

One of the boldest actions of Maj. Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart under the leadership of Robert E. Lee was his effort to make "a complete circuit around the Union Army, heading to the north end of the lower peninsula (near the York River) and returning to Richmond along the James." . Allowing Stuart to make this move was one of the first decisions of Robert E. Lee, who had just replaced the more cautious Gen. Joseph E. Johnston as the leader of the Confederates. "In the aftermath of the inconclusive battle," led by Johnson "Lee suspected that the right flank of McClellan's army was 'in the air' not anchored to any natural formation, and thus vulnerable to attack. To be certain, he decided to send Stuart to reconnoiter."

This paper will examine the Battle of Fredericksburg through the research of analytical papers, historical articles and technical reports by conducting the four steps of battle analysis. It will analyze the effects of the use and dismissal of intelligence assets and disciplines when applied to the planning of a territorial battle campaign. Using terrain analysis it will discuss how the choice of advantageous terrain can sway the outcome of a battle. It will also discuss how timing and momentum can be critical to our overall military planning. Finally, it will present an alternative outcome to the battle by establishing the utilization of intelligence assets available to both commanding generals and how altering critical decision points would have presented a significantly different result.

COL Prescott’s understanding of operational variables (PMESII-PT) and mission variables (METT-TC) contributes to his mission command effectiveness. In Battles of the Revolutionary War (Wood), COL Prescott demonstrates his grasp of these variables by determining the British forces’ strength, the morale condition of his own men and the effective location from which his orders say defend. The 6000 British soldiers’ training and equipment outstrip the colonists in every aspect. To deny the British from seizing Dorchester Heights, COL Prescott’s understanding of the current situation gave way to his effective planning that was effective in his visualization of the defense mission.

Civil War historians view the Battle of Chancellorsville as General Robert E. Lee’s “greatest and most remarkable” victory (Sears 1). Lee, facing an army twice his size, defies all military doctrine and divides his army multiple times in order to out-maneuver and surprise the Union forces. The daring maneuver succeeds and ultimately forces the Union’s Army of the Potomac to retreat. The victory was another major blow to Union troops, but it came at a huge cost to the Confederacy: the loss of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. By evaluating the battle through the lens of the mission command activities, one can see how Lee’s daring maneuver was actually very calculated and his only option for victory. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will describe the timeline of the battle and how General Lee used the mission command activities of understand, visualize, assess, and lead to ultimately achieve victory at Chancellorsville.

On the other hand had the Confederates been able to press their advantage after the Union lines broke, they might have made things difficult for Washington. Later in the war, with more experience they certainly would not have passed up that sort of opportunity, but as it was they were quite happy with the victory they had won.

Lincoln felt that the destruction of Lee’s army should be the primary goal, not the capture of a Southern city, however, he approved Burnside’s plan. This was mainly due to the fact that Burnside was actually moving the army in pursuit of Lee. Burnside’s first act as commander was to divide his army into three grand divisions, the right commanded by Major General Sumner, the center commanded by Major General Hooker, and the left commanded by Major General Franklin. Once this was completed he set forth for Virginia with a compliment of 100,000 men.

The Battle of Fredricksburg was a huge success and victory for the South. The Union faced 13,000 casualties, which has boosted the morale of soldiers in the Confederacy. This victory could be our pathway to victory in this war of Northern Aggression. The Confederacy needs to make smart moves and use proper tactics to ensure this. Our generals are important to winning this war, as proven in the Battle of Fredricksburg. General Stonewall Jackson and General Lee worked very well together during battle. They used high ground to their advantage and fired from above the Union soldiers, destroying them completely. After this battle, the Confederates gained an advantage—the Union was unable to defeat the Virginia Army. This raised the spirits of our

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought for three days from July 1 to 3. The Army of the Potomac, led by General George Meade, repelled the attack of the Confederate’s Army, led by General Robert E. Lee. The purpose of this paper is to examine General Lee’s effectiveness by analyzing his utilization of the mission command, and its principles.

General Lee used the storms that delayed the British attacks as time to build up the city’s defenses.6 General Lee was still unsure of where to establish a defense and eventually agreed with General William Moultrie and the American’s defense was placed solely on Fort Sullivan.7 This decision would prove to be the British’s undoing. During the attack on Fort Sullivan the British were unable to establish a ground offensive and also lost a quarter of their naval firepower to bring upon the Fort.8 The Fort’s position allowed for American domination over any shipping entering and exiting the port of Charleston and using their position the Americans poured deadly fire power down onto the British naval

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

The nation’s capital could have been conquered by Lee's army of north virginia, influencing who had more control as the war was coming to a close. The growth of slavery and pro-slavery states would have most likely remained in power if Lee was successful (historynet.com). If the Union had not stopped Lee and force a surrender, the outcome of the way would have been very different. After this, no confederate invasion of the north was successful. Gettysburg was a turning point in the war because battles were only fought on southern ground (historynet.com).

As commanders understand the operational environment and the problem, they can begin visualizing the desired end state and solutions to solving the problem.6 After noticing that Confederate artillery fire had slackened, COL Chamberlain’s experience told him that Confederate troops were coming and quickly began to envision an operational approach that would achieve his desired end state to hold his position on the far left of Little Round Top. Through his critical and creative thinking, COL Chamberlain showed a skill common within good tactical leaders. He mentally visualized possible countermoves against imagined threats to his unit. While analyzing the terrain he could see that the 83rd Pennsylvania was forming on his right but there was nothing at all on his left. COL Chamberlain could see a dark bulk of a larger hill to the left of his men and determined that if the Confederates got an artillery battery on its crest the Confederates could take Little Round Top and subsequently drive off the Union Army. Visualizing how this could affect his desired end state, COL Chamberlain decided that he would send a company to the 20th Maine’s

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

The battle starts at the lower bridge over Antietam creek. This battle was now led by General. Burnside instead of McClellan. General Burnside told his soldiers to go down the hill and they all got shot one by one. About 500 people died before General Burnside realized he had to change his plan. Confederates were greatly outnumbered but had a high advantage of being on top of the hill, The Union soldiers were easily picked off as they tried to cross the bridge . General Burnside came up with a plan to sneak around the back and attack. That plan worked perfectly. At the end of this battle ( eleven hours long) there was around 20,000 casualties. McClellan should have ended it, when he has the chance to do so.