Malicious Prosecution

In Cizler, a wrongful death action had been dismissed, before submission to the jury, for failure of proof. At the time of the trial the plaintiff, despite a diligent search for eyewitnesses to the automobile accident, could find none. The plaintiff afterwards found such an eyewitness and moved for a new trial. The court found the requirements of what is now paragraph 2 satisfied and granted the plaintiff's motion, but with the condition that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs and disbursements to date (including appeal costs).

Facts: Gawley was a police officer who worked for Indiana University for several years. She sued the college because she noted sexual harassment by a higher-ranking officer than she was. She also sued because she felt she was part of a hostile work environment and that officers in her department retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the college. Her final argument was that there was spoliation of evidence. The district court found in favor of the employer. The case did not go to trial because the district court granted summary judgment. Summary judgment is used to avoid trials. The decision was made based on two key decisions made by the Supreme Court in other cases and that the university was able to establish an affirmative defense. The university “may assert an affirmative defense that examines the reasonableness of the employer’s and the target’s conduct” (Kaplin & Lee, 2014, p. 167). Gawley then appealed to the United State Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. This case brief will outline the question, holding, reasoning, and significance of this case as it was decided by the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

(1) Whether a plaintiff must plead and prove willful and wanton conduct in order to

The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Americans with Disability Act claim. The plaintiff’s is not estopped by her SSDI and long term disability claims.The court foreclosed to grant the plaintiff new trial. The appellate court the district court’s ruling.

Additional Damages– The Courts felt that the employer owes an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the way in which it dismisses an employee. They did not condone terminating employees in a callous and insensitive way and showing no regard for well-being when terminating an employee. The plaintiff Mr. Beatty stated that his termination was carried out in a dishonest, unfair and insensitive way even though the termination was “without cause”. He was called to Mr. Lebeter’s office and informed of his dismissal and given his letter of termination. He stated this

The Plaintiff will be able to move forward with her suit against the Defendants in the areas of heightened-risk and negligence, here is why:

The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial. The Third Circuit agreed with the District Court that Suders had presented sufficient evidence for a trial to conclude that the supervisors had engaged in a "pattern of sexual harassment that was persuasive and regular." The appeals court disagreed with the District Court and ruled that a constructive discharge, if proved, constitutes a tangible employment action that renders an employer strictly liable and precludes recourse to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. The Court of Appeals remanded Suders claim for trial. The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement on the question whether a constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment action and therefore precludes

Reviewing the dispositions, the court denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on both its first and second causes of action….

providing private remedy for injury to one party caused by the tortious conduct of another

Because the Contractor Defendants either could not be located or have ceased doing business, plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims against those defendants with prejudice.   Accordingly, plaintiffs now seek damages only from the Liberty Defendants.

2. Facts: Plaintiff Irene George (P) is filing suit against Defendant Jordan Marsh Co. (D) for mental anguish and emotional distress which resulted in two heart attacks. D sold goods on credit to P’s emancipated son, who purchased them on P’s account. D alleged that P stated in writing that she would pay the debts (which she did not incur), even though it is understood that P did not make this guarantee. D then attempted to intimidate P into paying these debts she did not owe by calling her at late hours, by mailing her bills, by sending her letters stating late charges were being added on and that her credit had been revoked, and by numerous other tactics. P suffered great

“Successful Anti-SLAPP parties get back fees and costs in dismissing action against them, they then can go after the party with a new claim filing a SLAPP -suit with statutory right to also get back costly damages under NRS.41.670.” (Randazzo, M.J. (2013).

Plaintiff further asserts that the Defendant breached its duty of care to her by: (1) “failing to fix a hazardous condition within a reasonable time;” (2) “failing to adequately warn plaintiff of a hazardous condition;” and (3) “otherwise failing to exercise reasonable and due care under the circumstances.” The Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages in the amount of two hundred thousand dollars, plus interest and costs.

When Josh was asked, during a bankruptcy proceeding, whether he had ever been sued, he responded that he had not. In fact, he had once been sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That suit had been settled many years earlier and had no financial impact on Josh today. Josh’s debts were discharged in bankruptcy. Creditors want the discharge revoked because of Josh’s lie.