Another source of problems in the Battle of Malvern Hill stemmed from poor evaluation of the enemy forces. Lee underestimated the effectiveness of Union artillery on the heights, morale of the enemy army, and misinformed of the nature of the enemy commander for this battle. These factors, combined with a misreading of the terrain, resulted in the costly tactical defeat at Malvern Hill. The Federal artillery played a major role in the operation at Malvern Hill. From their position on the hill, they were able to disable a large portion of the Southern artillery. Within minutes of the Confederate artillery reaching their positions, Union batteries “tore them into fragments… piling horses upon each other and guns upon horses” (Longstreet 403). This success proved to be very valuable to the enemy forces because Lee's …show more content…
McClellan had proven throughout the Peninsula Campaign to be an incredibly timid opponent. He had been deceived time and again into believing that he was vastly outnumbered when the Southern forces were of similar size to his own. Lee's aggressiveness had proven successful against him in every previous engagement, and Malvern Hill looked to be no different. However, his opponent was not McClellan, who” rode to Haxall’s Landing.. and determined the site of the Army’s new base” (Santoro, 191). As a result, Fitz John Patrick commanded Union forces at Malvern Hill (Krick). He was not intimidated by the Confederate offensive. This confusion over the nature of the enemy commander proved to be another major blow to the Army of Northern Virginia's assault. Had the enemy commander been more timid, he may have failed to reinforce the lines under assault with the reserve because he believed the Southern attack is a feint, a mistake McClellan would make at Antietam. Had this occurred, the Confederate attack might have met with more
Although Bloody Hill was one of charge and countercharge for the Confederates, the major problem was tactical positioning of the topography and technology. BG Slack and Woodruffs defense greatly outnumbered Lyon’s force as they were positioned down the hill and held inferior weapons. As Slack’s 2 regiments alongside Woodruff guns proceeded to move forward, close enough to be within range to shoot their shotguns and muskets, but the Federals would drive them back with artillery, small-arms fire, and short counterattacks. In order to hold Lyon’s advance, almost his entire force was engaged except for his reserve, the 2nd Kansas Infantry. Eventually, when the fighting died out all along the line as both Confederate and Union sides needed to reposition and recuperate to continue to fight as time went on. (George E. Knapp, 1953).
McClellan’s caution in waging war is evidenced clearly in the Army of the Potomac’s Peninsula Campaign. McClellan was charged with leading the assault on Richmond, delivering what could have been a fatal blow against the Confederacy. During the Army of the Potomac’s movements towards Richmond, McClellan repeatedly delayed, believing he had inferior numbers to his initial adversary, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston knew the caution McClellan was prone to, and slowly drew McClellan closer to Confederate forces defending Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pines, Johnston reinforced the idea in McClellan’s mind that caution was necessary. (McPherson, 1988, p. 461) The surprise attach by Johnston’s forces, though ultimately defeated by the Army of the Potomac, delayed McClellan’s advance as he called for more reinforcements from Washington. Johnston was wounded in the battle, and replaced by General Robert E. Lee. Lee, whose prowess as a tactician bordered on legendary, led a series of surprise attacks against McClellan’s Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days’ Battle. McClellan’s forces were pushed back, and he was relieved of duty as commander of the Army of the Potomac, until later in 1862. (McPherson, 1988, pp. 462-470)
Lee's Army was not very prepared for the battle with two of its three Corps having new commanders appointed. Lee did not do much to prepare these new commanders as they were
The Battle of Gettysburg has been known to many as the decisive turning point of the Civil War. The battle itself was a Union victory that forced the Confederacy into a defensive posture which ended General Lee’s most ambitious attempt to invade Union Territory (Gettysburg Foundation, 2017). The Battle of Gettysburg alone consisted of 67 Battery’s in which totaled 362 guns making it the largest artillery attack in United States history. This battle was a historical landmark for the field artillery, as it established the field artillery as an effective firing weapon system and paved the way for more accurate fires (Herhily, 1931).
The Union led by McClellan’s 87,000 man army, was preparing to intercept Lee. He soon discovered a copy of Lee’s detailed battle plans but was soon forced to come face to face with a backfire as the plans were misled.
However the General leading the troops, General Longstreet, was slow in getting his men ready for battle. So while he found difficulty in getting his men into position, it gave the Union time to fortify theirs and dig what little trenches they could manage. The rest of the Union army had also finally arrived at Gettysburg, ready to reinforce the army that was already there. The Battle of Gettysburg was comprised that day of many smaller battles. They took place at places like Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheat Field, and the Peach Orchard. Victories were won on both sides that day. The Confederate forces managed to take Peach Orchard under their control but were driven back at Little Round Top by the opposing forces. By the evening of the second day the Confederates tried to attack again, but unlike the first night they were unsuccessful and Meade’s forces managed to beat them
The Army of the Potomac was the largest Union Army in the Civil War, and it fought in many important battles (“Army Of The Potomac”). The Confederate cavalry was said to have given three options when being faced- run, surrender, or die. The Federal cavalry knew they had to improve their unequipped and unorganized fighting force if they were ever going to get a chance to claim victory. Hooker’s ultimate goal was to crush Robert E. Lee in battle, so he took the cavalry, reformed it, and made it a new force of over 2,000 men, which “acted as a single body” ("The Battle of Kelly's Ford Summary & Facts"). This was the largest cavalry force to be put together by a lone commander up to that point. Control of this force was given to Averell. With this new army, they would have a chance to change the course of the war in their favor. After the renovation, Hooker wanted a place to test his new brigade and turn the tables on the Confederates, so he chose Fitzhugh Lee’s fort at Kelly's’ Ford on the Rappahannock River. He figured he could show the Confederates how good the Unions can be if they are organized. Now that the battle was set in place, the real course-changing fight could
The Battle of Fredericksburg took place between December 11-15, in and around Fredericksburg, Virginia. General Robert E. Lee commanded the confederate Army of Northern Virginia, while the opposition forces of the Union Army of the Potomac, were commanded by Major General Ambrose Burnside. The battle stemmed from a need for the Union Army to demonstrate some success in the war effort. The Northern public was currently losing confidence in Lincoln and his ability to win the war. Lincoln had replaced several of his top Generals in order to thwart the recent advances of the Confederate Army, which made significant advances during the fall. The battle is remembered as one of the most one-sided battles in the history of the war, being that the Union casualties would amount to more than three times that of the Confederates. When looking at the methodology Major General Burnside used to stage his troops and prepare his attack, we can assess why the number of casualties far surpassed that of the Confederates. Preparation, equipment, time and execution were the main factors which attributed to the failed campaign, ending with the withdrawal of the Union troops on December 15, 1862. The plan initially went awry after Burnside and his troops arrived to the Rappahannock and there were no pontoon bridges to cross the river, which were only requisitioned for 10 days prior. The equipment would eventually arrive two weeks later, giving General Lee
It was a dark and wet June evening in 1863 when Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart (J.E.B. Stuart) received the order. Maintain contact with the enemy, harass and impeded the northerners if they attempt to cross the Potomac River, and guard the Blue Ridge’s mountain passes. If the enemy attempts to cross the river, cross first and stay on the Confederate’s right flank. The orders were clear enough for execution. General Robert E. Lee often issued orders that gave his trusted subordinates the leeway to conduct operations as they saw fit. Only this time, not even the strategically talented General Lee could predict the necessity of having Stuart’s Cavalry support the Army of Northern Virginia’s advance from the front and flank while maneuvering into Gettysburg.
In the summer of 1862 the Union’s Fifth Corp which was commanded by General McClellan came under attack from General Robert E. Lee. This attack was not foreseen because General McClellan and the Union felt that they were on the offensive against the Confederate army. The attack came on June 26, 1862 at Beaver Dam Creek where McClellan’s Fifth Corps was stationed near Mechanicsville, Virginia. After close to a week of battling the Fifth Corps retreated to Harrison’s Landing located on the James River. General Lee retained the initiative he gained at Beaver Creek Dam and continued to pursue General McClellan. By the third of July General McClellan along with the Army of the Potomac was ordered by Washington to retreat from Harrison’s Landing. The pressure from these actions caused President Lincoln to pull back some of his forces from various areas and reduce the
Field Artillery played a significant role in many battles during the Civil War. The Battle of Malvern Hill is one such instance. Located in Henrico County VA, Malvern Hill sits South East of Richmond just north of the James River. This battle is part of The Peninsula Campaign (March-September 1862) and more specifically the Seven Days Battle. The Seven Days Battle was a series of six battles starting on June 25, 1862 at The Battle of Oak Grove and ending at Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862. During the battle, artillery in both armies had a drastic effect on the outcome whether good or bad. In this paper, we will discuss the initial disposition of troops as well as the challenges faced by each army, the actions taken once hostilities initiated and the outcome of the battle. In conclusion, we will discuss the lessons learned from this battle as it pertains to the Field Artillery as well as the relevance of the lessons learned to the modern day battlefield.
During this period, a few battles broke out between the two armies, but as the Confederates moved through the Shenandoah Valley, Lee had Major General Stuart’s cavalry cover their movements by holding mountain passes to the east. Major General Stuart’s cavalry allowed the three corps of General Lee’s army to move north with almost zero action being taken on them. General Lee pushed further north to position himself between Washington D.C. and the Union Army. Stuart took approximately 50 percent of his cavalry with a plan to move toward Washington D.C. and then northward to rejoin General Lee and the remainder of The Army of Northern Virginia. This left General Lee without his main reconnaissance force, and Stuart would not meet up with Lee again until after the Battle of Gettysburg had
On the other hand, General Meade's, Army of the Potomac also had reasons to win the battle. Newly appointed, General George Meade, had a huge task ahead of him. He had just assumed command of the Union's main eastern army and now he must halt Lee's advance. Two very difficult obstacles for him but if he couldn't stop the Army of Northern Virginia then his country was in jeopardy. With the capture of Vicksburg seeming
The 137th New York Unit persistently defended the Culp’s Hill, deeply entrenched, with 750 Soldiers from other three corps of the Union. General Lee’s Confederates went after the hill and advanced about few hundred yards from Baltimore Park, a single supply line for the Army of the Potomac. (Reardon & Vossler, 2013) At ten o’clock in the evening, Colonel Rufus noticed the risk of Confederates occupying the hill and possibly distressing the supply line of Baltimore Pike, so he decided to move in and defend it with his survived men. If General Lee’s forces reached the supply lines of the Union, and disrupted the ammunition supply, General Meade’s Army would have no choice but to retreat, and this could have been favorable to the Confederates. (Scott & Scott, 2011)
On July 1st at Cemetery Hill, a large number of casualties from Heth and Pender’s Divisions due to the effectiveness of the Union artillery. Artillery was also used with effectiveness at the Peach Orchard, Wheat Field, Devil’s Den and Little Round Top, but during the battle, artillery is well known for on July 3rd, commonly known as Pickett’s Charge. The Confederates sent an infantry assault of 12,000 against the Union at Cemetery Ridge, but were met by Union rifle and artillery fire. As a result of the assault, General Lee was met with great casualties and led his troops back towards Virginia.