The concept of maneuver warfare has very little to do with where the fight happens or how forces arrive to that fight, but how we attack the enemy system and establish a tempo that drives the enemy into a “deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (MCDP 1, page 73). The key to creating the conditions for that deteriorating situation is to orient on the enemy understanding the enemy’s strength, weakness, and disposition by orienting ourselves to the enemy and “turning the map around” to exploit that established enemy system. Whether the enemy is on a fortified high ground or is a littoral nation, our goal is the same take the enemy system and destroy it. MCDP 1 gives several examples of what orienting on the enemy means to the various warfighters; a pilot examining the integrated air defenses that must be penetrated or the rifle …show more content…
Having an AF that likely has freedom of maneuver outside of an enemy threat ranges with an amphibious OTH capability, combined with air assets capable of delivering assault forces from multiple avenues of approach. The AF commander has the ability to achieve another important tenet of maneuver warfare: Surprise. Having orienting to the enemy and identifying those centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities that AF can now maneuver itself to best employ its highly maneuverable assets to best address the enemies system and destroy it. In some cases, the threat of having a highly maneuverable AF postured with the ability to conduct a landing is enough to fix enemy assets and allow attack from conventional land forces such as the amphibious demonstration (feint). Operation DESERT STORM is a great example of using an AF to drive the enemy into decisions that ultimately served our needs and not their
The production focuses on the period before and during Koschorrek’s station in Stalingrad and places Hitler’s decision for a two-front war in a historical context. The documentary covers the massive success of ‘Operation Barbarossa’, Hitler’s artillery barrage strategy in 1941 up until the retreat of the German army in 1943. Hitler Turns East tells the audience how the German army ultimately failed despite its initial success. Although the German army quickly and powerfully dissolved Soviet defenses, the Red Army bought the German troops to a standstill. These aspects of the documentary are clearly accounted by Koschorrek in far more, firsthand detail in his memoir. The Soviet Army continually drives the German troops from their positions and this is specifically shown in Koschorrek’s entry of November 20th and December 13th 1942. Stationed along the Don, a river running along Stalingrad, Koschorrek records “the Russians have also broken through,” Romanian lines in the south, “and are coming at us from both sides, trying to take us in a pincer movement”. The documentary specifically remarks on the pincer strategy of the Soviet troops, a method that attempts to encircle and surround troops but cutting off defense lines at both sides. The documentary also remarks on the involvement of Romanian troops while Koschorreck goes into more detail of their social behavior (as soldiers) rather than
Carl Von Clausewitz and Helmuth Moltke the Elder were both practitioners and theorists of the war art in the 19th century. Their military thoughts on war’s character and its dynamics have influenced the later militaries in the conduct of war. Particularly, the Clausewitzian concept of the “culminating point of victory” and the Moltke’s principle of “Auftragstaktik”, or mission type tactics by a decentralized command were implemented and culminated in the battlefield of World War II. Moreover, today, the US Army has adopted both concepts in its latest refined “AirLand Battle” doctrine recognizing their importance in the operational art of modern warfare.
Conventional operations target the enemy’s forces directly or indirectly by targeting the enemy force and war material producing factories.
Exterior Lines of Operation (LOO) best characterizes General Schwarzkopf’s Operational Approach for Desert Storm. The Coalition operations converge on the enemy and XVIII Airborne Corps along with VII Corps used the envelopment firstly to cut lines of communication of the enemy and to destroy it in the Kuwait Theatre of Operation. In addition, the Coalition showed itself as a modern army with high-speed armor capabilities and total control of the air. It kept distance from the enemy since units remained outside of enemy artillery and multiple rocket systems range until the Ground Offensive Campaign began.
Leading into the Fall of 1914, tactics on both sides of the line involved the rapid mobilization, maneuver and envelopment of the opposing side.10 Pre-1914 doctrine took little into account the effects of emerging new technology and their impact on both defensive and offensive operations. This disconnect between doctrine and technology contributed to the failure of early offensive operations in the Fall of 1914 and resulted in staggering casualties.11 Both sides developed doctrine that took into effect the unique terrain and technology that had been developed prior and during World War I. However by the end of the war, a combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system the most effective.12 This “elastic defense” had three unique characteristics; dedicated counter-attack force at all levels, decentralized command and control, fluid defensive belts and integrated artillery support at the Division level. Under this new doctrine, Corps headquarters had the role sustaining subordinate units, but not directing their actions during battle.13 This defense-in-depth and the lessons learned during the Verdun battles of 1918 were so successful that British forces adopted many of the German tactics with a special emphasis on their counterattack capability.10 Utilizing the new doctrine, by August 1918, Germany had made substantial gains, however had
The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle utilizing the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. Furthermore, this paper will relate the causes and effects of essential elements critical to the tactical success and mission failure of Operation Ivory Coast. Ultimately, all contributing factors will coalesce into lessons learned from the operation that are still applicable to this day.
There are no universal theories to explain the true nature and character of war, and any war theories are not a fact or absolute truth. All strategic principles are dynamic and contextual, so “every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions.” The battlefield environment of the 21st century will be the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, and nature of war will be completely different because of the Revolution in Military Affairs. Highly advance communication and information technologies, a dramatic increase in computing capabilities, developed of precision munitions, dominant air and space power ‘war could be waged by the projection of
On June 6th 1944, the U.S. and allied forces executed an amphibious assault named Operation Neptune, commonly known as D-Day, along the north-western coastline region of France. The operation covered in this paper will discuss a key battle during the Invasion of Normandy. The Invasion of Normandy was a successful operation focused towards German-occupied Western Europe during World War II. This paper will also cover a brief history and key points of The Battle of Omaha Beach. Critical reasoning and battle analysis will be expressed through what intelligence assets were applied, utilized and available during the time era. The analysis outcome will lead to an expressed alternative ending on The Battle of Omaha Beach. A detailed explanation of how intelligence assets could have been used to change the course of the battle will defend the explained alternative ending discussed. The main points of discussion will include Adolf Hitler’s decision to move most of his tank divisions and infantry units 150 miles north to Calais, the significance of the highly effective group known as the French Resistance and a famous illusionist Jasper Maskelyne.
Shakespeare in Hamlet wrote, “by indirection finds direction out.” Although used in a different, the quote directly relates to the principle of asymmetric warfare. Andrew J. Mack first used a name for this tactic of war in his 1975 book, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars.” Asymmetric simply means that two sides are not the same. This type of warfare can be used between groups of people or countries. Just like any war, the motivation can be economic, religious, or political. Asymmetrical warfare is usually exemplified in long, drawn out wars, rather than short battles. More small groups are turning to this idea, making “the world more uncertain, unstable, and difficult to anticipate.” (Grange)
It is here that the critical strategic objective must be found. Combining this perspective with scientific metaphors, he states that in keeping “…the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (Clausewitz, p. 595-596) By disrupting this center of gravity, the enemy is thrown off balance and if not allowed to recover, will, according to Clausewitz, eventually succumb.
Irregular warfare has become the centre of much military and academic study in recent years, due mostly to the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. However irregular warfare is by no means a recent revelation in the evolution of warfare and strategy, numerous examples exist throughout history in which irregular warfare tactics and strategy have been adopted and later analysed by academics and military professionals. This author will focus on the key issues that governments face in creating effective strategies for irregular warfare with a particular emphasis on counter-insurgency (COIN) and terrorism. Resources such as time, space, legitimacy and support present themselves as key issues in dealing with insurgency and terrorism and are
The Army’s Strategic Goal is to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) with forces prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. (United States, 2014)
Movement and Maneuver – The discussion should include how both sides conducted maneuver and movement as well as the capabilities each side possessed.
The argument can be made that the deas and concepts of Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart are not the most relevant of the classical theorists when applied in todays’ strategic environment. Their concepts do provide value for military leaders to study, however there are other classical theorists that should be studied as well. Sun Tzu along with Liddell Hart’s explanation regarding the indirect approach to focus the attack on the enemy’s weakest point is where one argument can be made. When using their theory of indirect approach, while seemingly convincing at times there is also a degree of logical fallacy (Gerras, p. 23). Sun Tzu concedes that the stronger form of warfare was defense, but he also recognized that offensive warfare is needed to win
Various military tactics were by both sides of the Vietnam War, the belligerents used military strategies based primarily around getting a geographical or strategic advantage, such as Booby traps, the Ho Chi Minh Trail and Agent Orange.