Mary Jo White Summary

Recent years, there is an increasing rate on sexual scandals of Chief Executive Officers from business and political area. As a result, these CEOs not only lost their jobs because of bad influence from sexual harassment, but experience a higher chance of ruining company’s reputation and firm future performance. Under this circumstance, an increasing number of companies decide to add code of moral into the area of corporate governance and declare that CEOs should resigned or be fired when they related to some scandals. However, other corporations choose to not fire the CEO and at the meantime to help them hide this news from the media and the public.

The study conducted by Hardjo and Alireza (2012, p. 4) represented that the independent directors have a few understandings of the company’s circumstances, and make decisions depends on what the management provides (Hardjo & Alireza, 2012, p. 4). Although Gallagher and Bennie (2015, p. 20) contended that the independent directors are likely to express their individual opinions and focus on the interest of the company. Thus, the formation of the directors’ board with a significant number of independent directors might not prevent DSE from the downfall due to reliance on filter information which is not adequate to make decisions (Rankin et al., 2012, p.

In any organization the personal and professional relationships between board of directors, CEOs, management and staff play a critical role in how effectively an organization’s operational goals and objectives will be fulfilled. Personal relationships between the board of directors and CEOs can be especially problematic when personal perceptions and emotions are influencing decisions of the organization. Singleton and Nail (1986) indicated in some situations professionals are able to handle business and personal relationships with the same individuals while others see the relationships as dichotomous. Board members that are family or long-time personal friends can create personal bias based on incentives to individual members rather than pursuing the best interest of the organization.

Lynn White Jr. is a medieval historian. He talks about how the western world change how we treat the environment, especially by western religion. White starts by giving the history of technology around the world, for example, the clock. He also talks about the different people who were involved with helping technology growing into what we know now. He goes into his subject of Medieval and it View of Man and Nature. He explain, “This, distribution of land was based no longer on the needs of a family but, rather, on the capacity of a power machine to till the earth. "Man's relation to the soil was profoundly changed. Formerly man had been part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature." Pg four because of technology men was no longer part of Nature anymore. White has also say that religions especially Christianity change how men think. He explains “ If so, then modern Western science was cast in a matrix of Christian theology.” pg 5 That Western Christian is how people will see the environment. White believed to solve this problem is to think of an alternative

Today was a very eventful day, for it is Easter and our wonderful community had put together this

Portuguese producer David Rebordão created a popular internet video featuring a fictional White Lady. The video consists of supposedly "recovered footage" found at the scene of a fatal car accident, near Sintra, Portugal. In the video, a woman and two young men are shown taking a car trip to the mountains. One passenger records the trip with a video camera. While driving along the road, the travelers spot a strange female hitchhiker, whom they pick up. The passenger with the camera focuses on the hitchhiker, who seems strangely quiet, but says her name is Teresa, and states that she has not been the same since her accident. She then points out a spot on the road where she says she died. She suddenly turns to the camera and screams,

The failure of gatekeepers , this includes boards of directors, career politicians, auditors, and Wall Street analysts

In March 1995, Fred Aldrich, a summer trainee with the First Investments, Inc., was called into the office of the head of investment analysis section of the trust department. The following conversation took place: Fred, here are the 1994, 1993, and 1985 Basic Industries Company’s financials (Exhibit 1) and a 10-year summary (Exhibit 2 ). Our trust department has owned this stock since the early 1980s. As you know, our portfolio people place a lot of emphasis on the quality of a company’s earnings and the return on owners’ equity in making stock selections. Well, they are worried. The 1994 Basic Industries annual report shows a

While shareholders’ agreements take away the directors’ discretions across a range of important matters, investors still claim to value the right to appoint a director. They actively encourage close relationships and communication between shareholders, directors and management. In fact, the size of many boards is determined by the maximum size of the shareholding that can be attracted without director representation. This frequently results in shareholdings of 5 to 7% appointing a director and, in combination with independent chairman, can produce boards of 15 or more directors.

After the financial scandals in the early 2000s, i.e. Enron, Worldcom, and Satyam Computers, researchers have increased interest in understanding the character and positions of chief executives. One reason for this growing interest relates to the control of executives over the financial reporting (Geiger and North 2006, Ferrell and Ferrell 2011, Francis, Huang, Rajgopal, Zang 2003). Another reason relates the issuance by the SEC of a one-time order requiring “written statements, under oath, from senior officers of certain publicly traded companies…revenues…greater than $1.2 billion (SEC order no. 4-460)” (Geiger and Taylor III 2003; Zhang and Wiersema 2009).

With such incentives, it is naturally expected that directors manage earnings to meet analysts’ expectations. Directors have a range of methods that they can adopt, which makes the identification and measurement of earnings management more complicated. This essay splits the methods and reviews literature that has used different models to study earnings management.

Most often management engages in the earnings game because it is a part of the company’s culture. Financial goals are tied to earnings performance, the focus is only for short-term goals, and/or superiors make special requests in order to meet the goals. Management compensation is a powerful incentive tied to firm performance. It opens the door for managers to do whatever it takes to meet earnings projections and obtain their payouts (Duncan, 2001). When it comes to playing around with the numbers until they are just right, managers are only looking at the here and now. They may believe operating based on short-term earnings is in the best interest of the company. However, this has complete disregard for future long-term performance. Top executives, as well, have a significant amount of influence over earnings results. In a 2006 survey of CFO Magazine readers, the results showed that approximately 51% of CFOs can influence reported earnings by 3% or more (Durfee, D., 2006). According to Duncan (2001), managers would need to “learn to play the earnings game” to do more to achieve quarterly and year-end targets.

The quality of the chairman and CEO relationship can impact the happenings in the boardroom (Kakabadse et al. 2006, p.134). A positive relationship between chairman and CEO facilitates an open non-judgmental quality discussion in the boardroom (Kakabadse et al. 2006, p.141), thus improving board performance.

The rise and fall of the Royal Bank of Scotland is characterized by poor corporate governance which allowed for the complete dominance of the executive management over the board of directors and a massive principal-agent problem. Positive social dynamics and the power of weak ties allowed for compliance while intimidation and bullying tactics silenced questions, concerns and opposition. The board’s utter compliancy and borderline negligence enabled rampant, unchecked empire-building at the cost of shareholder value and led to a spiral of unaccountability and gross incompetence. Stakeholders’ loss of confidence from misinformation and misdirection was an inevitability that sealed

This literature review will presents a debate around the topic of the relationship between board structure and information disclosure and the different methodological approaches taken by researchers to study the research topic. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn at the end of this literature review on the major findings.