• Messa (P) V. Sullivan & Keyman’s Club (D, a) Essay

For summary judgment to be granted, the movant must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The appellate standard of review for reviewing summary judgment orders in this case is the de novo standard, as this is a decision regarding “mixed questions of law and fact”. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 562 (6th Cir. 2008).

The trial judge, therefore, entered judgment for plaintiff Foster against defendants Grant and Gray. Grant and Gray appealed.

Philip J. Cooper v. Charles Austin 837 S. W. 2d 606 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)

The case was brought forward to the NSW Supreme Court in 2001 whereby Judge Hulme ordered both Respondents as negligent. This decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal whereby the judgement was granted in favour of the Respondents. This case affirms the previous decision.

The appeals court ruled that there was no evidence to show that the defendant’s conduct was willful or wanton or in reckless disregard to safety.

Case 2 is an appeal against the sentence imposed by Judge C. F. Wall on appellant

The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Americans with Disability Act claim. The plaintiff’s is not estopped by her SSDI and long term disability claims.The court foreclosed to grant the plaintiff new trial. The appellate court the district court’s ruling.

The Court ruled in favor of the appellant, and the decision is described as follows:

Plaintiff, Dobbie Brown, a minor child, has brought a cause of action with his parents, Michael and Tina Brown against our client, defendant, Lawrence Vincent Smith for statutory liability under Florida’s dog bite statute. On October 31, 2009, around 9:30 p.m., Plaintiff, along with seven other children came running up to our client’s property to trick or treat. Plaintiff ran to the glass window where owner’s dog Beast was. Plaintiff began to pound on the window yelling, “Trick or Treat!!” while Beast barked, ran back and forth and jumped around. Our client answered the door a few minutes after he went to retrieve his hot biscuits from the oven. When our client answered the door, the kids were screaming “Trick or Treat” at the top of their lungs. Plaintiff was dressed up in a cat costume. When our client opened the door, and handed Plaintiff a biscuit, Beast sprang up from the door and bit off Plaintiff’s finger. Our client quickly restrained Beast, wrapped up Plaintiff’s hand along with the severed finger and took Plaintiff to the hospital where doctors were able to successfully reattach the severed finger. Our client had purchased Beast about eight months before the incident. The Beast is an eight to ten pound Yorkie who has bitten our client’s niece on a prior occasion, although the bite was minor. The Beast has been around children in

Thus, the court determined that La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:961, 40:962 could have no application in the prosecution of a person for the mere status or condition that might possibly arise unintentionally or involuntary. The court dismissed defendant's appeal of the judgment that revoked the suspension of two concurrent 10-year sentences for violating the conditions of his probation.

In our case, the plaintiff was more aggressive toward the dog by striking it with her shoe. In Pulley v. Malek, the plaintiff was attempting to assist the dog and ended up accidentally harming the dog by picking it up. 495 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio 1986). In both cases, the dogs received physical pain as a result of the plaintiff’s conduct. Applying the same definition of tormenting used by The Supreme Court of Ohio in Pulley, to our case, it is likely that Monica’s conduct will constitute as tormenting, if not abuse.

What did the appellate court rule? Did it agree with the trial court (affirm) or disagree (reverse)?

Appellant contends that the district court erred in convicting her under the malicious-punishment statue as well as in ruling that the statute does not require proof of bodily harm. Accordingly, if proof of bodily harm is not required for conviction of malicious punishment, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.

The court ruled that State could not sue for equitable indemnity or contribution based on the fact that there was no evidence that Moffatt owed a duty of care or that Moffatt was negligent. The court also determined that there was no contractual relationship between State and Major and that a person or other property was not damaged. Based on the two core findings, all cross complaints made by State are disregarded and State is found to be solely responsible for the damages. Moffatt is also awarded costs on the appeal.

This element was shown in Messa v. Sullivan in which the court affirmed that Betty Messa was lawfully present when the attack occurred because there were no signs or notices anywhere on or in the building, indicating that the fifth floor was a residence and not a business. Messa entered Keyman’s Club building with the purpose of selling printed cards that had the deaf and dumb alphabet on them. There were notices and signs that the building was utilized by businesses, but nothing on the directory or the building indicating that the fifth floor was used as a residence and that it was not legal for anyone to be on that floor. The elevator that was could be utilized by anyone, including Messa, went to the fifth floor. The door Messa opened was a manual door, heavy, and although it could be locked with a key, was not locked. The manual door had a sign that indicated there was a vicious police dog on that floor, but the sign was on a sliding door and not easily noticed or seen except for a quick second when the door was being opened. See id at 874, 344 N.E.2d 268, 389. Messa exited the elevator and turned left in the hallway when suddenly the Sullivan’s dog, which was