Metaphysical Necessity Is The Way Things Must Be Within All Possible Worlds

1341 Words Sep 8th, 2015 6 Pages
Place responds with examples where the terms have distinct meaning, and science has identified these terms to have the same denotation.
Dualist like Jackson, Kripke, and Chalmers have continued to argue against Place, Smart, and Lewis. To begin with, early identity theorists make no distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility. Metaphysically contingent cases are ways that the world might have turned out. The way the world might have been acknowledges the notion of possible worlds. A possible world portrays the idea that our world could have been different. The universe might have ended up differently supposing a difference from the actual world. ‘It is possible that…’ is another way to talk about the ‘possible worlds’ idea (Kripke 15). Metaphysical necessity is the way things must be in all possible worlds. Epistemic necessity is precisely what can be certain of given what we know.
Jesse Prinz offers an alternate possibility for situating consciousness. Prinz proposes the A.I.R. Theory of Consciousness. A.I.R is an acronym for attended intermediate level representations. Prinz believes consciousness is sensory in nature. The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is how we perceive changes in sensory receptors. Feeling the taste of vanilla for instance might be something like olfactory receptors stimulated, slight stomach muscles tension, and palate stimulus. These stimuli effect our brain’s gamma vector waves and when we attend to them the effects become…
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