Military Campaign Planning For An Inclusive Iraqi Government

After years, the US must withdrawal troops from Iraq, but leaving behind is a shattered and exhausted country with no longer a war land but peace has not seen. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was not only destroyed the regime, but also destroyed the internal security and order. It has been promoted the rise of the forces of al-Qaeda terrorists and the sparking an outbreak of conflict ethnic conflicts, sectarian. The Bush Administration rested its public case for war against Iraq on two putative threats – Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda. In hindsight, the Bush Administration should have planned much better such as strategy of exiting, released convincing evidences about Iraq’s possession of WMDs, whether Iraq was connected to the 9/11 terrorist attacks or maybe, ultimately stayed out of the

In the years leading up to and during the Iraq War, the United States pursued a neo-conservative agenda that aimed to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s regime, eliminate the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and install a democratic government in Iraq. To do so, U.S. policymakers deployed military forces and diplomatic ambassadors to intervene. This strategy, clearly seen during the early invasion in 2003 and the surge of 2007, produced mixed reactions. Indeed, more than a decade after the U.S. decision to mediate, the question remains: Can intervention actually work?

“If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” These were the first words spoken that would give any inclination towards what was soon to come. In George Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, he referred to the Middle East as an “axis of evil,” a term that would be used for the next ten years, throughout the devastating war with Iraq. Millions of American’s views on Iraq were clouded by the malicious actions of the few nineteen suicide bombers on September 11, 2001, and other preconceptions about the Muslim people. Consequently, today many people think that the U.S.’s involvement in Iraq was successful, removing Hussein’s regime and restoring freedom in Iraq. However, they probably aren’t aware of the massive impacts the war has had on Iraq and less importantly, America. The U.S./Iraq war has had a devastating impact on the social and economic states of Iraq, and has contributed to the U.S. pouring billions of dollars of taxpayer money into the military.

Following defeat in 1991, where US Air Land Battle doctrine and “second offset” technological advantage were demonstrated effectively, Hamdani recommended transforming Iraqi land forces from “heavy mechanised” to “light infantry” with focus on “guerrilla war” to counter US air power dominance. However, Saddam was in denial viewing the “Mother of All Battles” a victory; this was logical to him – he remained in power when his enemy was no longer POTUS and he still had a military with the world’s largest Arab army. He regarded internal (coup, Shia) and regional (Iran, Israel) threats ahead of external (US) threats with “the possibility of … American invasion … nonsense.” Having successfully quelled in March 1991what he perceived as the greatest danger to his regime, an internal uprising, he intended to maintain the military capability proven to ensure “the internal security of the Ba’ath dictatorship” ; viewing change unnecessary. But he was wrong: the US threat was credible and his military was not fit to counter it. Nonetheless there was no transformation. The regime complied with his will, coerced by fear. Saddam’s draconian leadership created a culture of deceit. Most feared for their lives and ‘toed the Ba’ath Party line’ with lying becoming commonplace across government and the military. “The resulting personal and organizational paranoia profoundly affected how Iraq addressed its strategic and military problems.” This negatively affected Iraqi military readiness and planning. To the contrary, Hamdani, viewed as a competent officer with ‘top cover’ from

Information is revised and edited to be accurate. Britannica is a reliable website. Sources used are both primary and secondary. No knowledge needed to read this article. Great place to start. Covers most aspects of the Invasion of iraq and the iraq War in 2003. Written chronologically.

Based on a 2013 CNN report by Hans Blix, a Swedish Diplomat and former Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, “the [Iraq] war aimed to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but there weren't any” (Blix). In addition, Mr. Blix mentions the intent of eliminating the Al-Qaeda terror group in Iraq, “but the terrorist group didn't exist in the country until after the invasion” (Blix). Moreover, Mr. Blix elaborates by also stating how the locals of Iraq may have been against the 2003 invasion of the United States. He elaborates by saying that intent of entering Iraq was to set it up as a “friendly base for U.S. troops capable to act, if needed, against Iran -- but instead [the invasion] gave Iran a new ally in Baghdad” (Blix). Needless to say, this evidence can be used to explain why the initial entrance to Iraq was a bad idea from the start. Ten years later, Stephanie Condon of CBS writes, “Americans are still politically divided over the war, though most say the U.S. should have avoided it” (Condon). In addition, she too elaborates that “there was evidence that year [2004] that the war was not going as planned – such as the lack of weapons of mass destruction” (Condon). With all of that information established it really is no surprise to see why Americans and Iraqis alike were frustrated with the ever-lasting occupation of Iraq, which ultimately ended in 2011. However, with the phasing out of al-Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State in the area, as well as airstrikes being conducted against the latter of the two, controversies are again rising, discussing if the United States should be leading and carrying out these

The first mistake the Western architects of the war made was to invade at all. The decision itself was based on false premises—that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, that the US would be greeted as liberators, and that the war would be swift and successful. Sky characterizes the war as a “modern-day Crusade of ideologues and idealists and the ignorance, arrogance and naivety” (128). The architects of the war—from President George Bush to

In the months leading to March 2003 invasion of Iraq there was significant debate between actors, domestically and internationally, over if and how the US should overthrow Saddam Hussein and his oppressive regime. The two main camps on how to negotiate the issue were realist and liberal views on international policy making. For realists the view was held that decision making should be made in the interests of the nation with or without international consent. Contrary, for liberals the ideology was held that policy decisions should be made based on what will benefit the country while also working through and with international partners. The ideology of the two main groups, realists and liberals, focused on to what extent, if any, the US should seek international approval from the UN Security Council in its endeavors to invade Iraq.

As of present, the state of Iraq is plagued with a myriad of problems, each of which must be taken into consideration when determining the best possible course of action for the United States. First, previous interventions, particularly those conducted by the United States, in Iraq must be considered in order to understand how a particular course of action in the current dilemma might play out. While the United States has played a role in Iraqi coups throughout the 20th century and assisting the Kurdish population in the north, the most decisive interventions began with the Persian Gulf War. The second is the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the third is the American-led intervention in Iraq against ISIS which is ongoing.

Operational Design (OD) provides a useful framework to analyze the United States (US) military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign plan. Using the OD framework, the US OIF campaign plan from 2002 to 2007 was poor at planning and execution. First, this essay evaluates how OIF planners and commanders understood the Operational Environment (OE) and defined the overall problem. Second, this dissertation assesses strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach using end state, supported objectives, Lines of Operation (LOO), center of gravity, anticipation, and effects. Next, this paper gauges how planners and commanders assessed the initial OIF campaign plan and refined their operational approach over time. Lastly, this essay evaluates the degree to which current joint planning policy and doctrine (APEX and JP 5-0) incorporate lessons from OIF.

One project which could have potentially provided crucial insight for how to transition power back to the Iraqis was shut down by Rumsfeld. Titled the Future of Iraq Project, Rumsfeld successfully pushed to shut it down because he had no control over it. When the program was transferred to the DOD, Rumsfeld went as far as excluding former team members from joining the new team because they were not “pentagon people.” Tensions both within and outside the DOD had already established a negative tone with respect to interagency cooperation. Within the military, General Franks and secretary Rumsfeld were in strong disagreement about the number of troops necessary for the invasion of Iraq. Outside the military, Secretary Rumsfeld faced resistance from the CIA and the State department in the immediacy of invading Iraq—the CIA initially resisted linking Saddam with Al Qaeda and Weapons of Mass Destruction (though this would change under heavy pressure) and the State Department had differing views on strategy and treatment of POWs. Despite facing resistance from both within and from outside the DOD, Rumsfeld succeeded in establishing the Defense Department as the lead agency in charge of post-war Iraq. Thus, the military was ill prepared for post-conflict operations not only because it failed to anticipate major

The transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment we face today requires strategic direction and guidance from the President (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to allow the Combatant Commander (CCDR) of the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to employ his Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) across the conflict continuum. In the following paragraphs, the above statement will be supported by the USEUCOM CCDR’s operational approach of developing broad strategic and operational concepts into specific mission tasks to show his TCP is linked to and supports U.S. national interests. To do so, examples of U.S. strategic guidance documents incorporated within the linkage will be presented. Lastly, a current engagement activity that is linked to a U.S. national interest in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (GAAT) will be discussed to express the range of military operations USEUCOM faces.

With the benefit of hindsight, many people consider the invasion of Iraq a failure. After the initial invasion of Iraq, things go worse instead of better within the country. Ultimately both the United States and Iraq payed a heavy cost due to Western intervention, which this paper will later discuss. The purpose of this research paper is to the Iraq invasion which includes the events leading to the invasion, the invasion itself, and the consequences. The purpose of examining the Iraq invasion as a whole is because a proper understanding of the event cannot be achieved without proper context. Actions have consequences, which this paper will explore. Although the invasion of Iraq took place in 2003, the first paragraph will discuss the country

It is substantial to understand that there was a significant difference of opinions among these diverse groups. On the pro-war side were the neocons and the political leadership of the bush administration: VP Cheney, secretary of defense Rumsfeld and his deputy Wolfiwutz .the neocons were convinced that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to U.S and they were optimistic about the ability of the U.S military action to establish a democratic government in Iraq with beneficial consequences for the middle east.at first Bush was against the decision to go to war with Iraq, but after 9/11, bush adopted the neocons vision of how national security policy should deal with the threat. However, The author argues the decision was made to rectify the profound mistake that was made by the first Bush administration. On the other side were the skeptics about the likelihood that war to depose Saddam Hussein would lead to democracy for Iraq as well as those who were dubious about some of the claims the administration made about Saddams’s WMD. The skeptic included many democrats and member’s of George H.W.Bush’s administration and some military leaders in the professional officer corps. The author points out some democrats supported the resolution because of their fear that a negative vote could be used

In August of 2002, the Bush administration’s position about Iraq had changed significantly. Prior to this point, the United States and other western countries had been arming Iraq with weapons of every type. The fact the United States and other countries had been arming Iraq with weapons, shows how little they considered Iraq to be a threat. This quickly changed. A debate on invading Iraq, held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, created