Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.
Conflict brings out the best in us as an organization and no force on earth is as well-oiled and tactically proficient when there is a war to win. But, what about when the conflicts are over and our nation enters a time of peace? Historically, this has been a real challenge. Peace time typically brings a drastic reduction in force, both by intentional reduction in force by our leaders and in voluntary mass-exodus of many of our seasoned war-fighters. The mass reduction in force naturally breeds complacency in the performance of duties and a lack of effectiveness in war-fighting training because there isn’t the element of life and death that is needed to keep us sharp. When this happens, it becomes tough to call ourselves a ‘Profession of Arms’ with a straight face because many of the professionals that have left the service are no longer there to properly develop the next generation of professionals. While there historically hasn’t been a good solution to this problem, the best we can do as professionals is to continually work towards developing ourselves and the United States Armed Forces and attempt to build the best “base” possible for the next generation of Soldiers in the event of another massive reduction in
Consequently, the Obama Administration has silenced defense leader for a long time, so he could keep his Budget Control Act or (BCA). For example “8 years under the Obama Administration, top defense officials were largely silenced and prevented from articulating their concerns about budget cuts and decreased readiness”(Cooper pg1). The Obama Administration neglected top defense officials, which has resulted in “Army has lost more than 205,000 soldiers, or 30 percent of its staff”(Spencer). Nevertheless, this has also resulted in “3 of 58 Army brigade combat teams are considered ready for combat”(Cooper). Conversely, Obama cut down the military so far that America has 150,000-225,000 troops ready in the Army when all of our combat teams should be ready for combat, so that the armed forces can protect America’s interests at home and abroad. Moreover, the Army is not the only who has experienced decreased readiness, for example, there have been budget cuts across the board which have resulted in “The Air Force is the smallest and oldest it has ever been”(Cooper). “80 percent of the United States Marine Corps or (USMC) do not have the minimum number of aircraft they need for training and basic operations”(Cooper). “The Navy’s fleet is the smallest it has been in nearly 100 years”(Cooper). “Maintenance period will increase costs 2.6 times”(Pickup). Accordingly, all parts of the Armed forces have experienced budget cuts
To spend or not to spend, that is the question. America is torn, not sure whether it should increase military spending or if it should considerably slash the budget. Advocates for a higher defense budget claim more spending will lead to a stronger, better trained military, which would in turn help secure our status as the superlative military power of the world. However, supporters of the defense budget cuts argue for a reduction in troop size, which they believe would save the country billions and allow the nation to focus those savings on next generation technology for protection. This argument has raged for decades with no solution in sight. Maybe we have been approaching this problem all wrong. Perhaps, instead of the shortsighted approach of either raise or lower the budget, we try a smarter, more efficient method of spending to ensure every dollar of our annual military budget positively impacts our national defense.
Retention control points are directly linked to the manning needs of the United States Army. Military members that have served for twenty years or more have witnessed the cycles and fluctuations in strength. There are several issues that build or reduce the manning strength in the military. Building or reducing a large military force should be a slow process, but that is usually not the case. When the decision is made to grow the size of the United States Army, it is usually done quickly by offering large enlistment bonuses and re-enlistment bonuses. During the build-up years the standards for joining the military are loosened to include a larger population of potential applicants. When the decision for a smaller military is made,
The quick evolving military environment, needs the US Army redouble its efforts to reduce the uncertainty associated with the downsizing. There are some predominant principles that can guide the Army’s efforts in minimizing the impact of uncertainty during the force reduction. Even with major political and legislative challenges, keeping balance among the different proportions of readiness is a goal of US defense policy. During the budgetary preparation, downsizing of the armed forces often becomes one of the first victims of fiscal reduction. This was true of the years between World War I and World War II, when the Great Depression made military preparedness a very low national priority. The Army’s downsizing effect put its readiness
Renowned historian and classicist scholar Victor Davis Hanson’s January 11, 2012 commentary entitled “Heavy Price of Defense Spending Cuts: Nations That Choose Butter over Guns Atrophy and Die” warrants a thoughtful analysis of its merits and shortcomings by U.S. military officers entrusted with leading this nation’s youth while implementing our national strategy.
“President Obama has, conveniently, rewritten the standard of military strategy to conform to his defense-budget-cutting desires”(Bucci, 1). This quote shows how someone can manipulate the budget to make people think it is going to be for the better, but there are always two sides to a story. The defense budget cuts are causing the military a plethora of stresses because it’s taking away some training programs, benefits from soldiers, and even making America look tenuous.
remember back in May of 2013 when we were all told that the “BIG ARMY” doesn’t know what to do with us, because we were one of two Air Sault Artillery units in the whole military. So like in this article soldiers found themselves again up in the air waiting for further orders to come down the chain. I wound up going to 308th BSB (Brigade Support Battalion) unit the following January. Now I was with them from January through of March 2015. While I was with them it didn’t take long before they too started to shrink. My company shank from a three-platoon size down to a two platoon. Then it shrank even more. This time they halved the remainder of the company and created a special platoon that was attached to brigade as their support. Everyone started to come down on orders to either inner-post transfer, PCS or ETS out. While this happening “BIG ARMY” sent out a letter stating that all fourth brigades nationwide will be disbanded as part of the reduction of force. Meaning that all these units now will have to find a new “home” or disappear. So, with all of this said between this article and my first-hand experiences, my question is whether the incoming president elect will take charge and find way to rectify this or not on an economic stand point.
On August 2, 2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 which cut $487 billion from projected defense spending over the next 10 years.1 The act also established a system of sequestration, which would cut an additional $495 billion from the defense budget.2 Altogether, the BCA would cut almost $1 trillion dollars from the Department of Defense (DoD). The passing of the BCA and the subsequent loss of funding mark an end to a 13-year period of robust budget allocations to support the global war on terrorism. From 2001 to 2013 over $1.6 trillion has been allocated to the DoD to support preparations for and execution of operations in various overseas areas.3 Within this $1.6 trillion, 94% of the funding was allocated to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 This robust amount of funding cultivated a culture within the DoD that there would always be funding available to cover costs at home and abroad. This culture is deeply entrenched within the United States Army due to large budgets provided to the Army over the past 13 years. In today’s environment of shrinking budgets, this culture can no longer stand true and must be changed. Establishing a cost-conscious culture (CCC) within the Army is critical to our ability to sustain the current Army force structure and make the needed modernization investments to ensure our capability to fight and win our nations wars.
The Army should maintain its current level of reliance on contracting support to their ability to deploy quickly, execute missions that the military can’t, and reduce troop levels.
During the mid-to-end of the 1990s, during my career in the US Army, we had a reduction in force (RIF) that was conducted very poorly. The perceived best interests (Washington politics) for the organization and centralized decisions were implemented without regard for the work units spread across the globe. There
This time I decided to try a search using “downsizing of the military” as a starting point. I immediately came across an article in The Washington Times that gave me some insight about issues with having a smaller military and handling a global/world war. The article pointed out that we as a military would have no problem supporting small strike forces, but, if there were to be more than one major global conflict happening at the same time, we as a military would not have the personnel needed to support both conflicts. I knew I could trust where this information was coming from seeing as it was coming from the Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley. If anyone is to know what the capabilities of the Army is presently and will be in the future, it would be him since he oversees all operations in the Army.
The U.S has compared forces with its enemies to determine its strengths and weaknesses, but now with the developing of weapons and the advancement of technology have made the comparison harder. Technologies advances have been included into U.S weapons, platforms and operating concepts and this make it possible and easier than before with just fewer assets. These advances allow some military tasks like seizing, holding and occupying territory. In other hand, this will require the presence of soldiers no matter what and with the presence of smaller forces each soldier will represent an individual power. A war is like a chess game, each piece has its own power and function. Our military forces should be able to protect us in three key areas: capability, capacity and readiness. U.S Army is classified as weak among Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Nuclear (All of them represent U.S military power). Military strength has been reduced and corroded. One example is that the Army has been cut to 490,000 from 566,000 in 2011. Another example is the reduction of the Air Force’s tactical aircraft (26 down from
This paper will discuss pressing future challenges, and how Joint Force 2025 must prepare for them. Based on our current strategic direction and today’s global security environment, discussion will revolve around the general capability requirements for Joint Force 2025 to re-balance the force. It will also explain, by service, the capability requirements while considering the associated advantages and disadvantages of these requirements. This essay also articulates the risks involved in rebalancing Joint Force 2025 within the context of a fiscally constrained budget environment.