Essay on Military Ethics – Humanitarian Aid in Somalia

In the 1980’s and 1990’s violence in Somalia was getting worse as the days went by. This violence allowed warlords from the regions of Somalia and, in turn, go to war with one another. Images of the war showing starving children called for a response from the United States. The United States government sent supplies of food to the needy. However, these warlords got to the food trucks first. This resulted in President George H.W. Bush sending in troops to make sure that the supply lines could reach these desperate people in need of our help. As violence arose in Somalia United States citizens began to question whether or not it was our place to be there.

The deployment of United States Special Forces to Somalia to apprehend General Aidid was in the interest of the United States, if Nuechterlein's outline of national security interest was anything to go by. Somali had gone through difficult times and there was need to restore normalcy in this Horn of Africa's state. Restoring normalcy would have ensured that stability returned. Moreover, this would have ensured that the instability that had been realized here never spilled over into other Eastern Africa states. Had the United States Special Forces succeeded in apprehending General Aidid, a democratically elected government would have been instituted. This government would have prioritized democratic governance principles that conform to United States Army War College's "Favorable World Order category" (Nuechterlein, 1985). Yes, it was difficult to establish Jeffersonian democracy in Somalia bearing in mind that Somalia was a tribal nation; however, it was something worth giving a short. This could only be made possible by chopping off the head of Aidid's organization and ultimately taking Aidid out of the streets. Under the leadership of Aidid, the United Nations lost at least 24 soldiers of Pakistani origin many of whom were skinned (Bowden, 1997).

In 1991 when the dictator Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown after 21 years in power, the UN forces hurriedly left and the country slid into civil war and famine. Full- scale war broke out a year later between the militias of General Mohamad Farah Aidid and his archrival, Ali Mahdi Mohamad and the United Nations watched silently, not even offering humanitarian assistance. The Somalis were angry and felt that the UN had abandoned the country. When some 500 Pakistani Blue Berets finally did come, they were ill-equipped. The Somalis were very suspicious of the UN and two months later they welcomed Operation Rescue because it was an American and no a UN initiative. Two days later, the US Ambassador Robert B. Oakley publicly embraced General Aidid

Somalia is a country that has become synonymous with war. The international community continues to spend billions yearly in the fight to stabilize the country even with the persistence of criminal activity and transnational threat groups. The fall of the Somalian Government in 1991 set the conditions for terrorists, pirates, and criminal gangs to use Somalia as a base of operations. (Reed, Thompson, Kfir, 2015) The increase donor spending is accredited to the recent success of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) against Al Shabaab.

The United States has been challenging on deciding how deep it wants to engage in controversial global peacemaking conflicts and whether or not U.S. troops’ lives should be put in danger for the so-called peacekeeping affairs . Events in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 threw that argument into sharp relief.

President George Bush’s highly publicized U.S. led Operation Restore Hope humanitarian intervention in 1992, turned the world’s attention to the little known country of Somalia, located in the Horn of Africa. News footage showed emaciated men, women and children, ravaged by continued civil war, suffering under warring clan leaders vying for control in a place where food aid was stolen from NGOs and used as a tactical weapon against the starving masses. To understand how Somalia descended into such a state of chaos, but managed to survive through a shadow economy, it is

Several factors led to the development of the conflict: the ongoing famine in Somalia caused a civil war, and the United Nations approved of creating a multinational military task force tasked with stopping the slaughter of innocent civilians. The Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by Mohamed Farrah Aidid caused most of the killing and needed to be stopped. The SNA made significantly hampered the success of foreign aid, demanding a task force to stop SNA operations. The battle for Mogadishu resulted in the capture of Mohamed Aidid’s top planners and advisors. Eventually the regime fell and resulted in the clans fighting each other over resources and

The United States explicitly uses and recognizes the Just War Theory as a guide in order to justify going to war. In the Just War Theory there are a number of rules that are not suppose to be broken when at war: 1. Last Resort 2. Legitimate Authority 3. Just Cause 4. Probability of Success 5. Right Intention 6. Proportionality and 7. Civilian Casualties. When applied to the War in Iraq, three of these rules come under scrutiny due to devastating results of the war and they are just cause, proportionality and civilian casualties.

In this essay’s scope, the Syrian war has been analyzed using the just war theory. The just war theory highlights situations where waging a war can be justifiable and also provides guidelines on how a war should be fought. In as much as the theory recognizes the need to protect innocent human life even when it involves the use of force, the theory puts in place several principles that need to be met to qualify a war as being just. As for the Syrian situation, the bone of contention is whether the proposed US military intervention is justifiable or not. Those who are for a US military intervention observe that the enormity of the massacre in Syria justifies an external intervention. They point out that an intervention would protect further loss of innocent human life. Those against such a move point out some guidelines that have not been met to merit such an intervention as a just

Often the sentiment in a state is that the first responsibility of your state is to your state. In particular, armed humanitarian intervention would put the lives of a state’s soldiers in danger for another state, which may not even be consenting to the action. Further, the use of violent force for the goal of preserving human right, peace, and stability can be seen as paradoxical. This paradox can be seen in many conflicts which claim to be waging war for the long term goal of peace. There are additional concerns in the “jus post bellum” for armed humanitarian intervention. The intervening country may set up a government that is not representative of the people, using it as an opportunity to exert control over another country rather than protect human rights. Additional critics of the right for humanitarian intervention express realist ideas that ethics is not important in international affairs, or rather against improper use of morality in foreign affairs. A major explanation given by the international community against humanitarian action is the emphasis on maintaining sovereignty. This explanation is especially problematic since human rights should be more valued than upholding the norm of sovereignty, when all other ethical guidelines for intervention

Justice demands adherence to the six jus ad bellum principles for a war to be deemed just; the principle of just cause; right intent; proper authority and public declaration; last resort; probability of success and proportionality. It is universally accepted that self defence from an external aggressor is a just cause for hostilities. It is widely accepted that defence of others from an external aggressor is just, for example, the collective security provisions in NATO alliance. However, our subject of analysis is the most contentious. Just War theorists significantly diverge on the legitimacy of the defence of innocents from internal aggressors, or humanitarian interventions. However, many Just War theorists also believe that ethnic, cultural, religious, and political minorities are owed protection. I maintain that NATO fulfils the just cause for the use of force because the FRY’s forces intended to exterminate Kosovo Albanians. The NATO intervention must not only be just, but also have the right intent. For example, the American intervention in Cuba had a just cause, however, the US administration had dubious intentions. The justice of intent is difficult to assess due to epistemic limitations, or lack of accessibility to the truth. Moreover, it is worthy to ask whether states ever

In “International Troops Occupy Somalia”, it highlights an improvement in the political environment: “On January 15, 1993 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, warlords from rural regions signed a cease-fire to stabilize the political situation” (Great Events, 1999). The United Task Force did not produce results that would lead to permanent change. The humanitarian mission in Somalia entered a second phase because the United Nations desired different results. The article “International Troops Occupy Somalia” explains the change of the scope of the mission: “The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II was the first operation in which the United Nations asserted the right to intervene in a country's internal affairs in order to protect the lives of that country's citizens…which authorized a sweeping nation-building program, it went far beyond the initial humanitarian aims of the UNITAF mission” (Great Events, 1999). It explains how overtime the mission changed but also highlights how ambitious the policy and plan the United Nations

are “legitimate,” to use the familiar term. Without this assumption that intervening states are “legitimate,” (and, hence, represent no serious danger to their own subjects), the debate surrounding humanitarian intervention would be considerably altered. If, instead, all states were conceived to pose an extremely dangerous threat to their own subjects, (an argument I intend to make below), it seems unlikely that philosophers would so readily endorse the moral permissibility of state humanitarian

In this essay, my arguments are not entirely against the use of military force rather how the force actually is applied. Based on numbers of issues where international community has failed to address genuine humanitarian crisis and how some states have manipulated the norm and used other tools to promote and justify their interest related interventions defying the law and limiting UN as just an institution without any significant power.

involvement in Somalia was the product of a growing humanitarian crisis in this warring state in the 1990s. Somalia achieved its independence in 1960, and in 1969 the Somali army launched a coup that established a dictatorship under Mohamed Siad Barre (Dept of State). Barre’s dictatorship favored members of his own clan through a process where he made “parochial selections” from his Marehan clan to fill most high-level government and military posts; this “clan-based policy” reinforced inter-clan differences and rivalries, and soon Somalis in less-favored clans began to oppose Barre’s rule (Rutherford 5). In 1990, Barre’s opposition unified against him, and after joining forces, the combined group of rebels drove Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991 (Dept of State). No central government reemerged to take the place of the overthrown government: warlords, clan elders, and former government officials “jockeyed to preserve or increase their authority” and could not figure out what type of government they wanted or who would be its leaders (Rutherford 15). A humanitarian crisis of began to unfold as most of the country descended into a state of lawlessness, where “heartless warlords and hopped-up teenage gangs reigned over helpless innocents” (Crocker 4). In addition, the vulnerability of the Somalia people was intensified further by a severe drought, which resulted in a catastrophic famine that left thousands dead or malnutritioned (Dept of State). This state of chaos laid the groundwork for subsequent U.S. aid and military