Military Operations: The Battle Of Mogadishu

Six raids were conducted during the interval prior using similar tactics and patterns of maneuver. Minimal changes were made to the plan of operations from raid to raid. One of the drawbacks to performing several very similar operations was that Aideed’s forces used the intelligence collected during these raids to better prepare for a fight with the Ranger element. With each progressive raids, Aideed’s forces had identified the use of low circling helicopters and the lack of armored vehicles as the weaknesses of Joint Task Force Ranger. It became clear the week prior to the Battle of Mogadishu that Somalis were capable of shooting down helicopters with RPGS. MG Garrison added rockets to Blackhawks for added firepower. However, he but did not postpone operations while armor or heavier gunships were requested. He also failed to modify raid plans to keep helicopters out of the firing range of

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The United States of America, one of the most powerful nations in the world at the time, was completely unprepared for the war that it had joined in Vietnam. The terrain was unlike any we had ever fought in. From mountains to jungles to rice paddies, it was wet, hot, cold, and completely unforgiving. To say that the political situation was tenuous would be a drastic understatement. Not only could officials not make up their minds, neither could the general populace. The media had an influence in this war that was heretofore unseen. All of these factors were a great obstacle in and of themselves and then we put into play the greatest obstacle of all: the enemy. This was an enemy like we had never seen. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong (VC) were fast, agile, adaptable, and extremely unpredictable. The VC hid among the common populace and fought like demons. The NVA were well supplied, well organized, and did not restrict themselves the way many large armies do. This forced us to have to rapidly adapt and develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in order to counter all of these obstacles. Due to these needs and the rapidly advancing technology and versatility of helicopters, the Air Cavalry was born. The Air Cav was composed of several types of airframes including transport aircraft, attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft. The reconnaissance aircraft were also known as Aeroscouts and were known for their boldness, audacity,

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

For example, because the US refused to believe that Stalin was holding to the agreements at Yalta (Larson, 151), Truman missed a key opportunity to befriend the great power and continue with Roosevelt's Grand Design. In the case of September 11, cognitive dissonance resulted in intelligence failure. There were several warnings within the US intelligence system, but the government ignored them because the new information did not fit the old paradigm of terrorism, and because the government discredited the warnings, the greatest tragedy on US soil ever occurred.

Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre-registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non-unified command, the reverse effect holds true.

The use of Irregular Warfare has been ongoing for years around the world. Irregular warfare is described as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. I will discuss where the U.S. may apply military force in conjunction with other means of national power to stabilize the nation of Somalia. I will also discuss why it would be considered as an Irregular Warfare environment.

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

In one of the most famous cases of questionable doubt, and questionable information, Civil War General George McClellan refrained from chasing and attacking the vulnerable Confederate army as he was doubtful of his army’s abilities. This doubt was not born out of McClellan’s own observations, which would clearly show his army’s superior training and size, but instead on trusting the man in charge of “intelligence reports” who overestimated the size of the enemy by a factor of 2 or more. This doubt led to a major setback for the Union Army as the weak Confederate army was able to regroup and reset. In a similar way, a former Union General, George Custer, famous for his overconfidence, used outdated intelligence reports that instead underestimated the size of his enemy. Custer’s certainty that he would be victorious led to disaster as he led his soldier into an ambush where the enemy’s size ended up being much higher than anticipated. Even though one leader was doubtful and the other was certain, both failed tremendously at their task, showing that certainty and doubt are in fact not very different at all. Certitude is a spectrum that includes both complete certainty and complete doubt, and no level of certitude is always better than another. Instead, the decision of certainty or doubt should be reached through a careful

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

According to this now-infamous study, Saddam had "so overextended his capital in the war with Iran that he was not in a position to undertake any significant hostile action for, at the very least, three years"�. The CIA grossly underestimated Saddam's penchant for military expansionism. Critics of the quality of US intelligence abound. Freedman and Efraim have concluded that "Operation Desert Storm was a low point for Marine Corps intelligence. It revealed an antiquated architecture that was unresponsive to the needs of the United States Army"� while Seliktar writes of an "unprepared organization" and of "considerable in-theatre limitations and restrictions."� Arguably, the military success camouflaged these intelligence failings. Surprisingly, these intelligence failures during the Gulf War were carried over into the Iraq War.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

With intelligence gathered by the Defense Military Intelligence department “in May 1970 based on imagery” (Amidon, 2005) Operation Ivory Coast was conceived. The imagery showed strong potential for American prisoners of war held in North Vietnam near Hanoi. The mission was to raid a prisoner of war camp near the Son Tay Citadel and rescue approximately 70 personnel held captive by the North Vietnamese deep in North Vietnamese territory. A mission at this scale will be the first of its kind. The mission was to include crash landing a HH-3H into the main compound holding prisoners of war. The mission was

This case study is on the battle of Mogadishu. This battle took place on October 3rd and 4th of 1993 in the country of Somalia which is located in Africa. This battle changed the foreign policy of the United States. The battle cost the Americans 18 lives, and 77 wounded. Estimates are that it cost the Somalis about 500 lives and wounded 1000.1 This battle was fought with some of Americas most highly trained and lethal warriors. The main effort of the battle was led by Rangers from the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Operations Forces Detachment- Delta. It started out as a peace keeping mission and escalated into a mission to capture a Somali warlord. It ultimately ended up being a mission

The 2nd Battle of Fallujah was fought during OIF 2 (Operation Iraqi Freedom). Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 began at about March-April 2004 and lasted until February-March 2005. The 2nd Battle of Fallujah began 7 November 2004 and ended 23 December 2004. The objective of the operation was to capture or kill those responsible for murders and, corrupt activities, and end the rise of the insurgency in the city. The intent of the operation was to restore control of the city to the Coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council. Some of the events that led to the 2nd Battle of Fallujah were the U.S. forces being unsuccessful during Operation Vigilant Resolve (the 1st Battle of Fallujah) to capture the city and the Fallujah Brigade failing to maintain control of the city.