Irregular Warfare Essay

Theoretically, it holds that the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan as a self-defense strategy following the 9/11 attacks. Practically, however, as US foreign policy is about conquest, self-protection and resource-extraction, it seeks strategic dominance of geographical space to sustain its global relevance. The rationality of the US suggests the need to continuously accumulate capital, resources and military proficiency to ensure autonomy. Therefore, a pragmatic reading into the motivation behind the invasion of Afghanistan negates the self-defense theory. Rather, the shifting coordinates of power within central and southern Asia crafted the perfect criteria for US intervention. This work explores the motivations and systemic cover-ups designed by the Bush administration in ordering military troops into Afghanistan in 2001. It will hold that this invasion was not just a War on Terror, but rather a tactic to ensure US prevalence within the region, and henceforth, the rest of the world. Thus, why did the US invade Afghanistan?

Joes, A. J. (1996). Guerilla Warfare: A Historical, biographical, and bibliographical sourcebook. [ebrary]. Retrieved from http/:www.ebrary.com

2. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) counterbalances the Defense Departments tendency to focus on winning conventional conflicts rather than irregular wars by empowering those small nations to improve the security of their countries to prevent conflicts from happening. The NDS focuses on the different irregular warfare tactics that can be used by our enemies in the strategic environment. It gives us guidance on what we need to do to prevent the use of these irregular warfare tactics. It was not until the last decade that the U.S. military started fighting the irregular wars; our Special Forces units were the ones that were fighting the unconventional wars. The U.S. military has had a difficult time changing its focus on fighting conventional wars to fighting irregular wars. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. military became very experienced in guerrilla warfare tactics. However, when that war ended the focus shifted back to fighting the conventional wars and that experience was lost. Now, because of the lack of experience, the U.S. military is having a difficult time fighting the unconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The United States has not stopped winning wars; it has struggled to win counter insurgencies. This is a more accurate statement than the argument made by Tierney. In the 20th Century, the United States was very successful fighting conventional and small-scale wars. Tension among global powers presents the possibility that the United States might have to engage, or intervene, in an interstate war in the 21st Century. Additionally, the experience gained in Iraq and Afghanistan has produced changes to national policy and military strategy that will increase the probability of success against non-state actors, insurgents, and terrorist groups. It is impossible to predict the outcome of future conflicts, but the era of the United States

The Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) quarterly report for January is a bleak read. At close to 30%, not only do the Taliban hold more Afghan territory than any time after the 2001 invasion, but "The insurgency is spreading (Afghan forces) thin, threatening rural districts in one area while carrying out ambitious attacks in more populated centers." The Taliban trifecta of high-stakes attacks in late 2015 adds weight to SIGAR’s assessment. Moreover, even before militants briefly overran Kunduz, Kandahar airport and besieged Sangin district, UN figures revealed a 19% increase in “security incidents” between August and October.

In the book, the author makes it clear that executing counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is a difficult task for Special Forces operators. She explains that the commanding officers knew these operations would be a challenging feat. For instance, the author details Major General Scott Miller’s efforts to expand the Afghan Local Police initiative to the rural areas of Afghanistan. Major General Miller felt that the same approach that was taken in the cities would not work in the rural areas. In other words, the “Afghan local policemen by themselves were not sufficient to bring peace to rural Afghanistan, and the country had to be stabilized from the village up” (Robinson 2013, 26). In this instance, the book demonstrates the Generals knowledge and awareness of the situation in the region. That is to say, “the only capacities for dispute resolution and law enforcement in much of the country consist of village or tribal councils and mullahs who administer a crude interpretation of Sharia” (Rubin 2007, 76). Both the author and the general realized the importance villages have in securing peace in Afghanistan.

United States (U.S.) doctrine focuses its COIN methods on the ability to assist a host nation in building political legitimacy and creditability. Establishing political legitimacy is the foundation of COIN strategy enabling governments to create rapport with local leaders and gain the support of its communities while simultaneously eliminating an insurgency. Doctrine is subjective rather than prescriptive; however, failure to adhere to fundamental principles causes a good deal of contradiction on how to accomplish specific goals. Evidence provided in the COIN campaigns conducted in both Vietnam and Afghanistan showed flawed implementation of basic U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. That doctrine includes the ability to establish a valid political strategy, securing the populace all with a host nation in the lead effort. While these two wars have many differences, they are similar in ways. Specifically, how the U.S. failed to follow basic practices of COIN, and how leveraging lessons learned are paramount to U.S. strategic initiatives.

The modern nation of Afghanistan, as we come to know it today emerged during the eighteenth century. Pashtun tribes in response to the depletion of the Indian and Persian empires within their lands began to band together to form its very own nation, the nation of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan has been a strategic prize for foreign empires for more than two hundred years. The British, Russians the United States have all fought across its inhospitable terrain, in conflicts variously ruthless, misguided, and bloody. This violent history is littered with broken promises and underestimations” (Loyn 1). Many other nations have tried to conquer this rugged region of the world. All of which involved great nations far more superior in weapons and technology than Afghanistan.

This paper will be explaining the similarities, and differences, between the Vietnam War and the War in Afghanistan. There are many topics that bring these two wars together. However, I am only going to be talking about public support, policy objectives, military strategy, weapons, fighting spirit, links to home, and death totals. These topics have a lot of information about them, but there is too much to write about every little detail, so I will cover the broad overview of them. Each paragraph will be about one of the topics. There will also be a discussion about insurgencies and counter insurgency operations. These are two big topics in Vietnam and Afghanistan since almost all of the enemy in both wars were, and are, comprised of insurgents and different types of militia groups.

This ignorance was revealed in the way the United States fought the Iraq War, a classic example of an insurgency requiring a counterinsurgency, until 2007: by completely contravening basic principles of successful counterinsurgencies codified by 20th military

As wars have progressed throughout time, so have their complexities. Throughout history, wars and similar conflicts around the world began with limited goals and objectives; as a result, this leads to civil unrest and insurgencies. The Soviet-Afghanistan War provided numerous examples of an ineffective counterinsurgency strategy. As the Soviet Army tactically transitioned through the war, their reliance on military power, to try to stop an insurgency led them engage with a scorched earth approach. This method was successful in effect to achieve their military goals, however, failed to address their social and political goals. The lack of implementing security, economic, and political practices into the overall strategy provided disastrous

Military strategists believe the most formidable foe is one that evolves on the battlefield. While pundits have pronounced the Taliban dead many times since the 2001 US invasion, the latter continue to defy logic by ratcheting up anti-state attacks every year. Indeed, for a movement supposedly on its last legs and beset with factional infighting, the Taliban display remarkable vitality and purpose.

It’s the longest war our nation has ever been involved in. Thousands upon thousands of troops have died in it. The war in Afghanistan has been going on for fifteen years and it all started on a day no one can forget; September 11th, 2001 is a day of tragedy and loss created by Al Qaeda terrorist. Al Qaeda is “an international terrorist group existed which was dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments with force and violence.” (Al Qaeda Background) At the time of September 11th President George Bush took action toward this catastrophe by sending U.S. Troops to invade Afghanistan on October 23rd in retaliation. The mission was to eradicate Al Qaeda and the President wanted to know who the leader was behind this mass destruction. Al Qaeda is the main reason for the war in Afghanistan occurring today but their numbers are slowing diminishing. Now the troops are there defending from small Afghan rebel groups instead of searching for them. Many U.S. Troops have been pulled out of Afghanistan over the past couple of years by President Obama. Some Americans believe that these troops shouldn’t be pulled out of Afghanistan because what’s left of Al Qaeda can regroup again and increase their deadly forces. Al Qaeda is one group but there are several more groups such as the Taliban and Isis that have formed. Others believe that we have been in Afghanistan longer than necessary and we should all the troops back

An insurgency is defined by the United States government as ‘the organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region’. Insurgencies have been present throughout history as a form of warfare, however combatting an insurgency has always been difficult even in the modern era. In recent operations in Afghanistan, religious extremism and ethnic intolerance have given rise to fanatical groups that pose complex challenges which threaten social and political stability. These group utilise all available means in order to gain an advantage as they struggle for “the acceptance by the people of the state or region of the legitimacy of one side’s claim to power”. Results of this include the exploitation of the Laws of Armed Combat (LOAC) and the rules of engagement (ROE) used by COIN forces.

Throughout the 1990s, many armed groups have relied on revenues from natural resources such as oil, timber, or gems to substitute for dwindling Cold War sponsorship. Resources not only financed, but in some cases motivated conflicts, and shaped strategies of power based on the commercialization of armed conflict and the territoriality of sovereignty around valuable resource areas and trading networks. As such, armed conflict in the post-Cold War period is increasingly characterized by a specific political ecology closely linked to the geography and political economy of natural resources. This paper examines theories of relationships between