Minds, Brains, and Science by John R. Searle

In school, at the stores, anywhere, there are two types of people that can be encountered. What makes these two types of people different is their mindsets. One type has the mindset of a pessimist; they think they cannot do certain tasks and are afraid of looking stupid. The other type has the mindset of an optimist; they always try new things and are not scared to do so. In the article “Brainology” by Carol S. Dweck, she states that there are two different mindsets that people can possess, either a fixed mindset (pessimist) or a growth mindset (optimist); these mindsets are developed at a young age and will influence a person’s choices and opportunities.

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

The mind is a complex myriad of thoughts and psychological systems that even philosophers today cannot entirely grapple. It is composed of the senses, feelings, perceptions, and a whole series of other components. However, the mind is often believed to be similar or even the same as the brain. This gives rise to the mind-brain identity theory, and whether there exists a clear distinction between the physical world and the non-material mind. In this paper, I will delineate the similarities and differences between mind and brain, describe the relevant ideas such as functionalism and materialism, and provide explanations on how these theories crystallized. Further, I will discuss the differing views of this concept from multiple philosophers’ perspectives and highlight the significance of each. Ultimately, I will defend the view that the mind-brain identity theory is false by analyzing its errors and examining the invalid assumptions it makes about consciousness.

Is Martha right in her idea that the robot cannot think, which is why it could never be a duplication of a human, such as Ash? This paper shall attempt to demonstrate the validity of artificial intelligence’s inability to be thinking, conscious entities via Black Mirror’s “Be Right Back” episode by supporting it with Descartes’ Dualism theory.

If the machine is in S2, and sees a “1”, it says Even and returns to S1. The purpose of this example Block provided us is to give us a direct insight to how a functionalist theory works. The nature of a mental state in a human mind is equivalent to the nature of a machines state; therefore it can demonstrate the relations to other states and to inputs and outputs.

Ned Block, in his article “Trouble with Functionalism”, creates a thought experiment to serves as a counterexample to functionalism. Functionalism states that the mind and its mental states are only comprised of the functional role they serve, and not of the physical medium it occurs in. Block’s thought experiment, while intriguing, is ultimately a flawed comparison that wrongly applies human-centric prejudice to the definition of a mental state, and thus, cannot be applied to our mental life.

Curiosity is implanted in the human mind as it is an element of human nature. The thirst for answers and explanations drive the human mind to reason and deliberate in order to discover an understanding of life itself. It emanates inherently within the brain to solve a puzzle and in return, feel a sense of peace. Philosophers and scientists dedicate their entire lives to solve mysterious questions of the unknown. Throughout the development of distinctive theories, they build on each other to solidify concepts and bear them adjacent to the truth. Bernard Le Bovier De Fontenelle was a French writer and philosopher who made tremendous contributions to theories of the universe during the mid to late 1600th era. In 1686, he published his findings in the distinctive narrative Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds. His notions were radical in an age were the majority followed an Aristotelian Christian worldview. Radical beliefs were punishable as seen in the history of the many profound scientists that underwent penalty. To avoid such consequences, Fontenelle was clever to present his findings in a different method. He based his work on the Copernicus heliocentric theory of the universe, as well as the theories of Descartes, Tycho, Kepler, and Galileo. Fontenelle wrote a science-fiction novel concerning the conversation between a philosopher, also referred to as a scientist, and a beautiful inquisitive woman named Marquise. This prevented him from being punished as it was not a

Carol dweck's article brainology speaks about christopher situation and aspects regarding his fixed and growth mindset. By providing example from the text and carol dweck's article, this essay will further support his growth or fixed mindset, and thoroughly analyze the article itself.

Functionalism, one of the most influential and widespread theories of mind of our day, proposes a model of human behaviour based on the way certain inputs are processed when the mind is in a given state, to yield certain outputs. This theory concerns itself only what mental states do, rather than the substance with which they are made, or whether they exist at all; this is called ‘multiple realizability’. In other words, the theory is ontologically modest, or flexible, and this enables functionalism to stay compatible with Cartesian dualism or monisms like materialism, an advantage when other theories lose followers due to their ontological preconceptions. The other notable strength functionalism claims is that it avoids some of the pitfalls of its counterpart theory, behaviourism. However each of these apparent strengths has flaws, both in and of themselves and in comparison to other theories of mind. These strengths and their flaws will be assessed in this essay, but allow me first to outline what the functionalist theory of mind proposes.

John Searle formulated the Chinese Room Argument in the early 80’s as an attempt to prove that computers are not cognitive operating systems. In short though the immergence of artificial and computational systems has rapidly increased the infinite possibility of knowledge, Searle uses the Chinese room argument to shown that computers are not cognitively independent.

I read the article called “Secrets of the Brain” by Carl Zimmer from the February 2014 issue of National Geographic. Zimmer told of a story of a 43 year old woman named Cathy Hutchinson suffered a massive stroke which caused her to lose movement ability, becoming completely paralyzed, and lost her ability to speak. Her doctors didn’t know if she was brain-dead or still mentally there, until one day Hutchinson’s sister asked Hutchinson if she could hear and understand her and Hutchinson looked up with her eyes to answer yes and to let her sister know that she was still there and could understand her.

The Representational Theory of Mind proposes that we, as both physiological and mental beings, are systems which operate based on symbols and interpretations of the meanings of such symbols rather than beings which operate just on physiological processes (chemical reactions and biological processes). It offers that humans and their Minds are computing machines, mental software (the Mind) which runs on physical hardware (the body). It suggests, too, that we are computing machines functioning as something other than a computing machine, just as every other machine does.

* Developments in computer science would lead to parallels being drawn between human thought and the computational functionality of computers, opening entirely new areas of psychological thought. Allen Newell and Herbert Simon spent years developing the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) and later worked with cognitive psychologists regarding the implications of AI. The effective result was more of a framework conceptualization of mental functions with

In his paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing sets out to answer the question of whether machines can think in the same humans can by conceptualizing the question in concrete terms. In simple terms, Turing redefines the question by posing whether a machine can replicate the cognition of a human being. Yet, some may object to the notion that Turing’s new question effectively captures the nature of machines’ capacity for thought or consciousness, such as John Searle. In his Chinese room thought experiment, Searle outlines a scenario that implies machines’ apparent replication of human cognition does not yield conscious understanding. While Searle’s Chinese thought experiment demonstrates how a Turing test is not sufficient to establish that a machine can possess consciousness or thought, this argument does not prove that machines are absolutely incapable of consciousness or thought. Rather, given the ongoing uncertainty of the debate regarding the intelligence of machines, there can be no means to confirm or disconfirm the conscious experience of machines as well as the consciousness of humans by extension of that principle.

Substantial studying has been made on the subject and Turing’s overly optimistic point of view, yet, we experience difficulty when trying to combine idea of advancement in technology and what makes us humans: the capability of thinking. Conventionally, we have firmly grasp to the idea that the act of thinking is the official stamp of authenticity which differentiate humans from the rest of beings, and so while trying to decide if a computer can think or not, we are closely scrutinizing the foundation of our nature as beings to its core. But before we dive into the subject matter of why I disagree with Turing, we must inquire about what exactly is thinking. Some have tried to define thinking as having conscious thoughts; but thinking and consciousness are not terminologies that are mutually exchangeable. While thinking is a state of consciousness, consciousness is not thinking. Even as we process information necessary for reasoning, much of our brain activity and processing takes