MRAP Program Essay

Concepts lead change for the Army and drive the development and integration of future capabilities. More specifically, they provide a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. In addition, concepts serve as a foundation to help the Army maximize effectiveness and minimize risk through both materiel and nonmaterial capabilities. The role of concepts is to describe how future forces will operate. Concepts assists in the identification of prioritized capability gaps and integrated Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P).

Forensic psychology has made unique contributions to risk assessment with respect to the potential for violence and dangerousness, the accuracy of eye witness testimony, the dimensions and assessment of legal competency

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

2. Summary: ADP 6-0 is broken down into three major sections. These sections are; the guiding principles, the Art of Command, and the Mission Command Warfighting Function. This paper will place emphasis on the guiding principles and the Art of Command portions of the manual as they provide the baseline for conceptual implementation. Additionally, as a Group Support Battalion (GSB), the Mission Command Warfighting Function predominantly lies within the responsibility of line Battalion commanders. Within the GSB, our primary mission is to provide augmentees and unique enablers to commander’s to further enable them to meet mission success.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States

Our nation’s military continuously evolves to ensure success in future operations. This change is only be possible if our top leaders work in concert towards a common goal. The purpose of this document is to highlight how General Stanley McChrystal changed the manner in which the U.S. Military operates and communicates in an ever-changing environment.

In order to gain a thorough understanding of Operation Eagle Claw, it is imperative to account for the historical context which governed the military at the time. Induced by public opinion and the economic state of the United States proceeding the Vietnam War, dramatic reductions in appropriations and personnel plagued the Department of Defense. Consequently, in the midst of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the United States military was labeled as a “hollow force;” the cuts made to federal defense spending compromised the capabilities of most components of the military including the Special Operation Force, which proved to be critical to the rescue mission. Considering the unsatisfactory state of readiness, the disastrous conclusion of Operation Eagle Claw was inevitable. However, despite its tactical shortcomings, the operation has left a reclusive legacy as a constructive failure that catalyzed improvements to future implementations of Joint Task Forces in special operations.

The threat environment has expanded from a strategic, nuclear, symmetrical threat from bombers, ICBMs, and air-or-sea-launched cruise missiles, to a continuing symmetrical threat in addition to an emergent asymmetric threat, focused across all domains, borders and agencies. Accordingly, our political leaders recognized a need to transform the military for a new ‘home game’. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established to assume responsibility for the defence of the US homeland, and this new Command was tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities (MACA).

Purpose: To provide 554th Engineer Battallion with direction and guidance to assist in executing The Total Army Sponsorship Program and its priciples of service, support, functions and standards.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

I showed up relatively late to the war, or so I thought at the time. My first deployment was in the midst of the chaotic surge of 2006. When I arrived in Iraq, I found faith in my training and hoped that my fellow comrades’ experiences would fine-tune my skills. Since that time, I have learned numerous things about our Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). To my surprise, the poor decisions I learned about while reading the book Roberts Ridge, have influenced the

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)