The first clue that the physiological goal of civil defense was working in 1964, was the fact that many of the articles dealt only with the physical construction, installation, and maintenance of the Minuteman Nuclear Missiles. Thirty-one of the of the sixty-five articles published dealt with the building and maintaining of the missile wing. The fact that a great deal of the articles again demonstrated civil defense had successfully created an environment in which nuclear weapons could be installed, and people would not protest with fear. It must also be noted that the Herald did not hide either the potential dangers of nuclear weapons nor the protest of nuclear weapons occurring in other parts of the world at the time. On May 13th, the
The artifact that I choose was the Cuban missile, and the reason I choose the missile was because that was used as a main defense, and attack weapon in the cold war. Soviet Union during the Cold War whichwas the moment between two strong powers that came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was different in many ways, as well as direct and secret communications and misunderstanding between the two sides. There are serval types of missile but of them is called a Ballistic Missile According Office of Historian The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred from October 15th through October 28th, 1962, and it was a direct attack and dangerous battle between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the Cold War. According to Engineering and Technology
They incorporate petitions to the president focusing on worries of the welfare of the country if the bomb was to be utilized. The premise of using the bomb indicated different nations how capable the United States was. There was a discussion of the decimation of the Japanese urban communities and how the United States ought not to depend on the utilization of the nuclear bomb. The auxiliary sources are glancing back at archives and endeavoring to choose what was the proper activity. Experiencing the essential source archives, it encourages you to comprehend the perspective and battles of those included at the
The months before the end of the war, presented America with an opportunity to employ a deadly nuclear weapon, unbeknown to the rest of humanity. And whilst it was evidently crucial for America to expose their military strength through utilising the atomic bomb, the affects were far more detrimental to the Japanese than ethically permissible.
In 1942, the United States government bought an estimated sixty-thousand acres of rural farm land in eastern Tennessee (Residents). The acquisition of this land was cloaked with secrecy and its’ purpose would be unknown until the end of World War Two. The “Secret City”, now known as Oak Ridge, Tennessee, housed massive nuclear facilities that refined and developed the materials that were necessary to create the atomic bomb. The entire city was protected by armed guards and was completely fenced in (Taylor). The protection of the city and its purpose was so important to national security that its’ location was not disclosed on any map of that time. All of the workers were screened prior to being allowed into the city and many of them were subjected to lie detector tests. Even then the majority of the people who were employed in the facilities were completely unaware of what exactly they were working on (Taylor).
The response of the panel to which the concern was sent was that the use of the bomb would be “an obvious means of saving American lives and shortening the war.” While these scientists did not agree on the issue of its use, all believed it was necessary to control this new technology through international cooperation.
By September, 1944, before Roosevelt’s death, the threat of a nuclear arms race and possible retaliation for the use of this weapon is already a point of concern. The Office of Scientific Research and Development’s memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Stimson outlines some of the dangers the United States and Great Britain face in continuing the secret development of this “art”. Realizing this technology in the hands of the Soviet Union or other countries, especially defeated enemies, would make highly populated cities especially vulnerable. They also concluded that there was a high possibility of a “major power, or former major power undertaking this development.” The threat of the Soviet Union or Germany developing this weapon was a
After World War II, America continued to increase their defense to avoid more losses like the Pearl Harbor incident that killed 2,300 Americans and destroyed ships and aircraft. Furthermore, the Cold War raised the demand to increase the American defense system. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme commander of the Allied Forces during WWII and two-term President, was concerned about the sudden growth and cost of the American defense system. During his “Farewell Address,” Eisenhower addressed his concerns about keeping the peace, the creation of numerous weapons for the national defense, and how scientific and technologic development becomes a powerful and unregulated tool.
Although atomic bombs may be seen as a “ruthless annihilation of cities” (Leo Szilard, p. 5), they are also an effective means of war. The use of atomic bombs in war have both position and negative consequences however; Leo Szilard’s “A Petition to the President of the United States” is a successfully articulated article on why he felt atomic bombs should not be used against Japan. Leo Szilard effectively uses pathos and logos to support his position on atomic bombs to the President. He also successfully offers countermeasures that reinforce the negativity surrounding the use of these bombs. While people may disagree with Leo Szilard’s position, his use of pathos and logos makes it a successful article.
The nature of the Atomic Bomb created a global and theoretical set of stakeholders that few other ethical dilemmas reach. In many ways this use of nuclear technology created the Cold War and the global fear of a nuclear Armageddon. At that time every citizen of the globe feared how the use of nuclear weapons would harm them and their world. The future is also a stakeholder in this conversation. The effects of nuclear fallout were not well understood at the time. Nuclear aftermath could last for decades and even longer, effecting the health and livelihood of all living things for generations to come. The information that could be collected and research opportunities created after a nuclear weapon detonation would be studied for centuries and will change medicine and research forever. Future citizens and scientists were also stakeholders in this decision.
The first use of nuclear weaponry in warfare occurred on the morning of August 6, 1945 when the United States dropped the atomic bomb known as “Little Boy” on Hiroshima, Japan. The result was devastating, demonstrating the true power of nuclear warfare. Since the incident, the world has been left fearing the possible calamity of another nuclear war. Joseph Siracusa’s Nuclear Weapons: A Very Short Introduction explains aspects of nuclear weaponry from simply what a nuclear weapon is, to the growing fear from nuclear warfare advancements in an age of terrorism. The book furthered my education on nuclear weapons and the effect they place on society, physically and mentally.
Though people questioned why acts of war were committed, they found justification in rationalizing that it served the greater good. As time evolved, the world began to evolve in its thinking and view of the atomic bomb and war. In Hiroshima, John Hersey has a conversation with a survivor of the atomic bomb about the general nature of war. “She had firsthand knowledge of the cruelty of the atomic bomb, but she felt that more notice should be given to the causes than to the instruments of total war.” (Hersey, 122). In John Hersey’s book, many concepts are discussed. The most important concept for the reader to identify was how society viewed the use of the bomb. Many people, including survivors, have chosen to look past the bomb itself, into the deeper issues the bomb represents. The same should apply to us. Since WWII, we have set up many restrictions, protocols and preventions in the hope that we could spare our society from total nuclear war. The world has benefited in our perspective of the bomb because we learned, understand, and fear the use of atomic weapons.
I think the final reason I found this essay so compelling was its relevance in today’s world. The topic of nuclear war is as prominent as ever in our society, yet to any of us who weren’t alive during the second world war to see the only instances of this weapon ever used, it seems so foreign. And to see such a passionate, rational, and objective view
The necessity of the atomic bombs have long been debated in America. Although they did contribute to stopping the war, Americans still wonder if murdering Japanese civilians was a necessary means to an end, or if it could have been avoided. Some people believe that the war would have ended without using the bombs. Others believe they were the sole purpose that the war finally ended. Many people were involved with bringing the bombs to fruition, such as the scientists, the government and military leaders, and the very teams that flew them to their targets. Then the President addressed the situation and American citizens spoke their minds. All of these people had their own thoughts on whether the bombs were needed. In this essay, the opinions on the atomic bomb’s necessity will be reviewed by presenting both the pros and cons from a variety of sources.
In his article, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Marc Trachtenberg considers three historical approaches to the role that nuclear arms played during the 1962 conflict: first, the view that nuclear arms played no role at all, with U.S. and Soviet weapons cancelling each other out, second, the interpretation that the risk involved with nuclear warfare heavily influenced policy making, and finally the view that the strategic imbalance of nuclear force, characterized by a substantial American advantage, significantly impacted the outcome of the crisis. In weighing the three interpretations, Trachtenberg dismisses the first in supporting the existence of the second, using a variety of primary sources to identify instances when decision-makers were influenced by the risk of nuclear warfare. The focus of the article, however, is on advancing and complicating the third approach, which Trachtenberg claims is congruous with the second. In this third section, Trachtenberg advances the approach that the imbalance of nuclear capabilities impacted Soviet strategy but not American decision making. Accordingly, Trachtenberg’s article is characterized by two central claims: that risk of nuclear war influenced policy during the Cuban Missile Crisis and that American nuclear superiority disproportionately affected Soviet decision-making.
The previously accepted nature of war stemmed from the Clausewitzian trinity: war is emotional, an experience wrought with passion, violence, and enmity; uncertainty, chance, and friction pervade the medium of war; however, because war is not an end in itself, and because, as a means, it is subordinate to its political aims, war must be subject to reason (Clausewitz, 89). With the first employment of nuclear weapons, however, strategists and military theorists began to question Clausewitz’s foundational ideas (Winkler, 58). Similarly, Allan Winkler, in agreeing with Bernard Brodie’s thesis, opines that the advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Winkler’s assertion stems from his argument that such a nuclear duel would yield a post-war environment incapable of recovery for any parties involved (62). He further describes Brodie’s realization that “[t]he atomic bomb is not just another and more destructive weapon to be added to an already long list. It is something which threatens to make the rest of the list relatively unimportant.” (62) Ultimately, Winkler abridges Brodie’s assessment in stating that “the United States was caught in the paradox of having to prepare for a war it did not plan to fight.” (63)