Mission Command During The Carolinas Campaign

Mission command belongs to the Army’s list of seven war fighting functions. While the other six of the Army’s war fighting functions specifically align to the application of combat power, mission command applies to leadership and its application. Mission command redefines the old construct of C2, command and control, by morphing the ideology into two distinct thoughts, the art of command and the science of control. Although mission command is a relatively new concept, it’s principles and application transcend time. This paper examines General Robert E. Lee’s application of the mission command principles at the Battle of Gettysburg.

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

Grant created a command problem that eventually resulted in disaster when he decided to headquarters himself with the Army of the Potomac, Meade’s forces, and keep a close watch on Meade’s every action. Grant explained that his concept was to make Meade’s commanding role seem as if Grant was in Washington and Meade were in the field with the troops as much as possible, Grant issuing strategic orders for movement of the Potomac Army to Meade and Meade executing them. Grant would issue the broad, general intent commands for moving and maneuvering the Army of the Potomac and other Corps and Theatres, giving tactical control to Meade.

It was General Bragg’s lack of confidence, previous performances, and relationships with his subordinate commanders that ultimately caused the battle plan to not be executed correctly. Bragg was unable to successfully implement the first principle of mission command: build cohesive teams through mutual trust. He also had a history of not utilizing the sixth principle of mission command: take prudent risk. Bragg’s lack of competence regarding these two mission command principles ultimately set conditions for a poor mission command climate within General Bragg’s unit. Bragg’s sub-commanders, Generals Hindman, Buckner, Polk, Longstreet, and Hill were all skeptical of Bragg’s leadership and battle plans from his previous campaign at Chattanooga, where he retreated from the city. Bragg was well known for retreating at the first Battle of Chattanooga, and also for predictably employing frontal assault offensive tactics. His history of predictable plans, retreats, and inability to take prudent risk, caused his subordinate leaders to lose trust in his ability to plan and lead his army. One of Bragg’s sub-commanders, General Hill, stated

Union officer William Tecumseh Sherman observed to a Southern friend that, "In all history, no nation of mere agriculturists ever made successful war against a nation of mechanics. . . .You are bound to fail." While Sherman's statement proved to be correct, its flaw is in its assumption of a decided victory for the North and failure to account for the long years of difficult fighting it took the Union to secure victory. Unquestionably, the war was won and lost on the battlefield, but there were many factors that swayed the war effort in favor of the North and impeded the South's ability to stage a successful campaign.

The 7th Cavalry Regiment's destruction at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in June 1876 is the subject of over a century of debate. LTC George A. Custer failed to exercise four key responsibilities that were expected of him as the regiment’s commander. He failed to understand the problem and environment, visualize a feasible solution, clearly describe it to his subordinates, and effectively direct his forces. These four aspects of mission command are integral to the operations process and help Soldiers understand and execute their commander's intent. Custer's failure to properly fulfill his role in the operations process resulted in his death and a strategic defeat for the nation.

General Hazen was no rookie when it came to fighting, he was a seasoned veteran, one who fought in many battles and was fully prepared to complete his task. General Hazen fought successfully at Shiloh, Chickamauga, and Lookout Mountain and these events are what caught the eyes of leadership. General Hazen was given command of the XV Corps in General Sherman’s Army as it was just approaching Atlanta . He had fought with the 15th Corps during the seizure of Atlanta. During his time in command of the 15th Corps in the battle for Atlanta General Hazen gained valuable experience with his men, experience that he could parlay in his mission to take Fort McAllister.

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought for three days from July 1 to 3. The Army of the Potomac, led by General George Meade, repelled the attack of the Confederate’s Army, led by General Robert E. Lee. The purpose of this paper is to examine General Lee’s effectiveness by analyzing his utilization of the mission command, and its principles.

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

Scorched farms, slaughtered livestock, uprooted railway lines and cities set on fire was not typical battle strategy previously seen on American soil. However, the Civil War was dragging on and General William Tecumseh Sherman was determined to finally end the fighting. The circumstances that initiated the war created a figurative and literal divide unlike America had ever seen. The American Civil War took heavy tolls on the Union and Confederate States of America. Desperate to end the bloodshed, President Abraham Lincoln trusted Ulysses S. Grant control of the Army and Grant authorized Sherman the freedom to do whatever necessary to bring conclusion to the conflict (Davis 22). In the military mind of Sherman, the end justified the means and this belief is well documented throughout his 1864 and 1865 campaign through Georgia, concluding in Goldsboro, North Carolina (Phillips 11). Sherman despised war and the fact that America had entered into a civil war in the first place. However, Sherman knew the conflict was unavoidable (Meiers 26). He made the decision to follow his allegiance to the Union and eventually became the general to lead the Armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee into the heart of Georgia (Moody 22). During this event the wrath of general Sherman would be implanted in the South’s memories. By the use of unorthodox

General Washington 's adherence to mission command principles promoted the environment needed to win. Senior allied partners deferred decision making to Washington based on trust and collaborative input. Effective communications encouraged subordinate commanders to propose constructive alternatives aimed at streamlining action. The Siege of Yorktown embodied the approach effectiveness. Admiral Lafayette’s decision to avoid a major naval battle in Chesapeake Bay demonstrated this. Lafayette’s understood Washington’s intent, and the established trust ensured vital Colonial waterway supremacy. This decisive act ensured Lord Cornwallis’ entrapment throughout the siege. (COL Jerry A. Turner, 2015)

There is always strategy involved or else all is lost to the opponent. “Despite the defeat at Peach Tree Creek, Confederate Lieutenant General John Bell Hood still had hopes of driving William Sherman’s Yankees from the outskirts of Atlanta with an offensive blow.” ("The Battle of Atlanta Summary & Facts") During the battle, John Hood wanted to push the union out of Atlanta. He planned a fifteen mile hike, then a flank attack that would be carried out by Hardee and his men. Hardee’s army ended up off schedule because of the poor conditions of his troops, but he still carried out the attack.("The Battle of Atlanta Summary & Facts") “The battle is not only known for its strategic and military significance but for its political importance.” ("Battle Of Atlanta") The Union had the luck of the day, because McPherson predicted the attack and accidentally placed his army to meet right with Hardee’s troops. The attack by the Confederates had failed, thankfully because of McPherson’s quick thinking. “The victory greatly increased northern morale…” ("Battle Of Atlanta") Without this event during the Battle of Atlanta the Union might had never won. In the end of it all, out of all the soldiers, 74,000 did not walk out of the campaign alive. The Union, once again, was victorious. Though Hood’s strategy was tricky and well thought out, McPherson and his troops, as well as Sherman, were blessed with luck and

The Battle of Gettysburg was amongst one the most important turning points during the Civil War. It was a three-day bloody battle between the Union and Confederate forces which would ultimately lead up to the victory of the Union. In The Killer Angels, Michael Shaara shows a depiction of the battle through the eyes of the officers and tries to give the reader a first-hand look into the daily struggles that they had to deal with when it came to distinguishing between what’s best for their men and chances of success in the battle. In the book, we are introduced with two important officers: Colonel Chamberlain of the Union force, and General Lee of the Confederate force. Throughout the book, we witness different leadership strategies and philosophies between both officers which ultimately serve as their road to success or failure in the battle. Focusing on General Lee’s philosophy on leadership, “To be a good soldier, you must love the army. But to be a good officer you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love.”, it reinforces the idea that in order to fully succeed at battle, you must set aside and sacrifice your sense of sympathy towards your soldiers as a way to avoid making emotional decisions.

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

Operation Verbal Image is an exercise based on command and control. It used many leaders who used command and control to accomplish their assigned mission. This command and control shaped the battlefield and took the fight to the enemy. This paper will discuss, how important command and control is, what is command and control, what does command and control do, and command and control in the information age. This paper will also discuss how command and control was used, how it affected the outcome of the battle, and my personnel opinions on how command and control could have been done differently.