Mission Command Visualization Case Study

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Lieutenant General (LtGen) Richard F. Natonski, United States Marine Corps, commanded the 1st Marine Division (1 MAR DIV), to include a Brigade and specialized units from the US Army and Iraqi Forces in support of Operation Phantom Fury to gain command and control of Fallujah, Iraq, in November 2004. He described the situation to subordinate units and directed them continuously on the ground while simultaneously assessing the mission accomplished. An excellent execution of mission command and the operations process resulted in the restoration of local government in Fallujah.

Prove of the Marine Corps new efforts at warfare would pay off, but with great losses, in the Pacific campaigns, such as Peleliu, Iwo Jim, and Okinawa. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, led to the largest deployment of Marines forces since WWII, which consisted of 24 infantry battalions, and 40 squadrons, which totaled to a number of about 95,000 Marines in the Persian Gulf region, as a part of Operation Desert Shield, which began in August of 1990 to January 1991. It has been known as the “100 Hour War” because “by the morning of Feb. 28, 100 hours after the ground war began, the Iraqi army was no longer a threat.”(www.globalsecurity.org ) Most of the fighting that had been going on between the US military and enemy forces, after 9/11 has been in Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as the Global War on Terrorism “One of the key strategies of Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2003 was the capture of Iraq’s capital, Baghdad. A convoy of thirty thousand Marines advanced five hundred miles from the border of Kuwait in just ten days. On April 9, 2003, Marines secured the center of Baghdad. That same day, Coalition forces declared an end to the dictator’s rule.” (www.marines.com )

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

Operations Desert Shield/Storm took place during the Gulf War, which was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of more than 30 nations mandated by the United Nations, led by the United States commanded by General Norman Schwarzkopf, who conducted one of the greatest military campaigns of all times that resulted with the coalition victory. The name Operation Desert Shield was for the operation leading to the built up of troops and defense of Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Storm for the combat phase to liberate Kuwait. This war included more than 500.000 United States troops, dominated by technological superiority that definitely favored the coalition forces. The use of missiles, guided bombs and invisible plane made easy to destroy Iraqi ground targets, being so the first war in history to use the air power to defeat ground forces. The commander of this operation General Schwarzkopf was a consolidated leader with great experience in war and diplomacy, who had extend knowledge of the Middle East since the childhood. General Schwarzkopf ability to use the principles of mission command led the coalition into the desired end state, which was the defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait. General Norman Schwarzkopf successfully utilized mission command principles within Operation Desert Storm/Shield by creating a shared understanding, building cohesive teams through mutual trust, provide a clear commander’s intent, and accept a prudent risk, which played a

LTC Honeycutt continuously assessed the situation at every turn of the war. He knew that the enemy wanted to fight and he was more than happy to oblige. Members of the 3-187th located some documents from the enemy and determined it was the 29th NVA, which signified that they were up against a sizeable enemy force. After a heavy firefight on the fourth day, Honeycutt was able to assess that the enemy strength was more than just a company. He concluded the enemy strength size was a battalion. His assessment required him to develop new frontal attack plans. The companies were able to advance up the hill but they suffered multiple casualties which resulted in them pulling back to their previous night defensive positions. The 3-187th lost ground, troops, and the motivation to

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

Operation Forces were engaged in an intense fire fight with al Qaeda forces on a mountain top

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

The troops were divided into two great combat regiments, Regimental Combat Team 1 with 3rd Battalion/ 1st Marines, 3rd Battalion/5th marines, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, 4th and 23rd Seabees and the US Army 2nd Battalion /7th Cavalry. The other regiment, the Regimental Combat Team 7 included the 1st Battalion/ 8th marine, 1st Battalion /8th Marines and the US Army 2nd Battalion/ 2nd Infantry. Assisting in the assault 2000 Iraqi soldiers were incorporated, and with the order to surround the city to avoid bandits escape, the task was assigned to the 1st Battalion of the British 850 regiment, all supported by air raids and heavy artillery strikes over the city.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

Lieutenant General James Conway, Commander of the First Expeditionary Force (MEF), was ordered to withdrawal his Marines from Fallujah and leave the city to the insurgents1.

At the end of Operation Vigilant Resolve, the Marines withdrew from the city and handed over security responsibilities to the Fallujah Brigade. The Fallujah Brigade was an Iraqi solution to the Fallujah problem, composed of former Iraqi soldiers and locally recruited men. Major General Jassim Mohammed Saleh who was immediately replaced by General Muhammad Latif, a former Iraqi Army Intelligence officer, originally led the brigade. The security responsibilities included provisions for the surrender of heavy weapons by the insurgents and stipulated that the Fallujah Brigade would initiate investigations murderers and mutilators of the Blackwater employees. The insurgents and terrorists expand through the city,