Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theory

What risk-free rate and the risk premium did you use to calculate the cost of equity?

replacing some of the existing equity by issuing more debt will increase the value of the firm. If

a. What risk-free rate and risk premium did you use in calculating the cost of equity for each division? Why did you choose these numbers?

In accordance to this, MM provided assumptions to support their findings. These assumptions can be characterized by the existence of a perfect capital market where;

We assume that the debt of these companies is risk free, because debt represents only a small fraction of the firm’s value.

The effect of financial leverage on the cost of equity is prevalent in the Modigliani-Miller capital structure theory. Since the financial leverage increases the cost of equity, it can be considered one of the disadvantages of borrowing. As shown in Appendix A, the cost of equity, at each debt to capital ratio, increases by 0.1% as the financial leverage increases by 10%. With a higher

3) What is the weighted average cost of capital and why is it important to estimate it? Is the

3. If Lex had no debt in its capital structure, what would be its cost of capital? How could this estimate be used to value Lex? If Lex operated with essentially no leverage in its capital structure and then added a moderate amount of debt, how would this affect its total value? How might we capture this value impact of debt in our valuation analysis?

The fact that shareholders are taxed twice through this repayment methodology infers that dividends are not their repayment technique of choice. Furthermore, paying out cash reserves through dividends also has the effect of both reducing the company’s assets and also inhibited the company’s ability to fund future growth as Dividends reduce the company’s retained earnings.

* Please choose either the CAPM estimate or the DDM estimate for cost of equity based on your answer to Question 3.

If the firms funding requirements are larger than their retained earnings, they must issue debt as this is preferred to issuing equity. Based on this theory, a firm’s financing policies could be viewed as signalling management’s view of the firm’s stock value (Wang & Lin 2010).Myers and Majluf (1984) also add that if firms issued no new securities but only used its retained earning to support the investment opportunities, the information asymmetric could be resolved. This suggests that issuing equity turn out to be more expensive as asymmetric information insiders and outsiders increase. Large firms should then issue debt to avoid selling under priced securities. As the requirement for external financing increases, businesses will work down the pecking order, from safe to riskier debt, perhaps to convertible securities or preferred stock, and finally to equity as a last resort. Each firm's debt ratio therefore reflects its cumulative requirement for external financing (Myers 2001).The pecking order theory clarifies why the bulk of external financing comes from debt. It also describes why organizations that are more profitable borrow less: since their goal debt ratio is, low-in the pecking order they do not have a goal since profitable firms have more internal financing available.

Already in 1958, Modigliani and Miller have pointed the discussion of capital structure towards the cost of debt and equity. According to their first proposition, in a world of no corporate taxes and with perfect markets, financial leverage has no effect on a firm’s value. In their second proposition, they state that the cost of equity equals a linear function defined by the required return on assets and the cost of debt (Modigliani and Miller, 1958).

The relationship between capital structure and firm value has been discussed frequently in the literature by different researcher accordingly, in both theoretical and empirical studies. It has also been discussed that whether the firm has any optimal capital structure that has been adopted by an individual firm, or whether the proportions of debt usage is completely irrelevant to the individual firm value.

For example, if the public thinks that the firm’s prospects are rosy but the managers see trouble ahead, these managers would view their debt-as well as their equity-as being overvalued. That is, the public might see the debt as nearly risk- free, whereas the mangers see a strong possibility of default.

Harris and Reviv (1990) gave one more reason of using debt in capital structure. They say that management will hide information from shareholders about the liquidation of the firm even if the liquidation will be in the best interest of shareholders because managers want the perpetuation of their service. Similarly, Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that mangers have incentives to pursue strategies that reduce their employment risk. This conflict can be solved by increasing the use of debt financing since bondholders will take control of the firm in case of default as they are powered to do so by the debt indentures. Stulz (1990) said when shareholders cannot observe either the investing decisions of management or the cash flow position in the firm, they will use debt financing. Managers, to maintain credibility, will over-invest if it has extra cash and under-invest if it has limited cash. Stulz (1990) argued that to reduce the cost of underinvestment and overinvestment, the amount of free cash flow should be reduced to