Module Code : Questions On Law, Coercion, And Morality, As Types Of Social Phenomena

Defining law can be difficult to do since its definition varies among various people. Many people see law as standards for human behavior that reflect the deepest values and morals of the society. Others see law as a game which acts as a set of guidelines for settling disagreements in a nonviolent way. From a sociologist’s perspective law is viewed as a behavioral system with the two aspects of roles/hierarchy and rules/discretion. Not only is law thought of as a behavioral system from a sociologist’s perspective but also as an institution which is a set of directions for doing things. When laws have been disobeyed by a member of society a form of punishment will be determined and it is not always effective. Everyone has their own views on law and punishment which is why I want to look at what theorists Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx view as the role and function of law and punishment. Before I can show the weaknesses, similarities and differences between each of their views I will give an overview of their thoughts on the role and function of law and punishment.

As societies expanded due to the economic demands posed by the Industrial Revolution, Durkheim said that the moral ties which bounded society together were weakened. Therefore, as society became more complex, a mechanism was engineered to effectively regulate these relationships and the result was the legal system[5]. The codification of moral behaviour, through laws, created guide-lines for large-scale societies. The foundation of these boundaries is in effect a function of crime and deviance, because without crime and deviance, on what basis would these laws be drafted upon?

Overall, in the process of understanding the relation between social order and the law, the consensus provides a clearer and more radical view. It shows society as what it really is. It presents society as a united force respecting and following the norms as to

Sanctions are only appealed to in the event that there is a breach. It therefore follows that the opinion of Hart is that various form of law cannot be explained in a single expression as orders backed with threats of sanction. Thus, in contradiction with Austin’s viewpoint, Hart formulated a dual system which contains two types of rules, primary rules (duty-imposing) and secondary rules (power-conferring). Primary rules are generally duty-imposing, which embodies non-optional rules of obligation. It often concerned with standard of behavior as requirement to do or to abstain from performing an act. On the other hand, secondary rules are ancillary to primary rules the former conferring right to introduce, to vary the primary rules and to determine the mode in which their violation could be determined (judicial process). Such secondary rules are rather regulatory or facilitative than coercive in nature. In short, Austin’s catch all theory of seeing law as command back with sanction leave no room for right, privileges given to subject of Sovereignty which does not constitute non optional

In August 2015, the case Miller V Davis brought to light the complicated relationship between law and morality. Indeed, Mrs Davis a county clerk in Rowan county (Kentucky), is being sued for not delivering marriage licences to same sex couples as she believes that homosexuality is morally wrong. Thus, despite the fact that same-sex marriage has been made legal by the U.S Supreme Court since June 2015. Ought individuals to apply the law though it is in inadequacy with their moral beliefs? Do the law should be totally free from any moral influence? Many legal scholars have argued on these questions, as well as trying to define the terms “law” and “morality”. While no one has agreed to a universal definition, law can be defined as a “body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its members or subjects”. On the other hand, morality is referred to as an “ethical wisdom” , the set of common values unifying a society. This essay will discuss the role of morality in the law, while analysing different legal school of thoughts arguing on the topic. First of all, positivists such as Bentham, Austin and Hart, argued that morality should not interfere with the law as it is created by a legitimate authority. On the other hand, naturalist theorists, such as Aristotle, Fuller and Dworkin, believed in the existence of a “higher law”, highly influenced by morals, has to be integrated in a legal system

The traditional legal perspective is law-centered. Law is purely law; it is limited in its

PHL 612 Philosophy of Law [Calendar Description]: What is law? What makes something a legal norm? Should

different from natural law because ‘ it calls for a certain measure of regularity of observance for without this feature, it would hardly be entitled to rank as law at all. A natural law on the other hand may stll be held to be valid even if it is never or scarcely even observed.’7 Legal positivism will only work in a community where it is widely accepted. Hart suggested that the legal system is a ‘closed’ logical system where decisions may be deduced by logic. For

     In his book on ?The Behavior of Law? Donald Black attempts to describe and explain the conduct of law as a social phenomenon. His theory of law does not consider the purpose, value, impact of law, neither proposes any kind of solutions, guidance or judgment; it plainly ponders on the behavior of law. The author grounds his theory purely on sociology and excludes the psychology of the individual from his assumptions on the behavior of law (Black 7). The theory of law comes to the same outcome as other theories scrutinizing the legal environment, such as deprivation theory or criminal theory; however, the former concentrates on the patterns of behavior of law, not involving the

The biggest difference between the writings of Austin and Hart might be that the former while setting the framework for a plausible theory, fails to elaborate on its most basic premises. Hart expanded on legal positivism by enhancing the theory suggested by Austin and making it more credible, all while debunking natural law theory. One example is the manner in which Austin argues that the concept of law is subject to the command of a higher authority backed by threats. Although this is a way in which law can be presented, it is also a simplistic definition. Hart argues that although Austin’s definition of the law might be applicable to criminal law, it fails to justify other variants of legal process such as contracts or marriage licenses. He argues that “Such laws do not impose duties or obli­gations. Instead, they provide individuals with facilities for realizing their wishes, by conferring legal powers upon them to create, by certain specified procedures and subject to certain (p. 27)” It is difficult to associate laws such as the ones concerning marriage to the idea of a command backed by threat. The differentiation between laws that grant liberties when compared to those that might take them away is something that is not taken into account by Austin or explored in depth by natural law theorists such as Aquinas.

Law and morality work together to guide our behavior; while law does it by punishing us if we do something wrong, morality does it through incentives. In their articles, both H.L.A Hart in “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” and Lon Fuller’s reply to professor Hart in “Positivism and Fidelity to Law,” discuss the concept of law post world war II Germany and their re-imagining of natural law as put forth by Gustav Radbruch’s theory. In this paper, I hope to show how both law and morality is needed to create just rules, more specifically drawing from the “grudge informer” case mentioned in Hart’s article. First, I will explain the dilemma of the “grudge informer” case and the contradicting theory laid down by Radbrunch’s.

Hart goes on to write of the importance of being able to settle cases in the courts rather than legislating in advance. He refers to Von JHerring’s ‘heaven of legal concepts’, Hart explains this concept “this is reached when a general term is given the same meaning not only in every application of a single rule, but whenever it appears in the legal system.” This would appear to be the polar opposite of ‘open texture’ and would be prevalent in a legal system of mechanical jurisprudence. He explains that this would allow for a greater measure of certainty and predictability but at the expense of being unable to exclude cases which we may wish to exclude. “The rigidity of our classifications will thus war with our aims in having or maintaining the rule.” Thus the concept of mechanical jurisprudence would hinder the courts ability to take into account things such as equity and the pursuit of social aims, in the pursuit of a clear and rigid

This paper will demonstrate how Hart’s account of the relationship between law and morality shows an understanding of how they both work together yet can also work as separate entities. It will take a specific look into the internal point of view to aid the understanding of why

Sociologists have many perspectives when it comes to the examination of our laws. Three out of many theories of lawmaking processes are the Rationalistic model, Functionalistic view, and Conflict perspective. Rationalistic models view laws as a rational way of increasing protection for members of society from crimes which are “socially injurious” (Vago 2012). Functionalist view look at where the ideas behind the laws come from and describes laws as “re-institutionalized customs”, where lawmaking is a reiteration of customs (Vago 2012). Conflict perspective describe laws as value the opinions of the elite, instill unequal access to economic goods which upkeep the social economical groups, basically keeps the elite on top (Vago 2012). The three theories are all similar but different at the same time. In my opinion, conflict theories captures the reality of law making process.

This article discusses the conceptions of legal normativity, both moral and “strictly legal” conceptions. According to Spaak, regarding the normative force of legal justification, legal positivists can still embrace the moral idea and not be in conflict with their generally held belief in the “strictly legal” concept of law. In Torben Spaak’s opinion, there is a reason to desire legal positivism; he explains this through introducing the concept of jurisprudence. When discussing the nature of law, Spaak states, “that while the moral conception is what is likely favored on a smaller scale, the strictly legal conception is more appealing because it is broader,” (478). Spaak is arguing, his belief that “validity-based explanations come nearer to the truth,”(483) rather than belief-based explanations. He concludes that we are to prefer legal positivism over natural law theory. “That is why in this article I have been concerned with the law itself rather than our views about it.”(483)