Moral Hazard And The Banking System

Bush on October 3rd, 2008. Some of the recipients of this bail out were and continue to be large financial institutions including Wells Fargo & Co., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., and Morgan Stanley. In this situation the banks are not only able to continue risky behavior, but take little to no responsibility for their actions in causing such a situation. Fundamentally, if the financial institutions were bailed out once it has set a precedent for other financial institutions to view and believe that taking part in risky behavior will not affect them in the long run.

On October 3, 2008 President George W. Bush signed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, otherwise known as the “bailout.” The Purpose of this act was defined as to, “Provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of trouble assets for the purpose of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend certain expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other purposes” (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act). In my paper I will explain and show the relationship between the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and subprime lending, the collapse of the housing market, bundled mortgage securities, liquidity, and the Government 's efforts to bailout the nation 's banks.

The banking industry consists of almost sixty-five hundred banks that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Out of these, there are eighty-one substantially large banks in the United States that are publically traded, which is where the market structure and industry information will be based. However, as with the rest of the country, these banks are very concentrated, with the largest banks accounting for over half of the market as well as accounting for the largest amounts of revenue.

Congress responded to this crisis through TARP, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. TARP was a unique piece of legislation in that it wasn’t your average piece of fiscal or monetary policy. Originally, the crisis took a turn for the worse after the House of Representatives failed to pass a $700 billion-dollar bailout package proposed by the bush administration. The representatives at the time were fearing for their careers in politics since constituents would have most likely responded very negatively to a Wall St. bail out package. It wasn’t until October that TARP was actually passed. TARP temporarily increased deposit insurance to 250,000. The TARP

In order to better the financial crisis, financial experts must first understand where the problem originated. In Too Big to Save, Robert Pozen develops principles for evaluating the government bailout efforts on a financial crisis. Pozen explains why the taxpayers will take most of the fall if the banks fail and we go into a recession. He confirms that financial officials will use prefer stocks compared to common stocks because they wanted to not nationalize the banks and to keep capitalism. Pozen presents an idea on how the United States financial regulation should be structured in the future. Since there are different proposals and perspectives, everyone will not agree on every proposal but this shows how we can evaluate our economy and how it should

The relative successes and failures of that Act are becoming more apparent with time, and the shortcomings are subject to intense partisan criticism. As discussed below, Dodd-Frank seeks to address the highly sensitive and controversial notion that Wall Street banks have been designated by the Federal Reserve as too-big-to-fail. In fact, during the most severe moments of the crisis, the voices of free market proponents could be heard advocating that these troubled big banks, suffering massive losses due to their own bad bets, and if weakened to the point of failure, should be allowed to fail. Hindsight shows that allowing just one to fail, Lehman Brothers, had serious and lasting detrimental effect on the US and global financial system and markets. Had Lehman been saved, it would have been the most effective agent to unwind all of the transactions and trades to which it was a party, and likely in a rapid manner. However, being thrust into bankruptcy, and thereafter receivers were appointed to unwind the business, took months upon months and vast resources to settle Lehman accounts. Had Citibank, Bank of America, Bear Stearns, or AIG been allowed to fail, it may have been possible that the US financial system would have melted down completely. So these super banks, and non-banks, cannot be allowed to fail in crisis, due to the system-wide risk. Notwithstanding, such an implicit assurance, that they will always get a bailout, no matter how toxic

In recent years, financial organizations have been bailed out to prevent the financial collapse of the economy. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) provided relief funds to financial institutions. This program is a part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. While controversial, the Obama administration determined it was necessary to prevent worldwide economic failure. This bail out was necessary to add stability to the financial markets after high-risk investments and fraudulent practices of the largest banking institutions in the US

The banking crisis of the late 2000s, often called the Great Recession, is labelled by many economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Its effect on the markets around the world can still be felt. Many countries suffered a drop in GDP, small or even negative growth, bankrupting businesses and rise in unemployment. The welfare cost that society had to paid lead to an obvious question: ‘Who’s to blame?’ The fingers are pointed to the United States of America, as it is obvious that this is where the crisis began, but who exactly is responsible? Many people believe that the banks are the only ones that are guilty, but this is just not true. The crisis was really a systematic failure, in which many problems in the

Banks have been at the forefront of the financial system for as long as they have existed and have captured the attention of stakeholders on both controversial grounds as well as being undisputed with regards to the many helpful services they provide. JP Morgan & Chase is one such bank, surrounded by hostile news articles and excessive scrutiny but rightfully so as it has of recent been the topic of much controversy as turning a blind eye to the moral codes established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and assisting Ponzi Scheme masterminds in swindling unsuspecting investors.

However, after five years of the financial crisis happened in 2008, is the “too big to fail” problem being solved or controlled? Jim Puzzanghera who published his article on Los Angeles Times insists that banks considered too big to fail are even bigger now. Puzzanghera provides his opinion based on the data he collected, “Just before the financial crisis hit, Wells Fargo & Co. had $609 billion in assets. Now it has $1.4 trillion. Bank of America Corp. had $1.7 trillion in assets. That's up to $2.1 trillion.” Puzzanghera explores that one main concern of coming out with a solution to this “too big to fail” problem is that Democrats and Republicans rarely reach an agreement on the problem. Most Democrats are willing for the federal authority to seize the power and to get rid of the firms if they are too big to fail while most Republicans do not want to force the banks to shrink. In stead of regulating those big financial firms, “the government's new power to seize large financial firms teetering near collapse could result in them being rescued instead of shut down, in effect enshrining

The recent financial crisis has a huge impact on systemic Important Financial Institutions; it’s distressing effect can be felt in almost every business area and process of a bank. A fairly large literature investigates the impact of financial crisis on large, complex and interconnected banks. The great recession did affect banks in different ways, depending on the funding capability of each bank. Kapan and Minoiu (2013) find that banks that were ex ante more dependent on market funding and had lower structural liquidity reduced supply of credit more than other banks during crisis. The ability of banks to generate interest income during the financial crisis was hampered because there was a vast reduction in bank lending to individuals and

There has been a debate for years on what caused the Financial Crisis in 2008 and if there was one main cause, or a series of unfortunate events that led to the crisis. The crisis began when the market was no longer funding many financial entities. The Federal Reserve then lowered the federal funds rate from 5.25% to almost zero percent in December 2008. The Federal Government realized that this was not enough and decided to bail out Bear Stearns, which inhibited JP Morgan Chase to buy Bear Stearns. Unfortunately Bear Stearns was not the only financial entity that needed saving, Lehman Brothers needed help as well. Lehman Brothers was twice the size of Bear Stearns and the government could not bail them out. Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Lehman Brothers bankruptcy caused the market tensions to become disastrous. The Fed then had to bail out American International Group the day after Lehman Brothers failed (Poole, 2010). Some blame poor policy making and others blame the government. The main causes of the financial crisis are the deregulation of banks and bank corruption.

For instance, the increased importance of networks and the rise of highly systemic banks created a system in which the banks became, on one side, too big to fail, and, on the other, too big to save. Indeed, the lesson from Lehman Brothers Chapter 11 is that letting go bankrupt a systemic player (even not one of the largest) might bring about unknown undesirable effects. The policy makers are, therefore, definitely captured because banking sector is architecture in such a way that constrains the policy makers to go through a bail-out in case of a relevant financial distress. So which are the consequences of this behaviour? The outcomes are double: the ex-ante banks’ possibility to engage moral hazard behaviour and the ex-post debt burden on the tax payers. This creates an incentive for the banks to take more risks due to the implicit protection of the government, that rely on the tax payers to pay for the bailouts, creating a substantial problem of fairness and social equity, in which low income class has to pay for the top income class’ errors. Another example of this theory is the state dependence on taxes generated by the financial sector. For instance, in the UK “the financial sector’s gross value added (GVA) rose over the last decade, but has declined since 2009. Its contribution to UK jobs is around 3.6%. Trade in financial services makes up a substantial proportion of the UK’s trade surplus in services. Estimates of the sector’s contribution to Government tax

Yet another concern centres on “moral hazard”—that is, the possibility that fiscally irresponsible policies by recipient countries will be effectively rewarded and thereby encouraged by bailout loans. While theoretically a serious concern, the existence of such moral hazard has not been proved.

This work will examine the case 'Banking Industry Meltdown: The Ethical Financial Risk Derivatives" and determine which moral philosophy is most applicable to an understanding of the banking industry meltdown and explain the rationale. The case study will be analyzed and white-collar crimes considered as to whether they are different in any substantive manner from other more blue-collar crimes. This study will determine and discuss the role that corporate culture played in banking industry scenario and the response will be supported with specific examples. This work will postulate how leaders within the banking industry could have used their influence to avert the industry meltdown.