alternate possibility, to do so. But, is this really the case? Is it truly the case that you need to be making a choice between two genuine alternatives in order to be responsible for your actions? Harry Frankfurt famously argued that alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility, and therefore that PAP is false. Consider a case in which one subject, Jones, wishes to vote Democratic in a forthcoming election. Now suppose that another subject, Black, wants very badly for Jones
incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical history. The question that then arises in the realm of compatibilism particularly, is one dealing with moral responsibility: If our paths in life are not totally pre-determined
Harry Frankfurt debates the issue concerning moral responsibility without the presence of free will. However, his hypothetical demonstration cannot exist, therefore his account does not adequately address the problem with free will. The metaphysical issue is in regards to the concept
Zhiyuan Li Philosophy 3000 Frankfurt Without Counter-Examples: An Alternative Possibility Harry Frankfurt (1969) argues that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): (PAP) a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise (829) is false, because there are cases where a person is morally responsible for what she has done even if she could not have done otherwise (835-6). Call such cases Frankfurt-style cases. A lot of literature thereafter has been
In this paper, I will consider Harry Frankfurt 's arguments for the compatibilism of determinism and freedom of will, as presented in "Freedom of Will and the Concept of Person" and some problems that arise with his reasoning. I will claim that those problems do not come from any propositions central to Frankfurt 's argument, but rather from his neglect of the issue of the relationship between freedom of will and moral responsibility. I will argue, that Frankfurt makes an invalid implicit assumption
Frankfurt says that the freedom required for analysis of morals depends on whether or not an individual accepts himself/herself in his/her actions. Perhaps this is the stronghold of the theory because when a person acts from free will, he/she owns his/her action and therefore, some
What does it mean to have free will when one cannot choose the environment in which they live in? Because the environment in which one lives in shapes their beliefs and practices, how is it they are morally responsible for their actions and decisions when they are not in control of the environment they live in? Causal determinism is a belief that everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. Furthermore determinism implies if the conditions under which one made a choice
Desires and Moral Responsibility We have certain notions of what free-will is. But before we can discuss the notion of free-will, we need to establish the meaning of this term. Having free-will refers to one’s choices or desires (O’Connor, “Free Will”). A person who is able to act according to the determinations of their will (i.e., choices or desires) is free (Russell, “Hume on Free Will”). But is it always fair to blame people for performing morally wrong actions when they act on the basis of their
theological fatalist, why there might be a possibility, regardless of their opinion, have ever been free. Then, I will explain the dilemma that there is between theological fatalism and free will. In addition, the Frankfurt solution will be explained. Finally, critics of the Frankfurt solution will be mentioned and critiqued. To begin with, free will is broadly defined as being able to choose between different courses of actions without being restrained by any physical or divine forces (“Free Will”
this essay I will argue that moral responsibility for something we do does require that we have alternate possibilities in some sense. I will explore the criticisms of this from Frankfurt, with the suggestion that Frankfurt cases are not as damaging as they seem. Finally, I will attempt to show that it is philosophically safer to adopt Otsuka’s slight revision of alternate possibilities. It has long been taken for granted that for an agent to have moral responsibility for an action, they must have