alternate possibility, to do so. But, is this really the case? Is it truly the case that you need to be making a choice between two genuine alternatives in order to be responsible for your actions? Harry Frankfurt famously argued that alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility, and therefore that PAP is false. Consider a case in which one subject, Jones, wishes to vote Democratic in a forthcoming election. Now suppose that another subject, Black, wants very badly for Jones
incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical history. The question that then arises in the realm of compatibilism particularly, is one dealing with moral responsibility: If our paths in life are not totally pre-determined
If we are not free to choose these actions, then are we responsible for them? The importance of free will then is made more salient when the concept of moral responsibility is introduced. These moral obligations can reflect on how we blame, praise or judge certain courses of action. Harry Frankfurt debates the issue concerning moral responsibility without the presence of free will. However, his hypothetical demonstration cannot exist, therefore his account does not adequately address the problem with
In this paper, I will consider Harry Frankfurt 's arguments for the compatibilism of determinism and freedom of will, as presented in "Freedom of Will and the Concept of Person" and some problems that arise with his reasoning. I will claim that those problems do not come from any propositions central to Frankfurt 's argument, but rather from his neglect of the issue of the relationship between freedom of will and moral responsibility. I will argue, that Frankfurt makes an invalid implicit assumption
Desires and Moral Responsibility We have certain notions of what free-will is. But before we can discuss the notion of free-will, we need to establish the meaning of this term. Having free-will refers to one’s choices or desires (O’Connor, “Free Will”). A person who is able to act according to the determinations of their will (i.e., choices or desires) is free (Russell, “Hume on Free Will”). But is it always fair to blame people for performing morally wrong actions when they act on the basis of their
this essay I will argue that moral responsibility for something we do does require that we have alternate possibilities in some sense. I will explore the criticisms of this from Frankfurt, with the suggestion that Frankfurt cases are not as damaging as they seem. Finally, I will attempt to show that it is philosophically safer to adopt Otsuka’s slight revision of alternate possibilities. It has long been taken for granted that for an agent to have moral responsibility for an action, they must have
Free Will and Determinism For something to occur in this world, there must be the course and the reason for the occurrence, and which will then affect other future consequences. The theory of determinism states that all events whether moral choices or vices are predetermined by other existing courses. In the same connection, the free will of humans is connected to determinism since humans do things the best way, or they cannot act otherwise. According to Saul McLeod, “the determinist approach proposes
Zhiyuan Li Philosophy 3000 Frankfurt Without Counter-Examples: An Alternative Possibility Harry Frankfurt (1969) argues that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): (PAP) a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise (829) is false, because there are cases where a person is morally responsible for what she has done even if she could not have done otherwise (835-6). Call such cases Frankfurt-style cases. A lot of literature thereafter has been
Additionally, the concept of free will often extends itself to the concept of moral responsibility. The moralist would like the concept of free will to be a truth, because he or she believes that if individuals act freely, they can be held responsible for their actions. This is the concept behind the principle of alternative possibilities. In his essay, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, Harry G. Frankfurt defines the principle of alternative possibilities as, “…[when] a person is morally
morally responsible for his actions? According to compatibilists Harry Frankfurt, Susan Wolf, and John Martin Fischer in certain events where one “could not do otherwise” one could still have free will and moral responsibility over their actions. With the example of Phil Connors and the ideas of compatibilists Harry Frankfurt, Susan Wolf, and John Martin Fischer show that determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. While determinists’ view that everything that happens is causally