Morgan's Stand Below the Goldsboro Road

He positioned his trained infantrymen on top of the first hill as the last line of defense. The militia was placed in front of the hill and the sharpshooters were place in front of the militia. The militia was the first line of defense and Morgan ordered his sharpshooter to target specifically the officers and cavalry and fall back in the line of militia before they get in firing range of the redcoats. Once the sharpshooter gets in position with the militia the British army advanced the attack the militia. The militia’s duties were to engage the redcoats for a short amount of then run away to the right side of the side of the hill. Tarleton expected the militia to run away. He sent one infantry unit and one cavalry unit after the militia. However, waiting behind the second hill was Lieutenant Colonel William Washington and his dragoon unit. The British cavalry didn’t expect to encounter another cavalry unit. Washington wiped out the Tarleton’s cavalry then flanked the right of Tarleton’s main element. Simultaneously, the militia ran around the hills to flank the left side. Tarleton found himself in a double envelopment. Tarleton receives 110 casualties, 229 wounded and 829 captured or missing, meanwhile Morgan suffered 25 casualties and 124

The leaders had many moments to shine in this battle. The “commanders” of the Patriot militia were James Johnston,

Americans had been engaged in a Civil War which had been begun in April of 1861 with shots fired on a fort in South Carolina. In the summer of 1863 in a small town called Gettysburg, there would be a fierce battle fought between the Union Army of the Potomac led by General George G. Meade and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia led by General Robert E. Lee. The events of the battle would overcome the losses suffered by the Union and put the Confederacy on the run. “Over 165,000 men would converge, and before the fighting ended, the ground would run red with blood. The battle was fierce, and the casualties proved it. But the casualties that resulted would not be in vain, at least for the Union; the formidable power

Despite this, the Rebel’s morale remained optimistic as they initiated the fighting on the following morning (King 18). Union forces retaliated and saved their position until one of General Meade’s commanders staged his own offensive battle (Appleby, Joyce 486; King 22). This Union general was Dan Sickles. By moving his position without consulting General Meade, a “bulge” was created. This foolish mistake allowed 1,600 Confederate soldiers to rush the Union line to overtake Peach Orchard, capturing 1,000 Yankee prisoners (King 22). Another Union Army general, G.K. Warren, secured and protected a hill called Little Round Top before Confederates claimed it which helped combat the loss from Sickle’s blunder (“American Civil War”).

Although Bloody Hill was one of charge and countercharge for the Confederates, the major problem was tactical positioning of the topography and technology. BG Slack and Woodruffs defense greatly outnumbered Lyon’s force as they were positioned down the hill and held inferior weapons. As Slack’s 2 regiments alongside Woodruff guns proceeded to move forward, close enough to be within range to shoot their shotguns and muskets, but the Federals would drive them back with artillery, small-arms fire, and short counterattacks. In order to hold Lyon’s advance, almost his entire force was engaged except for his reserve, the 2nd Kansas Infantry. Eventually, when the fighting died out all along the line as both Confederate and Union sides needed to reposition and recuperate to continue to fight as time went on. (George E. Knapp, 1953).

McClellan’s men were ordered to cross over south mountain and quickly found that Lee had fortified this area. McClellan pushed through and took this area as a victory. Since Lee knew of McClellan’s fortune in finding the 191 orders he quickly began

Civil War historians view the Battle of Chancellorsville as General Robert E. Lee’s “greatest and most remarkable” victory (Sears 1). Lee, facing an army twice his size, defies all military doctrine and divides his army multiple times in order to out-maneuver and surprise the Union forces. The daring maneuver succeeds and ultimately forces the Union’s Army of the Potomac to retreat. The victory was another major blow to Union troops, but it came at a huge cost to the Confederacy: the loss of General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. By evaluating the battle through the lens of the mission command activities, one can see how Lee’s daring maneuver was actually very calculated and his only option for victory. Throughout the rest of this paper, I will describe the timeline of the battle and how General Lee used the mission command activities of understand, visualize, assess, and lead to ultimately achieve victory at Chancellorsville.

As the battle wore on, the superior numbers of the Union Army began to wear down the Confederate lines. At a critical point, as the Confederates began to fall back, an officer pointed out a line of rebels who were still strong. He said, "look at Jackson's men standing like a stone wall". He was talking about General T. J. Jackson's men. Jackson would from then on be known as "Stonewall Jackson", one of the most famous of all Confederate generals. This seemed to inspire the Southern troops at Henry House who held their ground and began to beat back the Union forces.

On December 3 Daniel Morgan reported to Greene's headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina. At the start of the Revolution, Morgan, who had even fought in the French and Indian War, had served at the Siege of Boston. He was the colonists’ commander in this battle. Even though Morgan claimed to only have around 800 people on his side, other people have claimed that he had many more people than that. Morgan had a strategy. He would trick the British into thinking they had more power than they did. The plan worked perfectly. The British drove in strong lines, with knowledge of victory. But, American colonists slowly changed this battle to the favor of their side.

The date was December 10th 1864, just a little over three years after the beginning of the civil war, and the Union Army was waiting just outside the city of Savannah. Just 25 days earlier General Sherman and his Union Army had left the city of Atlanta after its seizure and were now poised to try the same thing in Savannah . The only thing standing in their way of completing this task was the formidable Fort McAllister. The Union Army, if it were able to seize the Fort would complete the seizure of the city of Savannah and open up a valuable resupply route to the sea. The man chosen to complete this task was General William Babcock Hazen, commander of the 15th Corps.

     As the battle wore on, the superior numbers of the Union Army began to wear down the Confederate lines. At a critical point, as the Confederates began to fall back, an officer pointed out a line of rebels who were still strong. He said, “look at Jackson’s men standing like a stone wall”. He was talking about General T. J. Jackson’s men. Jackson would from then on be known as “Stonewall Jackson”, one of the most famous of all Confederate generals. This seemed to inspire the Southern troops at Henry

The Battle of Gettysburg was fought for three days from July 1 to 3. The Army of the Potomac, led by General George Meade, repelled the attack of the Confederate’s Army, led by General Robert E. Lee. The purpose of this paper is to examine General Lee’s effectiveness by analyzing his utilization of the mission command, and its principles.

The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.

An interesting turn of events would soon favor the Federal Army as General J.E.B. Stuart and his cavalry were north and east of Gettysburg causing a lot of fear in the North but consequently were not performing adequate reconnaissance, the result was that General Lee did not know where General Meade and the Army of the Potomac were or what their strength was (Freeman, 147). When Confederate General Henry Heth moved into

Limehouse Causeway was the heart of Limehouse Chinatown. The area was known as the “Cantonese Quarter” as many of the early Chinese migrants that settled here were from Canton and southern China. Limehouse Causeway was an alley of Chinese stores and cafés and much smaller in size. There were also lodging-houses for the Chinese migrants, which were often run by English women. Limehouse Causeway was widened during 1934, which resulted in a number of businesses, alleys and side streets being wiped out. This was part of a then ongoing 'slum clearance', as Limehouse and Poplar (Pennyfields), were notorious for their