Mp Case Study

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

Over the last few months, the Northern Ontario Party has been approached by desperate business owners looking for any kind of assistance with their outrageous hydro bills. One such business owner is Roslyn Taylor who operates Taylor’s sawmill on Manitoulin Island. Roslyn, recently posted on Facebook her hydro bill for the month of July. It was nearly $4000.00 and this was a month where her main saw was down and her company’s production was low. So, you would expect the company’s power bill to be reasonable. But here is what the Taylor’s hydro bill looked like

In September 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee voted to cancel the Army and Marine Corps' Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) in their version of the fiscal year 2012 defense bill (Munoz, 2011). This measure could have completely shut down efforts to replace a thirty year-old fleet of Humvees, loyal but potentially outmoded tactical wheeled vehicles. The Army's Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle program has been a project set to replace the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family in the works for years. The project, however, continues to be stymied by budgetary constraints. Per-vehicle costs for the JLTV begin at $250,000 and are likely to climb, as Lockheed-Martin secured a preliminary contract for engineering, design, and development. The high cost of the JLTV does preclude it from completely replacing the HMMWV, and yet cost does not preclude the JLTV from supplementing the Army's fleet. A middle-ground solution is the best method of maximizing initial investments, while also banking on the robustness of national security.

The security environment today is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. Supporting these capabilities requires proper balancing of the Joint Force. This essay discusses the impending environment, key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required by

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) program featured remarkable speed of development and production at the time the United States shifted its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. The controversy over the MRAP program revolved around the three year delay from when the field initially identified its need until its production. This paper asserts that while MRAP development and production speed was impressive, the slow reaction to the enemy’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability and the lack of doctrine and concept development led to delay. To support this position, this essay describes the strategic environment with its competing efforts, and it compares the MRAP acquisition to normal Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP). Furthermore, it recommends rapid acquisition of other MDAPs of equivalent strategic importance and urgency, and it highlights the key roles of senior leaders, the Services and the CCMDs within the MRAP acquisition process.

Expertly represented the Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) at the HQDA Office of the Provost Marshal General's 2025 MP Strategy Plan development Work Group. CPT Kilgore ensured that the CDID's material development efforts were fully synchronized

Just about anyone of working age has been around a new project at work. Everyone has an opinion on how it should be completed. Disagreements are almost guaranteed. How these are solved is usually by the supervisor considering all recommendations and determining the path. This is a fairly easy process, however when dealing with the Department of Defense (DoD) joint acquisition process, the development of a new weapons system is much more in depth. With a diminishing budget and higher costs associated with new weapons systems the DoD has leaned more towards joint acquisition programs. This decisions improves logistics, interoperability of the services, and saves money. The DoD’s supervisor in the above scenario is better known as the joint Program Manager (jPM). The jPM’s role is vital to the success of joint acquisitions, by utilizing His or Her special skills, and could be a dream job for someone with aspirations for greatness.

Before doing anything with a client, especially a pregnant one, you would want a green light from the Dr. stating her ability to begin exercise. Next, you would want to know what her previous fitness level was as to where you would begin training her. It is important that if she was not performing any exercise before becoming pregnant, that she only use the minimal weight. At the beginning of working with her, I would want to make note of her BMI. 18 – 24.9 is stated to be an average BMI and it would be recommended she gain 25 – 35lbs and/or consume 300 more calories per day. 25 – 29 is labeled as an overweight BMI and be consulted to gain 15 – 25 lbs and/or 2- 3lbs per month, allowing for 200 more calories per day. More than 30 is classified

Today’s security environment is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA). The challenges presented by globalization, emerging powers as well as the continuing threat of terrorism indicate the future security environment will continue to gain complexity. Adding to this complexity is the challenge of increasingly constrained fiscal resources. To protect U.S. National Security interests in this complex and constrained environment, Joint Force 2025 (JF-2025) requires four core capabilities, it must be agile, adaptable, survivable and integrated. This essay discusses the key strategic direction for JF-2025, the capabilities required of the Joint Force, each member services and the inherent associated risks.

Recently General Dunford stated, “a ready JF is one that can effectively meet the steady-state requirements of the combatant commanders, deter our adversaries, and respond decisively in the event of a contingency.” The total JF in 2025 will need to adapt and become more agile faster than these emerging threats. It will also need to continue deterring global adversaries if it wants to sustain enduring strategic and operational success while remaining decisive in supporting the national defense strategy.

o Expedited the assessment and approval of over 500 C4ISR acquisition documents necessary for materiel release and fielding - support the future Army

The established CMOC “will integrate and synchronize interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), and nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities with joint force operations”.6

Commanders requested safer vehicles suited for irregular warfare tactics, and received up-armored HMMWVs and add-on armor kits, which did not provide sufficient protection in an irregular warfare environment. Further, the services were slow to respond to Combatant Commanders’ requests for MRAPs because their priority was to develop the JLTV, fueled by the assertion that MRAPs would be obsolete beyond the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This speaks to the tendency of the services to invest in future capabilities, while failing to provide Combatant Commanders with a method to develop or procure equipment necessary to fight present wars. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) oversees JCIDS and is “often misaligned because it often defers to the services. Neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to invest in MRAPs, so neither did the JROC”. As a result, the requirement for MRAPs was slow to validate and once valid remained an unfunded requirement until political pressure and public opinion forced the Pentagon to reevaluate fielding MRAPs in large numbers.

Please review the attachment. This is the vaccine rule that we provide to PMG last year and under the first two lines is the information how we has to charge the patient for the vacciness. Also The flu vaccine for Uninsured childrens is coverage under VFC program so we don't charge for the vaccine.

The MRAP program followed the normal defense acquisition process, but some aspects of the program cannot be duplicated easily. Conatser and Grizio outlined four requirements for a rapid acquisition process – mature technical solution, user’s acceptance of a short term solution, full support by the leadership, and full funding. The MRAP program met all these requirements. There were several MRAP type vehicles already in full production mode that just needed to be mass produced. Using multiple vendors allowed quick mass production of MRAPs. Although later shown to be insufficient to defeat all IED threats as the Insurgents increased the size of IEDs and used Explosive Formed Projectiles (EFP), the commanders in Iraq accepted MRAPs. There were several politicians pushing the U.S. military to procure MRAPs quickly as possible. In 2007, Secretary Gates “made MRAP the top DoD acquisition priority.” Lastly, the Congress allocated sufficient funding for the MRAP program. Secretary Carter cites the MRAP program as an example of “how much can be accomplished with the full backing of leaders in Congress and the