NASA Management Failure and the Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster

Rockwell, the shuttle’s primary contractor, did not support the launch due to the possibility of ice leaving the structure and damaging the thermal shield tiles during takeoff. Their concerns were relayed to NASA, but in such a way that NASA chose to proceed with the launch [2]. Though this was eventually determined to be a non-issue in the Challenger launch, the true nature of the problems that can occur when an object strikes the shuttle during takeoff would not be learned until 2003, when the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated on re-entry due to damage of a heat shield tile that occurred during takeoff [2]--[3].

The audience’s probable attitude and personality with respect to the Board and its findings are all addressed in the document. The attitude that the audience has is one of grief and distrust in both NASA and the Government. This is made evident in the statement, “The loss of Columbia and her crew represents a turning point, calling for a renewed public policy debate and commitment regarding human space exploration.” By stating that there is a need for renewed public policy regarding NASA’s missions, it is clear that the public opinion about NASA has been tarnished by the accident. They also have the probable objections that the Board was biased and that they do not have any effective results that could help reduce the risk that another accident like this will ever occur. However, the likely attitude that the audiences will have toward the writer are that of hope for the future and America’s return to space. This is shown when the document states, “These recommendations reflect both the Boardʼs strong support for

The Columbia mission, STS-107, was interesting because the public was more aware of the risk that was being taken upon re-entry. During the launch a piece of insulating foam broke away from the external tank surface, striking the left wing. In previous missions there had been evidence of this occurring which to engineers was seen as minor. In the case of the Columbia craft failure, it was more serious because the damaged section of the wing was damaged to the extent of which it allowed hot atmospheric gases to penetrate the structure of the wing, pulling it apart, rendering the craft unstable.

Ronald Dittemore, manager of Shuttle Program, received reports directly from Wayne Hale (manager of Launch Integration) and Linda Ham (manager of Space Shuttle Program Integration). It is clear that decision about foam issue was made based on communication with Linda Ham, stating that in previous flights had no critical problems with foam. Dittemore did not attempt to receive a professional opinion from the engineers. Furthermore, Rocha sent an e-mail to Dittemore in order to determine whether Columbia’s crew could make a space walk to perform an inspection of the wing. Answer to this e-mail was never received suggesting that communication attempts directly from engineers to high-level managers were rejected. NASA is a complex organization that maintains strict reporting relationship. Information exchange is built on hierarchy and rules did not facilitate fast informal communication between employees and high-level management. This filtering process diminished the information flow to the key decision-makers. To solve this hierarchical structure managers like Dittemore should exaggerate their ambiguous threats, avoid status differences and build trust among employees. Managers ought to communicate with specialists in order to obtain reliable information and understand the situation.

The article includes background information on the event as well as many quotes from people who followed the Challenger mission and remember the tragedy. Many of the quotes express the viewer’s shock at the disaster while others convey a sense of loss. The article also touches on the complacency of NASA leading up to the disaster and refers to a quote which states that “one of the biggest outcomes from the tragedy was the recommendation that NASA needed a stronger safety organization.”

President Regan ordered an immediate postponement of the Space Shuttle Program. The U.S. Congress then authorized an investigation of the Challenger disaster. It was a cold morning when Challenger was supposed to fly into space. Several NASA officials urged that the launch be postponed for warmer weather conditions. Since the NASA Launch Decision Team had okayed several space shuttles launches at and below that present temperature and had gotten away with it, the order was ignored (Howell). Seventy-three seconds later NASA realized that their luck had finally run out. President Ronald Regan tasked the Disaster Authority Commission with the investigation of the destructive incident. They concluded that there was two causes leading to the Challenger

Following the investigation of the American Airlines 1420 accident, the NTSB released a detailed and comprehensive list of the overall findings. Using data from the accident craft’s CVR and FDR, along with a thorough investigation of the crash site, the NTSB findings painted a clear understanding of the string events leading up to the crash. In addition, the events gave insight to the causes that prevented flight 1420 from landing safely in Little Rock.

During the year of 1986, on January the twenty sixth, a horrific shock was felt around the country. After Neil Armstrong’s landing on the moon, Americans felt a great sense of national pride and invincibility but many Americans learned on that fateful day that nobody is invincible; one of the worst catastrophes of the United States space program occurred on that day. About forty five seconds after liftoff, Americans witnessed the destruction of the breathtaking challenger space shuttle. Even though the disaster caused nationwide sadness, the reasons for its failure are clear. Named after the British ship that sailed across the Atlantic hundreds of years, could carry more than two thousand pounds the challenger was truly a glorious achievement.

On the cold morning of January 28th, 1986, The Space Shuttle Challenger was launched. Seventy-three seconds into the flight, the space shuttle broke apart, causing the seven deaths of its crew members. Roger Boisjoly, a mechanical engineer for Thiokol brought to NASA’s attention about a failing O-ring safety concern in the shuttles rocket booster. After being ignored by NASA Boisjoly tried to bring the issue of the O-ring to people higher up in his company, all of the people ignored Boisjoly in his attempts to get the issue resolved. Thirteen hours before the launch of the shuttle, Boisjoly strongly urged not to launch the shuttle, all attempts failed. After the disaster took place Boisjoly told the press exactly why the shuttle failed to

On an unusually cool Florida morning in January 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 50,000 feet above ground just moments after liftoff killing seven crew members onboard (Palmer, Dunford, and Akin, 2009). A presidential commission, dubbed “the Rogers Commission” (hereafter, the Commission) after former Secretary of State William Rogers, was appointed to investigate the cause of the disaster. Although mechanical failure of an O-ring seal in one of the rocket boosters was identified as the physical cause, the investigation revealed something much more disheartening; organizational deficiencies at NASA had allowed potential safety hazards to be disregarded. The disastrous consequences of NASA’s organizational failure prompted calls

Exhaustive research revealed the technical cause of the disasters. The Columbia was doomed when during the launch a loose piece of foam struck the leading edge of the left wing ripping a hole in the carbon tiles previously thought to be indestructible.

With seven ‒ novice as well as seasoned ‒ astronauts on board, they were going to space to deploy a satellite “into orbit to observe Halley’s comet”(“The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident” 256). The first affirmation of a problem was gray smoke, this was detected 678 seconds into flight. Shortly after the smoke there was a small flame and “at 73 seconds, the Challenger reached an altitude of 46,000 feet and exploded”(“The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident” 256). That evening, President Ronald Reagan said: “We will never forget them, nor the last time we saw them this morning as they prepared for their journey and waved goodbye”(“The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident” 256). Five months later, in June 1986, it was conjectured “that a fuel leak through faulty rubber O-rings that sealed joint sections of the rocket booster caused the accident”(“The Space Shuttle Challenger Accident”

IB Public Speaking Gladwell Final IOP: Blowup Teacher Copy 2 Hala Yazdani Good Afternoon Everyone. I am Hala Yazdani and my presentation will be Gladwell ’s essay titled “Blowup”, which is about the tragic explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986.

In 1986 when the space shuttle Challenger launched from Kennedy Space Center people watched in awe for a little more than a minute before the shuttle exploded in flight. This was the first of only two major accidents that occurred during over two decades of NASA’s shuttle program and many would consider it to be a fluke that could not have been prevented or predicted. In truth the Challenger disaster was an accident waiting to happen and was a symptom of systemic problems that were occurring at NASA during that era. The 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster was cause by a number of factors including structural failure of the shuttle, a change in NASA’s work environment from the days of the

On 1st of February, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia exploded when it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere after finished a 16 days mission in space. All seven astronauts were dead because of this incident. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had stopped the space shuttle program for more than two years to investigate this tragedy. In the 16 days period, the astronauts did approximately 80 experiments on different categories, for example, life science and material science [1]. An investigation later has found out that the disaster was caused by a problem on the day that took off on 16th of January.