Nagel's Dualism Of What It Is Like To Be A Bat

But, in another section of Jackson’s article, he refers back to the famous article What is it Like to Be a Bat?, written by the philosopher Thomas Nagel, to help strengthen his argument against physicalism. Jackson states how there is no amount of physical information that could possibly tell us what it is like to be anything other than a human being (Jackson 416-417). For instance, the dualist would say that I cannot possibly understand what it is like to actually be a dog. Even if I were able to obtain all the possible physical information there is about dogs, according to the dualist, I would still be missing the actual experience of being a dog. However, the physicalist would still argue that, although I am not a dog, I can still know the physical information about what it is like to be a dog and know how they perceive and experience everything in life. Then if, some day, I

Consciousness, Thomas Nagel states, “is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.” Here he refers particularly to phenomenal consciousness, which Block defines as “perceptual experiences,” and Nagel describes as “something that it is to be.’ This experiential element appears to present a challenge to the physicalist assertion that all mental processes are explicable in terms of physical brain states, biochemical reactions and the laws of physics. Frank Jackson presents this argument in his 1982 thesis Epiphenomenal Qualia. Whilst Jackson’s argument occupies a seminal position in philosophy of mind, whether he adds anything new to knowledge of the nature of conscious experience, is debateable. Thomas Nagel’s What is it like to

He explains that reductionism only accounts for reducing the mind to physics. However, it leaves out consciousness. Therefore, according to Nagel, reductionism is inaccurate because it excludes subjective experience. In order to explain his point, Nagel provides the reader with an analogy using bats. He states that the he is able to imagine himself with webbed arms, which permit him to fly around at night catching insects in his mouth. He expands, and says he is able to imagine that he has poor vision and has to use sonar to communicate, and finally he adds that he is able to imagine hanging upside down in an attic. However Nagel clarifies that these things would only explain what it would be like for him to be a bat. The question he wants answered is what it is like for a bat to be a bat? (423). He explains how if one tries to image this, they are restricted by their own mind. By presenting this information Nagel is able to support his claim because one cannot look and behave like another organism without changing their fundamental structure. One’s experiences cannot be anything like the experience from the point of view of another organism

Nagel then proceeds with his argument by demonstrating why we cannot know ?what it is like to be a bat?. A human has an imagination and could therefore imagine what it would be like to have the characteristics of a bat. However, a human cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Nagel supports this by saying, ?if I try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task.? (p.536). I agree with Nader on this point. In order for me to experience what it would be like to be a bat I would have to make the actual transformation to a bat and there is no way for me to do that. The only other possible way for this to occur would be by a proper explanation about the mind of a bat but this too

To drive my point, I will seem to drift off a little first, so bear with me. Consider the Organised Mind, and I think some neuroscience can shed some light on this line thing but before that, let's consider birds forexample, according to our most recent understanding, a perfect bird (or any Platonic ideal) is a concept that exists only as a collection of neuronal connections. When I say a "perfect bird", I mean the sort you might find in a children's book, or that a child would draw. A sparrow is close to a perfect bird. it flies, it's smallish, it builds nests, it has fluffy feathers... a penguin, however, is not a perfect bird (psychologically). Some people might add tenative language, like "well, a penguin is *technically* a bird... " and this reluctance is due to the penguin not sharing as many features of the Platonic ideal. Another example would be a whale. Many children might assume a whale to be a fish - I know I did. When I first learnt otherwise, I said things like "Did you know a whale is technically a mammal"? As if it shouldn't qualify to be a whole and entire mammal.

Physicalism is a philosophical theory that attempts to solve the mind-body problem with its explanation of the results of the interactions between our brains and our bodies. Physicalism explains that everything in the universe is made up of

In Nagel’s What Is It Like To Be a Bat, issues regarding consciousness are raised. One such issue is the mind-body problem which, as noted by Nagel, does not seem to fit with reductionist theories. That is, reductionist theories aim to explain things (e.g. persons and/or animal experiences) in relation to physical processes (i.e. organisms are just the sum of their physical parts). However, consciousness does not easily cooperate with such theories because it must be given a physical account. In addition, the nature of consciousness is that it is unique to a specific viewpoint (e.g. we can imagine what it would be for us to be a bat, but we cannot experience the mindset of said organism).

Theodore Roethke’s poem ‘The Bat’ clearly focuses on the animal the bat and effectively conveys through the latter an important message to the reader. One could interpret this poem in various ways; however a prominent theme would be that every

They then start to explain how humans are the only ones who can take images from the real world and pull them into their heads and divide them into parts and turn those parts into abstractions. We can imagine things and animals

Nagel discuses a lot about subjective character which he explains as what it’s like to be a specific organism. He believes that there are some experience that are completely beyond human understanding. Nagel states that even if you have an excellent imagination you still wouldn’t know what it’s like to be a bat. He argues that even if you can imagine what it’s like to have webbed arms and feet or hang upside down that doesn’t help you to know how a bat truly experiences its experiences. Each organism has a unique perspective and conscious experience that is only understandable from its own point of view.

Physicalism is the controversial doctrine that suggests the world is entirely physical, even that which is mental. Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument is one of the most well-known challenges to physicalism. Jackson’s knowledge argument is a dispute to the physicalist claim that mental states can be explained physically. (281) He demonstrates his argument in a thought experiment known as Mary’s Room.

Moreover, he combines the elements of a human form, and the physical attributes of a bat. He transforms into a young man, as well as, an old man. In addition, he feeds on the blood of other creatures for survival, as a bat, "Blood is the life. "(ch. 2)

In his text “What is it like to be a bat?” of 1974 Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the

A physicalist is one who believes that all information is physical. This is a view that sees all factual knowledge as that which can be formulated as a statement about physical objects and activities. Thus, the language of science can be reduced to third

Assuming that one has to be in a conscious state of mind in order for one to understand what it is like to be something, Nagel starts off his argument with an idea for consciousness. He criticizes the concept of functionalism for disregarding the subjective view of the mind into a purely objective view. Taking into account what he had just stated, Nagel makes his claim: “The fact that [a bat] has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something that it is like to be [a bat]” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). This “what it is like” is the subjective aspect of Nagel’s theory. He suggests that previous theories on the mind-body problem did not capture this “subjective character of experience” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). The “subjective character of experience” can be defined as the idea that a certain organism can only have conscious experiences that only it can feel. Using the subjective aspect of consciousness, Nagel explains that consciousness cannot be defined through only objective means. I agree in Nagel’s stance that the subjective experience is “not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states” (Nagel 1974, pp. 436). Nagel’s argument is convincing; when people feel an emotion such as pain, no one really knows how to describe it, for one person’s pain might be completely different from another’s. What is there to say that feelings such as pain could be described purely through objective means? In other words, the