National Guard Analysis

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

We, as NCOs, have the responsibility to develop, prepare, and train our Soldiers for the challenge of an ever-changing operational environment.

The subsequent sections will propose how smaller and better-combined joint forces maintain lethality, mobility, and survivability. In spite of some associated risks, force adjustment is an opportunity to form an aggregate joint force. Nevertheless, these contractions will not mirror equally among the services. The result will be a lean joint force that maintains the ability to defeat conventional and asymmetric threats in all domains. Discussed in this order, Air Force, Army, United States Marine Corps (USMC), and Navy general structure will revolve around the integration of skills and capabilities. Next, discussion of the four categories of risk involved in the transition to Joint Force 2020 include operational risk, force management

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

However, US advisors should be assessing the individual potential and performance of our partners. To increase this capability, US forces must stress strong continuity of support for those partners identified as having exceptional potential given the short term of deployments. Internally, USARCENT must stress emotional intelligence, patience, and language skills in its own talent management strategies as well. Fighting BWT requires Army leaders who are masters of exercising expertise and informal authority instead of formal authority. While BWT requires fewer personnel to execute the mission, it requires them much more skilled and

Regionally Aligned Brigades/Forces is the vision of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Secretary of the Army that will provide combatant command with constantly readily available troops that are versatile and responsive. Regionally Aligned Forces are based on an organizing principle that allows the United States (U.S.) Army to provide units that maintain core war-fighting skills complimented with cultural awareness training, language training, and regional expertise. A revised ARFOGEN cycle based on Active Component and 60-month Reserve Component sequence will replace the current Army model. Mission specific training requirements will be communicated, based on combatant command’s require¬ments, and organized through FORSCOM. These

As Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford emphasized in his February 26, 2015 statement to the house subcommittee on defense, “The challenges of the future operating environment will demand that our Nation maintains a force-in-readiness that is capable of global response.” Given today's fiscally constrained environment, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) continues to experiment with new tactics, techniques, and procedures to enable mission efficiency and improve combat effectiveness. Recognizing the gap between traditional crisis response capacity and demand, geographic combatant commanders (GCC) require alternative and creative solutions to traditional employment challenges. The Expeditionary Force 21 concept is one way the Marine Corps is answering that challenge. Expeditionary Force 21 is the USMC’s vision and response to threats in the contemporary environment while observing the limitations of

Combative positions are the most elite MOS’s that the United States armed forces has to offer. They require an immense amount of knowledge, training, and physical ability, making them the hardest to enlist in. Such high standards and requirements ensure that those filling such positions are equipped in every way possible to successfully complete each mission that they are placed in with as few casualties as physically possible. Combative positions carry a much

Following over a decade of irregular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is attempting to reset towards a conventional, regular type of warfare. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review describes a U.S. military shift to the Pacific and the supremacy of capability against near peer nations rather than support irregular of and counterinsurgency operations. As the QDR points out the U.S. military must “be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace.” This is balanced against the reality that “our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged

With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq coming to a close, the Marine Corps has found itself reverting back to its maritime traditions. As the Marine Corps footprint continues to shrink in Iraq and Afghanistan, Marines will find themselves aboard ships once again and serving their primary role as the Nation’s force in readiness. This leaves many questioning what the Marine Corps’ future role in irregular warfare will be. In the words of former Commandant General James T. Conway, “We must be a two fisted fighter – able to destroy our enemy formations with our scalable air-ground-logistics teams in major contingencies, but equally able to employ our hard earned irregular warfare skills hones over decades of conflict” (Conway). It is not yet time for the Marine Corps to hang up those boots! The Marine Corps can and will continue to serve as a key component of irregular warfare as it will continue to train and improve irregular warfare tactics to aid those nations with struggling governments from being overtaken by insurgencies/terrorist groups.

In a speech at George Washington University in November of 2015, the United States Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter also addressed challenges facing the United States, stating that the security of the US depends on a force better than it is today. This force not only includes the military services, but also extends to the civilian workforce of the combat support agencies, upon which this paper focuses. The vision of the future force is one that can quickly adapt and achieve success in a sophisticated, highly-technical and rapidly changing environment; maximize the benefits of commercial technology development; and address global military competition to defend the nation and make the world a better place.

The purpose of this white paper is to highlight current mobility requirements that have dictated the operational philosophy shift that will require the continuous utilization of the Guard and Reserve to accomplish its missions. We will discuss the personnel requirements in order to accomplish future missioning. It will also briefly discuss the fiscal relevance that these new force structure and operational requirements while reviewing the full time mobilization positions that are strategically positioned at the right functional level.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

PCCs and PCIs should be conducted at the beginning of each training exercise or mission as part of the troop leading procedures. They are a systematic way to ensure that leaders and Soldiers can successfully and efficiently execute the mission.

The requirement and future of Army Special Forces (SF) will be determined by our ability to fully comprehend Unconventional Warfare (UW), and capability to sell our ability as UW experts to senior leaders and policy makers. After 14 years of combat operations, we have lost focus and become complacent in our original and most important primary mission of Unconventional Warfare. I would speculate the majority of SF qualified Soldiers cannot even state the definition of UW; much less articulate the seven phases. Whom can we blame besides ourselves for not placing the utmost importance of our primary mission in the focus of training, education, deployments, etc.? The challenges of preserving our history and making Army Special Forces specialists