In the current intelligence environment, the relationship between the analyst and the policymaker balance on a fine line between being too politicized and the policymaker being too distant in order to provide feedback to the analysis performed. Policymaker(s) depend on intelligence products from the Intelligence Community to provide information that fills in the knowledge gap. The demand for such products is constant, so each agency within the IC participates with their intelligence to contribute to the overall product. However, unlike the constant intelligence products that give regard to current issues that just scratch the surface, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are related to prediction and estimations that are directly tied to …show more content…
There are two main weaknesses in the process and they are: the importance of information being placed outside the IC and the challenges of analysis within the IC. The first weakness of the NIE is that importance has been placed on outside sources due to the fact that the NIE itself has become unreliable in providing the information needed. The Brookings Institution points out that the NIE has become too detailed and often too late in the information provided that it comes down to the policymaker to perform the analysis and determine what is important to them rather than the analyst answering the consumer’s intelligence problem directly. With this constant disappointment in quality, this in turn has led the NIEs to be regarded as unreliable as it does not answer the needs of the consumers where the knowledge gaps are at. If the analysts cannot satisfy the needs of the decision makers in the US Government, then the analysts will be placed on sidelines while others will be leaned on to assist the policymakers with the answers they seek, whether they be one sided answers or not. Others sources such as think tanks, public opinion, and mass media can also influence decisions with a common assumption among the groups instead, as those sources are widely available. The issue with relying on the outside sources is the …show more content…
The IC has 16 agencies that contribute input to overall production for distribution to the consumers. Before the NIE even begins, the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) creates a terms of reference (TOR) and sends it within the IC for tasking of division of labor from each of the agencies. Then the 16 agencies reply with their own input to the task, where representatives of each agency will then hone their intelligence in the NIE draft. A few issues arise with the production, one of them being that the analysts participating are, or at least should be considered, experts in the field related to the question being asked of them. The second issue is that dissents are sometimes ignored in favor of the overall consensus, which allows too many details into the estimates. The final issue is that the NIEs are being created with the sense of being conclusive products rather than being estimates of possible courses of action. Too often, the IC forgets that the higher the level of consumer, the less time they have to read over the entire product and they are not straight to the point of assisting the consumer but rather driving the NIE to the back-burner for being overbearing with
Question #1 – Describe two process differences between the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Which budget funds the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP)? Briefly describe the DNI’s budget “hammer” over the IC.
Since 9/11, the intelligence community has improved greatly. It is not that they have been reconstructed from the ground up, or that their mission has completely changed, it is, in the community’s eye anyway, that they now all share information, no matter how important or how small. This information sharing now even includes all the way down to local and tribal authorities. The reasoning is that, even if it might be small or seem insignificant to you at your level, it may be the piece someone somewhere else in the country needs.
Unlike national security intelligence which primarily focuses on the collection and analysis of data and information which benefits the country’s security
The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.
Perhaps the most important change in how the federal government was reorganized after September 11th is the creation of both the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2004 with the passage of the same IRTPA that created TSA. This concept had been first suggested in 1955 after a study by Congress then and was recommended time and again but only became a reality after the September 11th attacks drove the need for major intelligence reform home and the 9/11 Commission continued the push for the creation of such a position (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-5). As one can see from the mission and vision of the ODNI, the importance cannot be overstated. The mission includes leading intelligence integration while having the IC produce the most insightful intelligence products possible and the vision is fully integrating the IC thus making the nation more secure (ODNI, n.d., paras. 1-2).
The challenge to an intelligence analyst, as mentioned by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, is the lack of experimental, independent testing within a controlled environment. That does not necessarily mean that the intelligence analysis process lacks a formal process or is absent scientific methodologies. Based on Knight (2010), intelligence research identifies patterns through observation so that an analyst can develop a hypothesis to predict future events the very premise of the scientific method. However, the IC has acknowledged a scientific gap and has been migrating towards a more ?coherent scientific discipline? based on the need to improve performance of intelligence analysis (Johnston, ). Furthermore, intelligence analysts are provided with scientific methodologies at their disposal that they can use to strengthen their estimates. In the analyst?s toolkit there are a variety of techniques that can be used to strengthen processes and conform to more valid scientific methods. Heuer (1999), the author of Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), use ACH as an eight-step procedure using basic insights from cognitive psychology, decision analysis, and the scientific method. According to Bruce, ACH attempts to eliminate cognitive bias and provide other explanations with possible outcomes through testing hypotheses in an attempt to refute or ?disconfirm? them (Bruce, 2008, p. 175). After all, the challenge to inductive inference is not in supporting a study?s conclusions, but refuting them through scientific means. Heuer?s ACH methodology attempts to reconcile this weakness and has become a recognized advancement towards this goal. In Bruce?s essay (2008), he acknowledges that had the 2002 Iraq NIE utilized this methodology, the estimate?s weighty findings should have exposed the
In this paper the subject of interest is the role of congress in the oversight of strategic intelligence, or the lack there of. Does congress have a proper role in the oversight of strategic intelligence? If not what should the proper role be? These are the questions best answered by looking at the history of congressional over sight and where it is at today. The next few pages will cover the topics above and shed light on what it is congress calls oversight.
The failure of dissemination occurs when intelligence is circulated too late, given to the wrong people and intelligence are accorded with a very low priority. Wherein politicians and policymakers failed to consider the intelligence to validate an espoused position by that of the analysts.
According to Robert Jervis, “Policymakers say they need and want good intelligence. They do need it, but often they do not like it, and are prone to believe that when intelligence is not out to get them, it is incompetent.” In order for intelligence to be
The United States Intelligence community draws on advanced technology and analytical techniques. An intelligence process that sets objectives, collects, analyzes, and report findings, with feedback loops integrated throughout. Explicitly, the intelligence community advantages technology and tradecraft within a proscribed process. However, estimation of threats and decision-making are outcomes of human thinking. Analysts and policymakers create mental models, or short cuts to manage complex, changing environments. In other words, to make sense of ambiguous or uncertain situations, humans form cognitive biases. Informed because of personal experience, education, and specifically applied to intelligence analysis, Davis
For instance, most common domestic terrorists targeted National Security are gangs and other forms of terrorists inside the US. Intelligence is a solid component of past data that stays permanent. Current intelligence is the non-stop information gathering process to complete the puzzle. Collecting and analyzing the material is what is occurring at this time. Information can be changeable and is also a brainstorming of information. Intelligence estimates is the future information that can be presented as brainpower on a major problem solving technique in our country. Intelligence analysts design endless drills on a how to manual that states explanations on circumstances such as terrorist attacks, nuclear accident, biological war, etc. let’s not forget that all these intelligence techniques are designed to protect and maintain the integrity of our president, our country, its allies and
In most cases these INTs community compete among each other to provide needed intelligence information to policy makers to justify their budgetary allocations (Lowenthal, 2014). However, intelligence collection can be divided into five main categories referred to as “intelligence collection disciplines” or the “INTs”. These include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence
and ensure resilience to disasters. In order to achieve these goals, intelligence is necessary. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, a subsection to the DHS focuses on obtaining and analyzing intelligence and puts them into the Homeland Security Enterprise which primarily
The analysis is then given to consumers and policy makers, once it is checked by the analyst supervisor and peers. The analyst should also be ready to give a briefing on short notice. But both the analyst and the policy maker or consumer have to be aware of at all times, is that the intelligence field does not know everything. “On any given subject, the intelligence community faces what is in effect a field of rocks, and it lacks the resources to turn over every one to see what threats to national security may lurk underneath” (Pillar).
Everyday information about developments in changing marketing environment that helps managers prepares marketing plans. The marketing intelligence system determines the intelligence needed, collects it by searching the environment and delivers it to marketing managers who need it. Marketing intelligence comes from many sources. Much intelligence is from the company's personnel - executives, engineers and scientists, purchasing agents and the sales force. But company people are often busy and fail to pass on important information. The company must 'sell' its people on their importance as intelligence gatherers, train them to spot new developments and urge them to report intelligence back to the company. The company must also persuade suppliers, resellers and customers to pass along important intelligence. Some information on