National Security

The past decade has witnessed fundamental changes in the information environment, which makes availability and access to information more prevalent than in the past. For this reason, we must develop and maintain the ability to influence the content and flow of information to potential adversaries, as well as foreign civilian audiences in the area of operations.

“How much freedom are Americans willing to give up for safety from terrorists?” We the people of the United States are willing to give away our natural born rights to be a safer nation. Millions of innocent lives were lost on 9-11-01. A problem not widely discussed in the United States much until September 11, 2001 the date of the attack from terrorist organizations on the world trade centers’ New York towers in New York City. The United States of America has not worried much about self-defense or in this case homeland security. Due to the actions on September 11th homeland security has been the main goal of many politicians and voters. Homeland security builds coalitions and partnerships, protects civil rights and civil liberties, and

The 1776 united States of America Declaration of Independence contain the words that succinctly describe our national objective, strategy, and message, “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” In today’s United States of America, the world acknowledges American’s as the preeminent owner of individual freedoms, holding and promoting these three basic principles for some 240 years. During these years, the U.S. has employed the use of intelligence to shape its objectives and strategies, and then in times of war used the same intelligence to shape strategic messages against foreign powers. However, as hostilities decline and give way to the restoration of relative peace, the use of intelligence for strategic messages against foreign powers ceases. Under these circumstances, the void created by secession of U.S. messages, provides a communication opportunity to foreign powers for transmission of anti-U.S. messages. Attempts have been made to reinstate the offices that during war countered these anti-U.S. messages to a comprehensive reorganization of the U.S Government intelligence community. This paper does not support creation of a new agency or department to utilize existing strategic intelligence.

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

The idea of securing the nation’s borders and securing the safety of the citizens has been a major topic since the beginning of the nation’s existence. There have always been means and procedures for it but it was never defined to the point it is today. The Homeland Security Department is a fairly new program which is constantly improving and adjusting in accordance to the threats that may arise. In the attempt to secure the United States, homeland security has become paramount and a lot of emphasis is being provided so as to ensure the safety of the borders and the citizens of the United States. So one must ponder what the difference between homeland security and homeland defense are since they both tend to mean the same

As we have seen throughout the entire history of warfare, ancient world terrorism, political intrigue and elitist terrorism of the middle ages, and into modern terrorism, intelligence is of vital importance on both sides. Armed forces have always used intelligence of some form be it sneaking up a hill and scouting what is on the other side to the use of modern platforms such as

In the future, technology and digital systems will continue to play an important role in how the United States Army fights and wins our nation’s wars. As technology improves and becomes an increasingly integral part of every Army system, it is important that leaders maintain the ability to fight and win without these benefits. Over reliance on digital systems and unfettered information is a weakness that our enemies will exploit on future battlefields. Ukraine learned this lesson very devastatingly in the recent annexation of Crimea. In order to safeguard the trust emplaced on leaders by the American people, it is a lesson not repeated by the US

1. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 reduces the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.

Surveillance and biopolitical governance are terms usually associated with the internal surveillance methods of the United States, especially in light of the Snowden NSA leaks. However, Canada has developed an elusive biopolitical national security policy that has both social and political consequences. In April 2004, the Canada’s federal government introduced its first national security legislation, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Bell 147). Discussions surrounding a national security agenda has expanded rapidly since the tragic events of 9/11. Canada has quoted $690 million in national security policy and strategy however, this only reflects a portion of the actual total amount of money put towards security and

Winning the war on [terrorism] requires winning the war of information. [The United state is] dealing with a very dangerous, very patient, very diabolical enemy who wants to [harm it], and in order to be effective in dealing with this enemy, [the country needs] to have information. [The United States needs] to know who the enemy is …[,] what the enemy is thinking …[, and] where the enemy is thinking about striking [next].(Domestic)

Every able-bodied male should serve at least four years in the United States Armed Forces

The Constitution grants Congress the power raise and maintain the armed forces, establish rules that govern those forces, and above all – declare war. The Framers of the Constitution intentionally designed Congress to have a collective control over war, thus granting the legislature authroity over offensive campaigns. In comparision, the president, as commander in chief, has the ability to use force to protect American sovergneity and American lives. Consequently, the U.S. national security policy process includes countless opportunities to delay or block action.

Important battles in a war are the ones that not only define the campaign but also the men who take part in them. An important battle often shapes the conditions for the rest of the war and enables future success. The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough battle analysis of Operation Anaconda by reviewing the setting, describing the actions of friendly and enemy forces, and then assessing the significance of those actions. Additionally, this paper will identify an alternate ending based on the use of available intelligence assets. Had military intelligence effectively employed measures and signatures intelligence assets and correctly analyzed the information those assets provided before the start of Operation Anaconda, estimates of enemy composition, disposition, capabilities, and intentions would have been known and could have drastically reduced the amount of casualties Coalition Forces incurred. Second and third order effects of realizing this intelligence would have shattered the enemy’s ability to conduct major combat operations and set the conditions for stability operations to take place.

Likewise, the intelligence community was able to support both the operational mission of the armed forces and the strategic mission of United States as a major player on the world stage. The War on Terrorism consumed a huge amount of intelligence resources to be sure. The United States was able to bend and flex in order to accommodate the surge in its intelligence efforts. While it is undeniable that the nation’s military has been “at war” for the last 13 years, it is hardly “wartime” that Kendal and Kent would recognize. The necessity to operate simultaneously in both the strategic and operational arenas has highlighted the fact that the need and use of intelligence differs greatly depending on whether it is supporting the wartime or peacetime mission. In this sense, Kendall’s doctrine seems to come out

I can’t agree more with your point that OPSEC is essential to defeat our adversaries in information warfare. We not only need to know our enemy’s capabilities but also our own. We have to acknowledge that we can’t rule of the possibilities of counter deception from our enemies. The less vulnerable we are, the harder for our enemies to attack our resources. Cyr argues These individuals must possess an intuitive sense and ability to function in an increasingly fast Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop. They will also have to rapidly combine their knowledge of the adversary (culture, values, modes of operation) with the real-time picture they receive from sensors in order to “convert information advantage to operational advantage.