National Surety Justifies Its Disregard Of The Waivers

Each Party enters into this release knowing that there may be unknown claims which it is releasing and waiving by executing this

This court case involved the plaintiff Hamptons Landscaping Service Inc., who had been represented by Lieb at Law, P.C. This side of the case then was seeking summary judgment to recover $17,217.00, from the defendants Michael & Frances Sherman who had been represented by Kelly and Hulme, P.C. which was alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment causes of action. The Sherman’s had crossed moved seeking an order dismissing Hampton's complaint, also had asserting that Second

Richards v. Richards, 181 Wis. 2d 1017, 513 N.W.2d 122. For example, in Richard, the court found the document signed by the plaintiff served two purposes: (1) authorizing her to ride in a Company truck, and (2) releasing Company from liability. Id. Moreover, the court ruled that a reasonable person would not take a document titled “Passenger Authorization” to release the defendant from liability. Id. In Richards, the plaintiff signed the waiver required to ride along with her husband in his truck. Id. at 1010, 513 N.W.2d 119. While riding in the truck with her husband, the truck overturned and the plaintiff was pinned inside the vehicle, causing injuries. Id. at 1014, 513 N.W.2d 121. The court concluded that the waiver did not go far enough as to describe the nature or significance of what injury the plaintiff might sustain because the passenger release and authorization to ride were combined into one document and served two purposes. Id. at 1018, N.W.2d

We write today to present you with a demand for settlement and the supporting documentation for our demand. As you know, we represent Ms. Betty Brath in the matter of a grievous injury she suffered due to the negligence of your insured. Ms. Brath has reached maximum medical improvement but unfortunately will never fully recover. We are able to calculate her past and future medical expenses at approximately $34,177.73. Her general damages at trial will be approximately $170,000.00. We therefore demand payment in the amount of $204,177.73. We elaborate on this demand below.

David A. Goldmeier and Terry C. Goldmeier v. Allstate Insurance Company 337 F.3d 629 (6th Cir 2003) case supports our

It is agreed by many, if not all, that the compensatory principle is the ruling principle in breach of contract

(b) Notice of Intent to Breach – if the Δ gave notice of intent to breach, then

Navigators submits that it is entitled to rescind the policy because the insurance application was riddled with material misrepresentations. Dr. Wong first argues that Navigators failed to provide notice that it would seek rescission, thereby waiving its right to bring this lawsuit. Dr. Wong then contends that rescission would unfairly prejudice him as a third party relying on the insurance contract's

To illustrate this absurdity, if we accept National Surety’s position that any negative defense to a breach of contract claim is a right or claim, National Surety would be free to assert any claim against WCS—no matter how preposterous and in want of merit—knowing that WCS has released any and all defenses—affirmative, negative, or otherwise—that WCS may have to such a claim. This Court could not afford the 2007 agreement such a construction. See Middlebrook Tech, LLC v. Moore, 157 Md. App. 40, 70 (2004) (“[I]t is a fundamental tenet of contract interpretation that a court will not read contract language to produce an

The Holding: Yes, Defendant did meet the standard required to move for a federal summary judgement to dismiss the causes of action.

Co. v. Distrib. Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 2003); McGirt v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 399 F.Supp. 2d 655, 665 (D. Md. 2005), abrogated by McGirt v. Gulf Ins. Co., 207 Fed. Appx. 305 (4th Cir. 2006) (The MCS-90 serves the purpose of the MCA by “creating a suretyship by the insurer to protect the public when the policy otherwise provides no coverage to the insured, [and] ensures someone will pick up the tab when the public is injured by the carrier’s accident and the policy terms deny coverage.” (internal quotation

The California Court of Appeal for the fourth District recently held in Underwriters of Interest Subscriving Policy Number A15274001 v. ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company that the statute of limitation on the insurer’s equitable subrogation claim was tolled until the underlying action came to final judgment.

1.2.1. Justices Mason, Brennan, Deane, and Dawson in Khoury v. Government Insurance Office of NSW states that the discovery of a breach that is serious or of an essential term creates paths available for the innocent party in which they are ‘…confronted by two truly alternative rights … the right to avoid or terminate a contract and the right to affirm it and insist on performance…’ They continue by quoting Lord Diplock’s judgment in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd , that if the plaintiff follows through on either path ‘…may lose one of [the rights] by acting "in a manner which is consistent only with his having chosen to rely on [the opposing right]"’

"[a]n insurance company has a duty to act in good faith in settling claims and a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action by the insured." Pasipanki v. Morton, 61 Ohio App. 3d 184, 185, 572 N.E.2d 234 (1990) (quoting Bean v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 9th Dist. No. 13543, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 4275, 1988 WL 114464 at *1 (Oct. 26, 1988)). Gekko did not act in good faith to settle Vic’s claim against Donna, and their failure to do so enables Donna has a cause of action against Gekko.

In this article, Justine Kirby (2000) analyzes the basic law, section 11 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979, and acknowledged routines for "exchanging" commitments, and after