Negatives Of Kodak 's Top Management

If I were responsible for solving the problem, in addition to Kodak’s repositioning strategy, I would do the following:

Another significant reason that has played a vital role in photojournalism of recent times is the emergence of imaging technologies. Imaging technologies has undoubtedly played a major part in the works of a photojournalist today. Based on earlier accounts on how photography itself is an inherent manipulation, the question is no longer directed on ‘how has imaging technologies manipulate photojournalism' but ‘how much more has imaging

Film photography is in my opinion, more of a sense of occasion, just the feel of having to cock the mechanism, and wind the film as you start your shooting and as you finish, always being gentle with the fragile delicate black tape, and once the photos taken there’s nothing you can do to edit it within reason, when developing the shots, it is a laborious task to take time and get all the correct chemicals. Film is ultimately higher in resolution than digital. So, for making very large scale prints, film currently can’t be beaten. This is specifically true for photos which have a lot of texture that needs to be preserved, such as landscapes. The dynamic range of film, which is its ingenuity to retain details in low light and areas of highlights, is greater. Also, it is much more merciful of overexposure and will not blow out the highlights nearly as much as digital will. While this is essentially idiosyncratic, some photographers and myself, we believe that film is a more “original and authentic” form of photography. However, the same line of thinking was protuberant in the antecedent

It was Kodak’s’ strategy to sell the cameras at low prices, and it used to earn revenue from the films; this strategy is called the razor-blade strategy. This model for photography became flop when Sony introduced a camera with floppy disk inside, in which there wasn’t any use of films. As a result of Sony’s introduction of the Mavica in 1981, Kodak took it as a threat and started investing in the digital photography. For this purpose, it has conducted a huge research on the digital photography. As exposed by Fisher in 1997, Kodak’s respond wasn’t appropriate for the digital world: “One of the mistakes we [Kodak] have made is that we [Kodak]’ve tried to do it all. We [Kodak] do not have to pursue all aspects of the digital opportunity and service side.”

The problem in this case is Kodak's steadily eroding market share and shareholder value in the film rolls market. This is especially undesirable given the fact that the market has been growing at a tepid 2% annual rate and the steadily increasing threat from competition. Kodak needs to come up with a strategy for corrective action so as to arrest this decline, regain market share and increase share holder value. Kodak's strategy is to reposition itself by targeting a new segment of price sensitive customers and re-segmenting the super premium customers’ space by including a wider segment of special occasion customers.

The names of Kodak and Fujifilm are well known around the world. They are two companies that have made a name from photos, film, cameras and printers. They are competitors that started in the same business and took different paths. Though they shared similar products their management direction and company direction differed. The differences led one company to be successful and the other to struggle.

(Bellis, 2009) Nevertheless, the main selling point of digital cameras was the convenient way that they could be stored. Every exposure is almost instantly saved to a removable disk drive, which remarkably expired the use of darkroom processing. It was convenient, less time was needed to produce an image, making it particularly appealing to journalism. The photograph has since then become an instant process. Combined with the invention of the Internet, and booming industry of personal computers, the newer technology would expire its predecessor. There are billions of photographs on the Internet, comprising the largest most diverse photo collection ever assembled. We have access to imagery from all over the world, using key words and hash tags to catalogue imagery and content; we can see what is happening without being there. The introduction of digital photography has enabled photographers to record terabits of imagery which can be stored in minute places, meaning the coverage that we have of the modern world is greater than ever. Unlike the formats that Henri Cartier-Bresson used, where each roll of film, or negative slide needed storing in a large physical place, under controlled conditions, an archive of objects. Automation came with digital photography, its combination of digital components allowed the camera to automatically detect light qualities, and

Taking pictures with the Kodak camera was simpler than the earlier camera because first, it did not require a darkroom or chemicals and glass plates. It did not require any of these things because it was not only one person’s job to develop and take the photo. The photographer could send their camera in, and the Eastman Kodak Company would develop the pictures for them. “In the first year, 13,000 people paid $25 for a Kodak; they each took 100 pictures, returned the camera and within ten days, Kodak sent back the prints and camera with film for another 100 pictures,” (Buckland and Lefer 250). This opened up a whole new door for inexperienced photographers. All they had to do was take pictures, and send the camera

When Kodak began making changes to its organizational architecture in 1984, its current architecture did not fit the business environment for the industry. The largest factor that motivated Kodak to make this change was increased competition and decreased market share. Until the early 1980’s, Kodak owned the film production market with very little competition. This suddenly changed when Fuji Corporation and many other generic store brands began producing high quality film as well (Brickley, 2009, p. 358). Another factor in this change was technology advancements. As technology rapidly expanded in the 1980’s, other

In my March 6 memo, I discussed the need for Kodak to revamp its core strategy and regain popularity. Eastman Kodak has been the leader of photography and printing products for nearly 130 years. Over the last few years Kodak has been in distress due to its poor fundamental shift into the digital age. Lack of strategic creativity led Kodak to misunderstand the industry in which it was operating. This lack of strategic creativity was costly for Kodak.

To account for their miscalculation in film sales, Kodak is undergoing a massive digitally based shift. Kodak plans on building a stronger base in its consumer, medical, and profession imaging products. However, this shift does not come without a price tag. Kodak’s projected spending could reach as much as $3 billion in future investments to aid the shift. With these investments Kodak claims a tremendous turnaround in revenue. Kodak anticipates reaching $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010. To pay

However as the authors stressed, probably more significant than the change in how images are produced, distributed and used, are the ideas to which the changes are giving rise and how digital imaging is challenging and changing traditional ways of seeing and thinking. It seems that our traditional belief that ‘the camera never lies’ has been brought into question. It also appears important to consider who

While Kodak has historically been a well-established brand name in the marketplace, it struggled to find a niche when the industry morphed from a film-based market to a digital-based market. Kodak has struggled to successfully evolve its film-based business structure to the new structure of digital-based technology, which has allowed for competitors to enter the market, decreasing Kodak’s market share. Competitors (such as Canon Inc., Fuji Photo Film Co., Hewlett Packard Co., Nikon, and Sony Corp.) have posed major threats to Kodak’s livelihood. Kodak faces a 5% drop in film sales (2001-2003) and a 3% reduction in overall revenues over the same time period. In addition, revenues and net income are expected to be fairly flat (or decrease) in future estimates. Kodak faces much pressure to revitalize their business through digital imaging, a radical innovation, or risk being eaten alive in an industry they thought they controlled.

Background Eastman Kodak Company, headquartered in Rochester New York, was founded in 1889. The corporation, now multinational and focusing on imaging and photographic equipment, posted revenues in excess of $6 billion in 2011. During most of the 20th century Kodak was dominant in the photographic film industry in 1976 it held 90% of the market but began a downward slide once the Internet, digital cameras and computer processing grew. By 2007, Kodak ceased making a profit and in January 2012 filed for bankruptcy protection and ceased making cameras, video cameras and began to focus on the corporate digital imaging market (De La Merced, 2012). In evaluating Kodak's corporate strategy from the mid-1980s onward, we find that there four major management paradigms in place during this transitional period:

Eastman Kodak Company, commonly known as Kodak is an American multinational imaging and photographic equipment, materials and services company headquartered in Rochester, New York, United States. It was founded by George Eastman in 1889. Kodak is best known for photographic film products. During most of the 20th century Kodak held a dominant position in this sector. In fact, Eastman Kodak Co. is one of the dominant market share holders within the camera and other photography-related industries. Kodak pioneered amateur photography and is often credited for the invention of roll film and the first camera. The markets for color film and color photofinishing in 1954 were controlled by Kodak. It had over 90% of the amateur color