Negligence Liability

791 Words4 Pages
It is foreseeable that future manufacturers will not be as compliant as some manufacturers are today in being held strictly reliable. To entice manufacturers, and relieve their concerns they will not be unfairly held accountable for the negligence of drivers; it is significant to discuss how a driver could be at fault. Negligence liability (NL) is less efficient than that of SPL because it requires a higher burdened of proof. A court will recognize negligence when (1) an act or a failure to act falls below the standard of due care (i.e. a breach), that act or failure (2) actually and proximately caused an injury to a third party whom (3) a duty was owed. In such a context manufactures must use reasonable care to design their AVs to minimize…show more content…
An example of a breach such a duty in an AV would be a manufacturer breaching the duty to warn a driver of newly discovered post-sale risks.
Actual causation requires the defect to be the cause of the accident, while proximate causation limits injuries only to physical harms as a result of the risks made by the actor of the tortious conduct. Negligence may be established through the violation of a regulation or as negligence per se. For the latter to be applied, the regulation violated must have been intended to protect a specific class of people, which the plaintiff is apart of, and created to prevent injuries that a plaintiff sustained.
The doctrine of comparative negligence would permit a court to create a fair distribution of fault between causal actors. Such a doctrine assigns percentages to those with legal responsibility. Courts would assign fault to parties based upon the “awareness or indifference with respect to the risks created . . . and any intent with respect to the harm caused . . . and the
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In fact, arguably, negligence is more efficient and fair than strict liability as negligence has a better ability on deterring specific negative conduct while still enabling an injured party to be compensated. Despite the potential benefit of being more efficient and fair, the legal costs associated with a comparative negligence doctrine are higher than that of a SPL. In a comparative negligence doctrine defendants that believe they are only partially liable in an accident may tend to opt for a hearing in court over accepting a settlement agreement. Selecting to enter court proceedings instead of accepting a efficient timely settlement, raises attorney fees, administrative costs, and further burdens the court system. Juries that lack expertise also tend to return bias monetary verdicts. This can be observed by looking at the verdicts returned in the Toyota’s electronic throttle case, where juries gave large verdicts in favor of
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