North Africa Story : South Africa

Agitation and turmoil of whites and blacks filled South Africa. A major theme that Alan Paton develops throughout the novel, Cry, the Beloved Country is the importance of acting with kindness. The author promotes the idea that kindness is a part of the solution to the problems in South Africa. Being able to be kind helps people understand one another which can help bring reform and hope to the small community of Ndotcheni. Alan Paton through the novel teaches the idea of love thy brother as yourself, as Christ did, in order to help the White and Blacks of South African Society to overcome their fear and misunderstanding of each other.

The outcome of this great battle was decided in the end by true courage and resiliency from the Allied Forces. The front line of their forces was at the time extremely thin, and even got thinner shortly before the German assault began due to some offensive strategies from General Eisenhower. The line was so

The final major European battle was Hitler’s Ardennes offensive also known as the Battle of the Bulge. The significance of the Battle of the Bulge is mostly characterized by the absence of Ultra. Hitler had undoubtedly knew the Allies were reading the Germans messages and he ordered radio silence. The Germans began using an extensive telephone and telegraph network to communicate and moving troops under the cover of night. Allied commanders had been gifted with information of almost every aspect of the enemy and had begun to rely so heavily on that information that they became overconfident. The radio silence employed assisted the Germans launch their last offensive with a high degree of surprise. There were many indications of a counter-attack collected from prisoners of war, documents,

The planning of Operation Overlord was an idea that formed early in 1942. One of the key points that helped move the planning along was the idea that the German U-Bats were no longer a threat to the Allies. This now created an ocean that would be safe for the flow of supplies from the United States to Britain. In November 1943 the agreement to plan an immense operation to cross the English Channel and liberate France was in effect. “ The

The Allies did air raids and by D-Day, Germany’s weakness there became a factor in their downfall. They also built a replica of the German defenses in their training grounds, (Popular Mechanics) by practicing here; they made sure they knew what they were doing. Allies made sure the Germans didn’t know what they were doing by holding up hoaxes. Confusing them with faux-assaults would be an important part of both execution and

(2) Depth: This was achieved by combing several schemes of attacks. In conjunction with this, they used close air support to provide depth into the enemy’s area and additional demands on his forces. Lastly, they initiated an Information Operation (IO) campaign against the enemy by dropping tens of thousands of psychological warfare leaflets

As Germany planned, they could make a disorder at the Allied Forces by separating the force, and using spies. The Allied Force were inferior at first, but they spied on the movements of Germany and they strengthened the army where Germany was heading to. Even though Germany had strong weapons and tanks, they had a weak point. It was short of fuels. They did not have enough fuels for all tanks.

The strategy of the allies attack on the Axis Powers took more than a year to strategize. The strategy used against General Rommel in Africa was a joint force of American and British forces. The main goal was to drive Rommel and his forces out of Africa, back to Germany and stop the supply lines that originated from Sicily. The name of the Strategy Operation Torch. The timing of the attack was perfect. While Hitler became occupied dealing with the Russian Army trying to take Russia he was not concerned about an invasion happening from the Allies any time soon. He trusted that the amount of Forces sent to Africa Under General Rommel would be enough to push away any forces that might try to attack Africa. He was mistaken. From the American Forces

The Germans knew the capabilities of their weapons systems and had learned how to maximize those capabilities. The Allied forces, especially the Americans who were the Allied combatants in this battle, had not yet learned how to differentiate parade ground and map bound tactics from actual battle ground tactics. This weakness had a far greater impact on their defeat than did their shortcomings in the technological

Rommel then led his entire detachment up the camouflage path into the Italian position and expanded the breach along the line fifty yards on either side and captured several dozen more Italians who were seeking shelter within their dugouts. Rommel’s breach of the Italian line was done without firing a shot and created an opening for troops to poor into the rear of the second line and cut it off from any support. This tactic was repeated up and down the Italian lines was great success and supported the unprecedented advance of the Central Powers in the region.

The most glaring instance of this reliance occurred shortly before the Battle of Kasserine Pass commenced, when intelligence officers of Allied Force Headquarters misinterpreted Ultra information that ran counter to what was being reported by other sources of intelligence. Through Ultra intercepts, the AFHQ intelligence officer (G-2) learned of the large German buildup behind the Eastern Dorsale and expected an offensive soon, but believed Rommel would attack further to the north at Fondouk, with diversionary attacks at Faid and Gafsa (D'Este). As a result, combat commands of the U.S. 1st Armored Division were shifted northward to Fondouk to meet the perceived

In late January 1943, Rommel and von Arnim receive change of mission from Italian Comando Supremo (High Command) to maneuver against Allied positions along Fondouk and Faid Pass (approximately 50 miles east of Kasserine Pass). By 3 February, the Allied

In February 1940, Rommel was named commander of the 7th Panzer division. The next year, he was appointed commander of German troops, The Afrika Korps, in North Africa. Rommel’s most important achievement was his defeat of the British at Gazala in May 1942. The British came back 5 months later at El Alamein, when the British imperial army won the battle under Bernard Montgomery. Rommel took the survivors of his Panzerarmee to Tunisia. By then the British and Americans had landed in North Africa, the British Eighth Army had reconquered Tripolitania and was on the Tunisian border, and the Germans were hemmed in, isolated and facing overwhelming odds.

Tanks cannot run forever though, and Rommel eventually had to retreat to Bardia. Using this sudden retreat to his advantage, the British relieved Tobruk and pushed the Germans, forcing them back to El Aghelia where they started. This victory would not stay for long as Japanese and German bombings would reduce supplies to the British forces and Rommel would get fresh troops and materials needed for a counter-offensive. Rommel would use this newfound army to push the British all the way back to Gazala, nearly halfway across Cyrenaica. Major General Neil M. Ritchie would set up the Gazala Line, a massive sixty-mile long line of strongholds, minefields, barbed wire and more than enough troops to man the line. Six strongholds, each about two square miles, would dot the line. Each stronghold was reinforced with artillery, armor, pillboxes, trenches, and minefields. Tanks would patrol between the strongholds, both intercepting German tanks and defending the line. Rommel launched the attack on the line, with positive results at first, but would be faced with a serious problem. Ritchie had been reinforced with brand new U.S. 31-ton Grant tanks with 75mm cannons, which could pierce the Panzer’s armor. Rommel would lose a third of his tanks and be

An important point to the deception was Ultra, code name for intelligence obtained from intercepts of German radio traffic. This was made possible by the British early in the war having broken the code of the standard German radio enciphering machine, the Enigma. Through Ultra, the Allied high command knew what the Germans expected the Allies to do, and thus could plant information either to reinforce an existing false view or to feed information through German agents, most of it false but enough of it was true, thus sometimes involving sacrifice of Allied troops, agents or resistance forces in occupied countries, to maintain the credibility of the German agents. Six days before the targeted date of June 5, troops boarded ships, transports, and aircraft all along the southern and southwestern coasts of England. All was ready for one of history's most dramatic and momentous events. Dummy troops, false radio traffic, dummy landing craft in the bay of the Thames River, huge but unoccupied camps, dummy tanks-all contributed to the deception. Although the Allied commanders could not know it until their troops were ashore, their deception had been remarkably successful.