Nsc-68 Analysis

During the cold war, the United States engaged in many aggressive policies both at home and abroad, in which to fight communism and the spread of communist ideas. Faced with a new challenge and new global responsibilities the U.S. needed to retain what it had fought so strongly for in World War II. It needed to contain the communist ideas pouring from the Soviet Union while preventing communist influence at home, without triggering World War III. With the policies of containment, McCarthyism, and brinkmanship, the United States hoped to effectively stop the spread of communism and their newest threat, the Soviet Union.

Washington D.C. in the summertime is constantly perspiring, a rather miserable place to be. And, although the summer of 1949 was equally as dredged, Paul Nitze, an expert economist who lacked status in the United States government, was about to receive the opportunity of a lifetime. George Kennan, longtime diplomat and Russian studies expert, was looking to retire to his quiet farm in Pennsylvania, but he needed to leave a successor for the Policy Planning Staff. He decided on Paul Nitze. However, just months later after Russia succeeded in building and testing an atomic bomb and Nitze’s appeal for an assessment of U.S. Foreign Policy, Kennan on September 30 wrote, “I face the work of these remaining months with neither enthusiasm nor hope for achievement.” Obviously, the Cold War would be a large undertaking for any Russian expert in the State Department, however, it is more than likely that he was referring to working closely with colleague whose foreign policy tactics evidently began to differ greatly from his own as time would show.

On April 14 1950 NSC-68 a 58 page top secret policy paper was presented to President Harry S Truman by the United States National Security Council. It was a very important statements of American policy in the Cold War. NSC-68 provide the blueprint for the militarization of the Cold War. It called for an expansion of the military power and defense budget of the united states development of a hydrogen bomb,and increased military aid to be allies.The US could not expect other countries to stop communism and the United States must estimates itself in a non communist

The two superpowers in the world, the United States and Soviet Union, had begun to show their strengths immediately after war. Following the war, they got involved in events such as the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War in an attempt to prove who was stronger. After those events the two countries participated in an arms race, a contest in which they competed to see who was to build more powerful weapons. As this race turned into a more serious situation, and Americans started to realize that the United States wasn’t the only one with powerful weapons, fear united them once again. As shown in Document 3, the dominant problem throughout the years 1953-1962 was the threat of war.

1.     How NSC-68 influenced America’s response to Communist North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and to Communist expansion in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. The NSC-68 called for military assistance programs that would meet the requirements of our allies. Since South Korea was an ally, we assisted them in repelling the invasion of another communist nation. This help for South Korea meant that a communist nation would be weakened and therefore possibly cripple a potential ally for the Soviet Union. Also, South Korea would then respond to a call for aid if the Soviet Union ever attacked

Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts -- and facts they are - this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up” (Document C). This quote set the precedent for containment and gives understanding as to why America reverted from its original policy of isolationism into an alternate strategy of preventing the spread of communist expansion. Moreover, George E. Kennan’s Long Telegram, or Document D, sketched “the roots of Soviet policy” and contained “warning of serious difficulties with the Soviet Union in the years ahead”. Kennan’s telegram portrayed the Soviets as aggressive and intent on world domination, suggesting that they would only respond to force and not

On April 1950, the NSC-68 was circulated as “Top-Secret” (https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68 ) report by United States National Security Council. It was a document created during the Cold War to help the United States in case of any communist

The Sources of Soviet Conduct, a highly influential article written by George Keenan in 1946, states that the US must pursue afirm and consistent opposition to the Soviet Union. In Keenan's argument for this, he explores the two factors of ideology and circumstance which shaped the Soviet Union. This is used in order to explain the behaviour of the Soviet Union. Thus, the most effective method for the US to counteract this behaviour is then explained.

The Cold War represents the disputes between the Soviet Union and the United States, and may be the most noteworthy political issue of the late 20th Century. The Cold War was a very political issue because it influenced foreign policies, impacted our economy, and even affected Presidential elections. The United States was worried that the Soviet Union would extend communism throughout Europe with its power and control over smaller and weaker countries. At the beginning of the Cold War the struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union were more political than military. The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949 which alarmed the United

In the book, Voices of Freedom by Eric Foner, George W. Bush and Harry S. Truman both had the same mind set; to impede other threats from outside nations. Following WWII came the Cold War. The Cold War was a struggle for control. There were two nations going head to head; The United States and the U.S.S.R also known as Soviet Union. The NSC-68 is a document that was able to shape the U.S foreign policy during the Cold War. It also involved in making the decision to stop the spread of communism which is also known as “containment” which also connects to the Bush Doctrine.

It was therefore the intention of the authors to bring about a general recession of Soviet power by gradual coercion, or in other words, by calculated diminution of Soviet military and economic capabilities. In strategic terms, the primary aim therefore was to contain Moscow penchant for world domination. This aim could only be attained by building up superior American military power and by creating an atmosphere that would severely compromise the ideological “attractiveness” of global communism. In other words, NSC 68 called for policies which would best confront the Soviet Union in the most critical and inclusive way. Nonetheless, this report, according to Professor May, was not just a foreign policy apparatus. It was more or less a compendium of strategic imperatives which sought, for all intents and purposes, the destruction of the Soviet Union and communism. Professor Cardwell agrees. The fact that NSC 69 accepted the possibility of nuclear confrontation speaks to an atmosphere of “waiting for eventualities” – a condition which the authors of the report never denied nor

With this book, a major element of American history was analyzed. The Cold War is rampant with American foreign policy and influential in shaping the modern world. Strategies of Containment outlines American policy from the end of World War II until present day. Gaddis outlines the policies of presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, including policies influenced by others such as George Kennan, John Dulles, and Henry Kissinger. The author, John Lewis Gaddis has written many books on the Cold War and is an avid researcher in the field. Some of his other works include: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War

George Kennan did not make any detailed policy recommendations in the Long Telegram of 1946, although he made it clear that he did not regard the Soviet Union as the same type of threat as Nazi Germany. He opposed the ideas of National Security Council Memorandum 68 (1950) as a hysterical overreaction, and thought that global containment was a serious strategic error, especially in peripheral regions like Indochina. Unlike Hitler, Stalin's aggression and expansion were unplanned and opportunistic, and its leaders did not wish to risk a general war with the West. For this reasons, the Soviets were highly sensitive to the "logic of force" and would retreat if confronted with resolution (Kennan 1946). Internally, it was a police state ruled by a Communist Party oligarchy and bureaucracy, but one that was always insecure in its power. Although Marxism had no real emotional appeal to the masses, the elites were guided by the assumption that the imperialist powers were always attempting to encircle the Soviet Union and that the contradictions within capitalism would always lead to wars. They would attempt to exploit these differences within the capitalist nations, while at the same time attempting to weaken their hold on the colonial areas. Kennan was well aware that the main problem in Western Europe was war-weariness and economic insecurity, and the U.S. would have to take the lead in reviving these countries or the "Russians certainly will" (Kennan 1946). In this case, though,

This caused the US to believe that Soviets had mainly expansionist aims. The US was “not prepared to see the opportunity for future investment [in Eastern Europe] foreclosed” (Crockatt 67) and this belief sparked the development of the containment policy directed by George Kennan, outlined in the Long Telegram (Lightbody 5). In addition, “the west had to oppose the Soviet Union for its own survival” (Lightbody 5) as the nuclear race between the US and USSR ensued and the USSR strived to equal the already well-established program of the US. This tension did not recede as Soviets sent spies into the US Manhattan Project, the nuclear development program (Lightbody 5). When the Soviets refused to join the Baruch Plan – which controlled nuclear weapon development – the USSR became even more openly viewed as a threat to US security. The growth of communism in Asia within the countries of Korea, Vietnam, and China along with tensions between the “Iron Curtain,” or divide, between Eastern and Western Europe also contributed to increasing threat towards capitalism and the Cold War’s inevitability.

In The Sources of Soviet Conduct, George F. Kennan explained “Containment was the central post-war concept of the United States and its allies in dealing with the Soviet Union”. To contain communism, the United Stated strategy was to have a strong