Nt1330 Unit 3 Assignment 1

That means that with the network operating system we can have lots of users all concurrently using resources on our serve.One of the most important aspects about server operating systems is the security. Workstation OS provides great security for end-users, but it's still not as tight as the security offered by the network operating systems. The reason for that is that with the network operating system were providing services to hundred or thousands of concurrent users. Therefore security is critical Workstation operating systems also provide some type of authentication by using user names and passwords which reside on local database on the local

After you register a new domain name or when you update the DNS servers on your domain name, it usually takes about 12-36 hours for the domain name servers world-wide

Just a quick question – Do we have any customers at NCI that there data including (PII) stored on outside vendor servers or any type of systems? The questions triggers while I was working with Dr. Linehan secretary(Georgia Shaw) and she ask me to inquiry about it with the NCI Security Team or Engineering Team. Per Dr. Linehan Secretary, If answer is “yes” then Dr. Linehan may be convinced to buy his favorite Office Accelerator Cloud Version. We “may be” make a case for Dr. Linehan that other customers at NCI using third party vendor services to store their confidential data. If Dr. Linehan agree to store their data on vendor site than he will save lot of cost associated with ACT Software hosting at NCI. These are just a questions and everything

The goal of this lab was to set up a windows DNS server on the same network as the other Linux servers. This lab focused on using the windows DNS server to be the master DNS server with the Linux DNS server that was built in the last lab to be the slave. This means that the Linux had to be configured to be the slave and when the master (windows) was set up it would need the IP address or the hostname of the slave server (Linux). In order to configure the Linux to be the slave server, an edit to the dhcp.conf file in etc (/etc/dhcp/dchp.conf). Once in the file you need to add a zone with the name of the slave DNS server. In the options for it (anything inside the curly brackets) a type is needed. The type should

Mixer is an active or passive device, from a switching signal Frequency to another. It can be adjusted or the demodulated signal. It has three signals Connection, which is called a port in the language of radio engineers. There are three ports. It is the RF input, a local oscillator input, and intermediate Frequency output. (NA, NA)

Chuptys & De Coninck (2013) proposed some factors in HMDs which are important in usability. Some of these factors are: depth of focus, latency, Limited resolution (Chuptys & De Coninck, 2013).

In this example, we have three routers A, B and C. C’s E0 is directly connected to 192.168.3.0. And C’s routing table is (192.168.3.0; 0; E0) which shows that 192.168.3.0 is 0 hop away. RIP (Routing Information Protocol), running on C, tells B that 192.168.3.0 is reachable through C with a distance of 0. B adds 1 hop to the distance and enters the route to 192.168.3.0 into its own routing table which becomes (192.168.3.0; 1; S1). Now RIP is running on B and tells C that 192.168.3.0 is 1 hop away. Similarly, C adds 1 hop to the distance and enters the route to 192.168.3.0 into its own routing table which becomes (192.168.3.0; 2; S1).

In 2003, I was recruited to set up and lead a new cyber security initiative for the Army Materiel Command (AMC), a 53 Billion dollar year logistics command that serves as the army version of amazon for the army’s current inventory of weapons, supplies and vehicles. AMC, at this time, had over a 100k workforce spread across 140 locations worldwide. During this timeframe, the Department of Defense was still trying to define Cyber Security and mature the process they had in place. DOD was a large target and AMC ranked high due to the research we performed for the Army and the DoD. The attacks came from all types of hackers ranging from, high school and college kids to state sponsored attacks using everything from off the shelf scripts to specialized tools designed to specifically break down our security systems. At this time my command had one of the worst records in the army for cyber security incidents. These attacks were, due to their ferocity and complexity, having a devastating impact on our ability to support the war efforts in Iraq and some attacks resulted in exfiltration of sensitive but unclassified data. AMC, during this timeframe, owned 50% of the Army’s computing power and this took the form of workstations, servers, applications and communication circuits so the impact was significant. Coupled with these ongoing attacks, the Army changed the way security incidents were being reported, directing all incidents to be reported to the Chief Of Staff (COS) of the

Various reports are conveying the types of personally identifying information were compromised. Thus far, the data

The data breaches at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) comprised of two likely connected and possibly coordinated incidents to obtain sensitive information of 4.2 million former and current government employees and security background information of 21.5 million individuals starting in July 2012 through 2015. This first report will provide information that describes the attack origin on how attackers gain access into the OPM infrastructure, the action performed, the assets compromised, and the state effect of the vulnerabilities. Moreover, brief the direct and intangible cost of the OPM cybercrime into the numerous impact factors.

In 2013, more than 40 million people were affected by stolen information in the United States alone. In 2015, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) announced the results of the interagency forensic investigation into two cyber intrusion incidents on their network. Following the conclusion of the forensics investigation, OPM determined the compromised information included details such as Social Security Numbers (SSNs); residency and educational history; employment history; information about immediate family and other personal and business acquaintances; health, criminal and financial history; and other details. The team concluded with high confidence that sensitive information, including SSNs of 21.5 million individuals, was stolen from the background investigation databases. This includes 19.7 million individuals that applied for a background investigation, and 1.8 million non-applicants, predominantly spouses or co-habitants of applicants. Additionally, over 1.1 million fingerprints were exfiltrated from the network. Essentially, for any federal employee, contractor, or military member who underwent a background investigation through OPM in 2000 or afterwards, it is highly likely their information was compromised in the OPM cyber

The data breach at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) comprised of two likely connected and possibly coordinated incidents to obtain sensitive information of 4.2 million current and former government employees and security background information of 21.5 million individuals starting in July 2012 through 2015. This first report will provide information that describes the attack origin on how attackers gain access into the OPM infrastructure, the action performed, the assets compromised, and the state effect of the vulnerabilities. Moreover, brief the direct and intangible cost of the OPM cybercrime into the numerous impact factors.

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in June 2015 discovered two cybersecurity breach incidents that impacted information of Federal government employees and contractors. OPM discovered that the background investigation data of current, former, and future Federal employees and contractors had been stolen y hackers. OPM found that sensitive information, including the Social Security Numbers of 21 million individuals were stolen from the background investigation databases. This includes 20 million individuals that applied for a background investigation, and 2 million non-applicants, mostly spouses or co-habitants of applicants. Some records also include Reports of Investigations/Statements from interviews conducted by background investigators and approximately 7 million include fingerprints. Usernames and passwords that background investigation applicants used to fill out their background investigation forms were also stolen.

Many violations and unsecured activities has been going on for too long without resolutions. These violations and unsecured activities include leaving websites open for long periods, sending personal identification information (PII) in emails, leaving the work station logged in unattended, and not logging out at the end of the work day. In addition, sending classified information through unclassified channels. By conducting these types of activities can be a hackers dream come true. “America must also face the rapidly growing threat from cyber-attacks. Now, we know hackers steal people 's identities and infiltrate private e-mails. We know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now our enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control

increase wiretaps, and read emails. Federal and states lawmakers are proposing many laws limiting access to public record. Airport security will face many changes in the coming years and the government will use new technologies, such as biometrics, for identification. These actions taken by the government has raised many concerns dealing with them abridging our civil