OPERATION ANACONDA

On November 27 through December 13, 1950, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir was a decisive battle in the Korean War. The battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain during some of the harshest winter weather conditions of the Korean War (Appleman, p24). Major General Olive P. Smith, commander of the US 1st Marines Division, used proper mission command

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

In 1969, US troops began Operation Apache Snow with the goal of clearing the People 's Army of Vietnam from the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam. Located near the border with Laos, the valley had become an infiltration route into South Vietnam and a haven for the Peoples’ Army of Vietnam forces. A multi-phase operation, the second phase commenced on May 10, 1969, as elements of 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne moved into the valley.

This was to be a joint operation between British, French and American forces. Though it was not the actual boundaries, the Meuse River and the Argonne Forrest restricted much of the U.S. 1st Army’s maneuverability between them. This area was comprised of a very dense and thick vegetation with few roads for heavy equipment and supplies to flow forth once the offensive began; therefore this was to be used to the Allied Powers advantage. The Germans would be attacked all along the front from British, French, and American forces simultaneously.

Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre-registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non-unified command, the reverse effect holds true.

However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were the “Hammer” that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the “Anvil” composed of U.S. forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the operation.

The site selected for the combat outpost at Wanat was adjacent to the village's houses, mosque, bazaar, and hotel, and was near the local District Center and Afghan National police station. The site selected was on a plateau where two valleys met and was surrounded by mountains and low ground, resulting in extensive dead space an area that cannot be visually observed around the position. The Battalion's plan to realign within the Wygal Valley and establish a combat outpost at Wanat was a two-part operation called Operation Rock Move. The Concept of Operations covered a 3-day period from July 8-10, 2008, and addressed the simultaneous disestablishment of combat outpost Bella and the initial movement to and occupation of the site at Wanat, and included those assets external to the Battalion required to conduct the operation. The Battalion wanted to disestablish combat outpost Bella because Bella could only be reinforced/resupplied by air and was not associated with any local governance, Afghan National Security Forces, or population center.

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The command structure of Operation Anaconda was multi-headed and lacked unity due to the U.S. military presence not being fully established prior to, or during, execution which adversely effected the operation. According to College of Aerospace Doctrine, combat operations were directed by CENTCOM under General Franks, based at MacDill AFB FL, with 2 subordinate commands, Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). CFACC was led by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen Michael Moseley & CFLCC was led by Army LTG Paul Mikolashek. CFLCC & CFACC were both based in the Persian Gulf where they directed Afghanistan force operations. MG Franklin Hagenbeck, commanded the 10th Mountain Division, Task Force Mountain, the forward headquarters for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. MG Hagenbeck answered to LTG Mikolashek directly, whom headed up all land forces in the theatre of operations. Combined Air Operations Center dire was headed by LTG Michael Moseley, based at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force (TF) Dagger headed by Col. John Mulholland, commanded Special Forces operations in Afghanistan. TF Rakkasan, 3rd Brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division was commanded by COL Frank Wiercinski based in Kandahar. Afghan forces supporting the operation were led by Zia Loden, a local warlord. TF-K Bar Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) South Kandahar, Afghanistan was headed by CPT Robert H

As the commander of the 3/187th BN, LTC Weldon Honeycutt understood the mission he was given. Hill 937, more commonly referred as Hamburger Hill, was a key terrain in the A Shau Valley. Securing the hill was not an option at the time he was given this mission. The terrain and enemy however made securing this key hill nearly impossible. He was a tough leader and demanded the most from his troops. Operation Apache Snow was a three-phased campaign to secure the A Shau Valley. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) used the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the A Shau Valley to transport supplies from Laos and Cambodia south to Hue and could easily overrun the South Vietnamese civilian population. (Battle Staff Paper) The NVA had over 6,000 miles of trails through the valley and while the US would bomb to destroy these trails the NVA would simply reroute and rebuild. This led to over 10,000 tons of supplies being moved through the valley every month. (youtube) LTC Honeycutt was given the brutal task of securing Hill 937 because of his previous experience. This task started on 10 May 1969 and ended after 11 attempts to secure the hill on 20 May 1969. (Hell on Hamburger Hill)

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.

Apart from air raids, the US backs the Afghan Northern Alliance, which is fighting the Taliban, contributing paramilitary teams from the CIA and special forces.Some 1,000 American soldiers are deployed on the ground in November, rising to 10,000 the year after.” Soldiers get deployed not knowing when they will come home or if they will even come home. They don’t enroll in the army just to say that they did, they enroll because they want to defend their country and fight for their rights as a U.S.