On Euthyphro's Dilemma and Divine Command Essay examples

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On Euthyphro's Dilemma and Divine Command
In Plato's Euthyphro, Socrates presents a fundamentally meta-ethical problem to
Euthyphro by asking “whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods” (Plato 219)? I will relate this question to the
Divine Command Theory of morality and discuss the philosophical implications associated with each possible answer to the dilemma while demonstrating fallacies and inequalities within each.
Divine Command Theory (DCT) asserts that “morality is somehow dependent upon God, and that moral obligation consists in obedience to God’s commands. Divine
Command Theory includes the claim that morality is ultimately based on the commands
or
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Following these a priori presuppositions that God is both omnipotent and omniscient (as well as intrinsically good), and that morality is ultimately dependent on God's commands, then it is sound to reason that piety and moral goodness are implicit in anything God commands.
The argument may be made that my logic is circular and that to define what is morally good by that standard is both flawed and fallacious. To this I rebut: How would I define good without presupposing that God is the foundation of such goodness? I would argue that although I may have to have a map to know where Dallas is, Dallas still has to exist prior to the map. Following that logic, “God’s goodness would exist prior to the existence of finite, derived goodnesses, though conceptually or epistemologically...” (Moreland
90).
The first horn proposed to Euthyphro “Are morally good acts commanded by god because they are morally good,” raises the question that if acts are commanded by God because they are morally good, then there must be some independent force outside of
God governing what is good and what is not. If there is an independent force governingZellner 3 this then God's will becomes arbitrary. Martin Luther adamantly argues against the possibility of this,
For it is not because he is or was obliged so to will that what he wills is right, but on the contrary, because he himself so wills, therefore what happens must be right. Cause and reason
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