On Euthyphro's Dilemma and Divine Command Essay examples

Someone who would believe a statement such as this one would most likely be in agreement with the Divine Command Theory---the reason being that the main claim in this theory is, all that is morally right, is right because God commands it so. Therefore in order to believe in the Divine Command Theory, one would need to be a strong believer in God---and would truly believe that if there were no God, morality would be absent. With this in mind, if God is the creator of all that is morally right, and there turns out to be no god at all, then nothing is morally wrong or can be capable of being morally wrong---would be a statement that non-believers of the Divine Command Theory would believe, and believe that morality can exist on its own, with or without a God. In this paper I will focus on the Divine Command Theory in relation to the statement above, and those who would oppose this statement. In doing so, I will attempt to show why I believe that those opposing this statement have a more plausible view.

At the core of Socrates’ argument is the need to break down the definition of holiness into smaller coherent characteristics. Socrates uses a series of question that are consistent with Euthyphro’s argument to ensure that he [Euthyphro] offers a consistent flow of definitions of the word holy.

Divine Command Theory theorizes that God it is the author of moral law and the right actions are those willed by God and that God clearly defines right and wrong. This allows the concept that sometimes situations are only right or good because God deems it so. In the simplest terms, God can determine right and wrong since he is omnipotent. Since God is all powerful, he can establish moral norms. Critics of Divine Command Theory believe that if a specific action is only right because God wills it so then evil acts would also be right since God willed them into existence. For example, if God wills murder or torture than these actions would be considered morally right.

In Plato’s Euthyphro, a dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro, the nature of piety is discussed. Euthyphro proposes several “definitions” of piety and focuses on the relation of piety to the gods. For one of these definitions, he proposes that piety is that which is loved by all the gods. In reply to this, a dilemma arises; and Socrates asks whether the pious, or holy, is loved by the gods because it is pious, or pious because it is loved by the gods. A similar form of this question asks whether the Good, or good action, is commanded by God because it is good, or good because it is commanded by God. If Euthyphro accepts the

I believe that God commands it because it is already right or wrong. This could possibly mean that whether or not God exist, those right or wrong actions were already right or wrong instinctively. The only difference is that, some people believe that they need a creator or God to tell them what is morally correct or wrong to believe it is.

The divine command theory states that “An act is morally required just because it is commanded by God and immoral just because God forbids it” (Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, p.67). In interviewing an Elder of a local Jehovah’s Witness congregation on the ethics involved in religion, he agreed that the divine command theory is correct, and that there are many commands and things that are forbidden in the bible that are considered to be God’s standards for the way we live our lives. But, when asked the modified version of the Euthyphro Question: is an action morally right because God commands it, or does God command an action because it is morally right, (Shafer-Landau, The Ethical Life, p.57) he picked the latter. Despite agreeing with the statement that the divine command theory makes, picking the latter is not uncommon even if the first affirms the theory. The statement that God commands an action because it is morally right, “implies that God did not invent morality, but rather recognized an existing moral law and then commanded us to obey it” (Shafer-Landau, The Fundamentals of Ethics, p.67-68). This does not make the Elder’s message wrong, in fact most theists don’t follow the divine command theory. This is based on the fact that if the theory were true, whatever God says is a command, and therefore morally right, but God could have said that rape, murder, and stealing is morally right if that was the line of thinking.

The consequences of accepting that the goodness of actions consists simply in the fact that God favours them are obviously disagreeable. However, the consequences of accepting the alternative also appear unfortunate. If it is maintained that God favours certain actions because they are objectively good, it seems that their goodness is independent of His will. But such a view appears to be inconsistent with the conception of God as the omnipotent creator and sustainer of all that is. It means that there is a realm of moral values which exist quite apart from God's creative will and to which His will must conform. Such a view must inevitably appear blasphemous to all those who believe in God, for it makes God out to be less than He is.

The divine command theory is put forth for people who believe in God. The theory implies that good actions are morally worthy as a result of their being commanded by God. God, for these individuals, include people from the Christian, Jewish, and Muslim faith. Individuals, because of these propositions, believe that it is their moral obligation to abide to God 's commands; which is, what is morally right is what God desires. This theory states the idea of objectivity between what’s right and wrong. If God makes

The Divine Command Theory is the assertion in ethics that an action is morally right if, and only if, it conforms to God’s will. This premise ties together morality and religion in a manner that seems expected, since it provides a solution to arguments about moral relativism and the objectivity of ethics. On the other hand, in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates questions whether something is right because God commands it, or whether God commands it because it is right. The ethical implications of the Euthyphro problem suggest that the relationship between morality and religion might not be as straightforward as suggested by the Divine Command Theory.

The conflict between the Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro objection come with questions about who sets the rules of morality, and how it can be assumed that these rules are justifiable. On one hand, the Divine Command Theory defends the idea that an act is morally right because God commands it and wrong because He commands against it. This sets God’s will as the foundation of ethics, making morally good actions those that comply with His commandments. This religion-based concept becomes problematic when it runs into the Euthyphro dilemma, founded from Plato’s Euthyphro dating back to 395 BC. The argument centralizes on why it is that God commands rightful actions, bringing in the question of, “Are moral acts commanded by God because they are morally good, or does God command things to be right because He has good reasons for them?” The Euthyphro argument creates its foundation on the idea that either God has reasons for His commands, or that He lacks reasons for them. This divides up the Divine Command Theory in two ways, either making the theory wrong or portraying God as an imperfect being. If God does have reasons for His commands, then these reasons are what would make the actions right or wrong. God’s reasons would stand as the basis of morality, instead of God’s commandment itself. God having reasons would insinuate that goodness existed before any direction from God because otherwise, there wouldn’t be any commandment. Morality would have to stand independent

This leads to the dilemma or the main question asked by Socrates which is “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods (Plato, Euthyphro)” Or in other words does God say things are morally right because they are by nature, or do they become morally right because God says they should be. Since Euthyphro believed in more that one god, that meant that they were all pleased in different ways and that there would be no possible way that something could be defined as pious or impious. With that being said there is no way to declare something right or wrong.

Euthyphro intends his definition of piety. If right actions are pious only because the gods love them, then moral rightness is completely

because, how can all the gods find everything to be pious when what is just to

& Jowett, 2013). Socrates refutes this definition since he views that the gods do not need to be assisted by mortals. In his final attempt, Euthyphro defines holiness as an exchange between the gods and human beings. The gods receive sacrifices from us, while we they grant our prayers in exchange. In response, Socrates posits that this perspective implies correlates to the prior argument on the gods’ approval. He states that if holiness is gratifying to the gods, it is ambiguous as seen in the argument concerning what the gods approve, and the influences behind them (Plato. & Gallop, 1997).

However, Plato’s dilemma is more applicable for the Christian, since we believe that God must be the ultimate source of the good, so a standard that is higher than God is problematic; and we are forced to deal with the apparent arbitrariness of a God who makes things good by commanding them. What if God commanded that we torture babies? That would imply that torturing babies was good, which is strongly counter-intuitive.3 A possible answer to this objection is that what is good is grounded in God’s character, and his commands flow from his character. While this is true, it does not really solve the dilemma – it only pushes the criticism back another step. What if God liked torturing babies? That would still imply that torturing babies was good, and it would still be strongly counter-intuitive.