SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH(PHANTOM FURY)
LIEUTANANT GENERAL RICHARD F. NATONSKI
Major ………………………..
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Signals Captains Career Course, Class 18-005
April 19, 2018 Major General John Mattis said to the US army troops “This is our test – our Guadalcanal, our Chosin Reservoir, our Hue City.” 1 when he spoke to inform them that the 1st Marine Division was to perform and direct one of the most significant and rough battles both strategically and purposefully in the record of marine unit. Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski’s strategic sharpness and character of command gained in the long years of experience and everything was tested during the second battle of Fallujah. This battle also known as Operation Al-Fajr and Operation Phantom
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Effective commanders build cohesive teams in an environment of mutual trust.”2 and falls as main responsibility of the leader. A great leader must inspire all of his troops from the senior commanders to the last subordinate or the last soldier, and that is the art of leadership. It is quite hard to build that kind of bound of trust between commander and the commanded and that is a successful formula to the victory of the battles. Military operations of any character require a wide-ranging cooperation for triumphant result, which is not probable if they do not have a high level of trust between each other despite the rank. LGNatonski was that kind of commander that wanted to be with his troops more than being in the headquarters. That way he would know what they were feeling be close to them support them with words while being in a difficult environment away from their families and making proud the whole US. “I’d rather see my commanders in person and talk to them face to face rather than talk to them on the radio. I wanted to see how the troops were doing and the stress they were under. The only way you can do that is by being there.” 3LGNatonski by acting this way showed how much he trusted his staff to execute the mission and also built the reciprocate trust among them. Troops get motivated when they see their commander fighting side by side with …show more content…
Opportunities come with risks.9 Accepting this risk is often the key to the success and especially when we are talking about fighting insurgents. To accept the risk means that you as commander have to make a detailed analysis of the situation taking in consideration all probable results and selecting at the end the course of action that meets best the desired result. The responsibility for what a unit does is always falls on the commander. As Gabbard said “In the military, I learned that ‘leadership’ means raising your hand and volunteering for the tough, important assignments.” Often commanders do not take the risk because they fear the failure and want to stay in the safe zone, but there is no victory without sacrifice. Personally, I think that one of the most difficult problems he had to think about was the possible destruction of the supply lines. What LG Natonski did was instructing the creation of a resupply point, which would be able to give them supplies for 15 days. He also made the decision to request a supply for 8,000 beers to celebrate the Marine Corps 229th birthday, which were distributed after the campaign, had stopped. This may sound as a crazy decision in a time like that but the moral and welfare of his troops in a
Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with
Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).
In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.
From the battalion level to the company level the leadership from the top started to makes its way the individual squad members. As 1st platoon continue to have their struggles with the leadership they begin to also have them with the battlefield. The constant stress from the leadership began to build up and continued to build up with the environment they were set in. A lot of the company commanders became passive leader not knowing what to or did not want to do anything that would get on LTC Kunk’s bad side. CPT good did show signs of stress in some of his decision making one in particular cost him the lives of his men. The platoon leader of first platoon LT Britt was an enthusiastic leader who everyone in his platoon respected but later feared for his life before dying to IED. The platoon sergeant seemed to take everything well even with the lack of sleep and supply. The squad leaders
Maj. Gen. “Fighting Joe” Hooker demonstrated an excellent example of failed mission command during the Battle of Chancellorsville in April 1863. He had thought he would defeat General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia by maneuver beginning in Chancellorsville as he pushed Lee toward Richmond. His commitment toward his own plan for Lee’s response would overshadow his operational planning and ultimately lead to a mission command failure at Chancellorsville despite outnumbering Lee’s troops 128,000 to 60,000. Through decentralized execution, Hooker could have empowered agile and adaptive leadership to operate under uncertainty, exploit opportunities, and achieve unity of effort. Instead, he failed in exercising at least four principles of mission command. He did not provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, exercise disciplined initiative, or accept prudent risk.
It was outstanding that during the strategy planning for the attack of the city one of the main concerns of the Lieutenant General Natonski was that the battle would result in a humanitarian crisis, but most of the civilians had abandoned the city before. Natonski was able to avoid civil casualties as much as possible but not proper to damage as much as hoped because, citing his own words: “You can always rebuild a house, but you cannot rebuild a life. It was important to protect the Marines and soldiers”. 5
Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully
Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their
The United States Marine Corps is a frequently misunderstood, occasionally maligned but more frequently mythologized division of the U.S. Armed Forces. Sometimes its role is perceived as overlapping the roles and responsibilities of its military counterparts such as the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. However, as the exhaustive text by Victor Krulak shows, it is far more often seen as enhancing, focusing and insuring the roles and responsibilities. As the original pressing of Krulak's text was completed in 1984, a great many of the sentiments that permeate First in Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps carry pointedly Cold War-related messages and imperatives. However, an open-minded consideration of the text demonstrates a particular relevance for the servicemen and women of today's U.S. Marine Corps.
As an effective leader one has to be especially close to their subordinates in order to provide them with the necessary purpose, direction and motivation to complete their assigned task. The tactical level is usually found at the company or platoon level, this leader is always looking to accomplish the short term goals in support of the long term mission. Tactical leaders must know how to solve problems quickly and without hesitation, they have more direct influence over soldiers because they are in the trenches with them. At this stage the leader has to council, correct and led their soldiers through the direct approach of leadership.
Preparing to return to the mainland, the four Marine officers paid their parting respects to the division commander, Major General J.L. Collins and his chief of staff, Colonel William P. Bledsoe. To their surprise General Collins chose to speak to his staff on how the Army was resolved to eliminate forever its deficiencies in amphibious matters and its dependency on Marines for amphibious expertise.
Arriving in October 2005, the entire campaign units were struggling throughout with being over-tasked and under-staffed, and 1st platoon was a major victim of this occurrence. Relieving the 48th Infantry Brigade, who had no relations with the locals and very little presence in the AO, they had to reestablish control of the area around FOB Yusufiyah. With terrible living conditions and little to no equipment, the platoon had to juggle improving their fighting positions while at the same time secure the JSB and the AVLB. The company TOC had no kitchen to cook food nor any running water. Soldiers would fill sand bags from sun up to sun down trying to provide themselves with some sort of cover against attacks. The PSG Miller would request supplies constantly, but it seemed a low priority of the the higher command. This was a common theme throughout the time they were in the triangle of death. It wasn't often that officers would visit the FOB or provide supplies to enhance their situation, but when they did it was not a welcomed response. Kunk would come by and tell the soldiers how undisciplined and how little work they had completed with little consideration of how hard the soldiers had been working with the limited resources.
The book Black Hearts opened my eyes to how leadership from a single Officer can have a grappling effect on such a wide range of soldiers from the lowest of ranks. One of the best takeaways from Black Hearts is to never do anything: illegal, unethical, or immoral. Although this is a easy statement to repeat, Black Hearts demonstrates the difficulties that lie behind these words. It has also painted a picture of how leadership can topple extremely quickly from a top down view. The Army is portrayed in a bad light throughout the book relentlessly. This is due to the concentration of poor leadership of the 1-502nd Regiment (Referred to as “First Strike”), a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division.
James R. McDonough sets a spectacular example of what it is to be a second lieutenant in the United States Army and what it is truly like to lead a group of enlisted soldiers for the first time. Lieutenant McDonough, a graduate of West Point, was deployed as a platoon leader in a small fort with the mission of holding a Vietnamese village out of the hands of the Viet Cong. When he arrived, Lieutenant McDonough discovered that the former Lieutenant and platoon leader of the 2d Platoon, Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry (Airborne) hardly ever left his
Parts five and six bring together the personal and professional relationship between Marines themselves and the American public. These relationships, forged by the millions of men and women who have donned the Marine Corps uniform, are a result of training methods and careful selection. General Krulak gives the reader a taste of why Marines do what they have come to be known as America’s force in readiness. First to Fight has many good traits. The book, while easy to read and addictively interesting, never sugarcoats the intense conflicts between high level officials. General Krulak enhances the “official” record with personal accounts of events and people now legendary. His no-holds-barred approach to his writing makes General Krulak’s book both honest and educational. His explanations of the struggle to keep the Marine Corps alive and the early development of amphibious doctrine make First to Fight a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the modern Marine Corps. In parts of the book, General Krulak provides a mountain of detail. While these facts would be of great historical value for a reader who knows military structure and nomenclature, they tend to bog down the reader at points. The political volleys also tend to get tedious when the General describes the how the Marine Corps had to fight tooth and nail for institutional survival. These