Operation Anaconda Battle Analysis

In keeping with the U.S. intention to keep the footprint in Afghanistan small and allow the Afghans to do as much of the fighting as possible, TF DAGGER was directed to develop plans for an operation to clear out the Shahi Kot valley (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003, p. 8).

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

Chosen company traveled to the Wanat area after the decision was made to abandon COP Bella. COP Bella had been attacked constantly by small arms fire because of how far it was isolated from other American bases. Relations with the people weakened when an Afghanistan solider shot an American soldier by accident. The Civilians near COP Bella also felt that the Americans did not help them even though Americans built schools, other buildings and gave the civilians food. The plan to move to the Wanat area was called “Operation Rock Move”. The Taliban forces hated Americans and did not want them in the area. Also, civilians in the area stated the attack on Wanat was a result of American helicopters that blew up vehicles, killing 17 people who were not soldiers but nurses and doctors from a nearby clinic. American forces claimed the vehicles were shooting at them. American forces also intercepted a radio message from the Taliban forces stating “Big gun has been hit,” which meant the mortar tube had been attacked and the commander had died

However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were the “Hammer” that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the “Anvil” composed of U.S. forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the operation.

On July 13, 2008, Taliban fighters launched a major assault on a small U.S. Army outpost in Afghanistan, killing nine soldiers and wounding 27. The story of Wanat is more then just one small group of commanders’ mistakes; it is a window into how the war in Afghanistan went awry and how we can learn from these mistakes to better future missions and future leaders.

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

The mission of Operation Anaconda was to bring down the Taliban government and to destroy al Qaeda. Operation Anaconda followed other battles that stemmed from the September 11 attack on the US. The first step in the battle was to overpower key stronghold towns in Afghanistan, which proved to be successful. But, intelligence reports revealed some members of the Taliban government and al Qaeda were hiding in the eastern White Mountains. Osama Bin Laden and other top al Qaeda figures were assembling troops in the Tora Bora region.

Operation Al-Fajr in Arabic, Operation Phantom Fury was the code name given to the second battle of Fallujah, considered the hottest point of conflict of all the military campaign in Iraq. Led by the US Marine Corp against the Iraqi combatants, who had held the city under their control, some consider it was the most difficult battle marines have been involved since Vietnam in the 60s. The battle put end to the insurgent control over the city and constituted an important victory for the US troops, however such victory had a high painful price 1.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Deceased philosopher Bertrand Russell once said, “War does not determine who is right- only who is left”. Those left are the soldiers of the 1-502nd, specifically Bravo Company 1st plt, and the Janabi family and to a greater extent, the ever-changing global world we all live in today. The tragic events that conspired in a small Iraqi village became a microcosm of how leadership failures at every level shaped the actions of a few soldiers who committed atrocious acts. One can also see how a high operational tempo, along with prolonged violence and death, has on a person’s psyche. It is the ugly side of war that the average American citizen may not want to hear or talk about. For a soldier, it is inevitably what they train their

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To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the