Operation Anaconda By Reviewing The Setting

The historical battle of Harpers Ferry was a pivotal point during the Civil War. While the battle was a clear victory on the Confederate front, Union forces could have changed the outcome with little efforts. This paper analyzes the battle with the intent of identifying how the application, utilization, or availability of intelligence assets could have resulted in an alternate outcome. With the proper use of All Source Intelligence analysis on the Union front, the Battle of Harpers Ferry would have played out completely different. While the results of this battle may not have changed the outcome of the Civil War, it would have affected the timeline of follow-on battles. The structure of this paper is simple, we cover the basics of the battle and follow up with relevant facts on how proper use of terrain analysis and troop capabilities affects the outcome of the battle.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

At the beginning of the war the Union thought it would be an easy, quick war. The Union leaders at this time had no actual plan for the war. General Scott saw this and came up with the Anaconda plan. Scott considered the war a strategy game, and would attack and penetrate the enemy 's forces without destroying all of their troops; focusing mainly on victory. At the beginning of the war Scott, unlike others, thought that the war would be over in more than two years. The war ended in four years. The term Anaconda plan came from Northern press trying to explain Scotts plan. Many people thought that Scotts plan was too passive and difficult. The Union’s effort in the civil war increased greatly on April 19, 1861. At this point Abraham Lincoln created a naval blockade, a system of ships that stops all imports and exports, on the Confederate coastline. This blockade stretched from the Rio Grande to the Chesapeake Bay. At this time Lincoln’s argument was that the Confederacy had no right to secede. Creating this blockade allowed the National warships to attack privateers. Privateers are privately owned and run warships. These ships were used to take the Union’s trade ships. Getting rid of the privateers meant that the Union could transport goods easier. Scott 's anaconda plan needed the Union’s army and navy to surround the Confederacy. After encompassing the Confederacy the army and navy would tighten in, and effectively strangle the South. This contained two

Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan. The mission began on March 2, 2001 and ended on March 16, 2001. A “hammer and anvil” attack, with 600 American and 400 Afghan troops, would rout, capture, or kill enemy forces. The operational timeline for a three-day battle projecting light combat took fourteen days to complete. During Operation Anaconda, Unity of Command planning did not fully anticipate the need for additional forces, inducing a stall in operations on the battlefield, and negating a timely victory.

In 1861, the United States was no longer united and its people were at war, in what is commonly known as the American Civil War. This left President Abraham Lincoln in a tight spot on how to go about dealing with the Southern states that had seceded, the Confederacy, who were now at war with the Northern states, the Union. Lincoln met with his generals to devise a strategy by which the Confederate states could be brought back into the Union. General Winfield Scott, commanding general of the Union army, proposed one plan of battle that he had earlier proposed to Major-General George B. McClellan. His plan came to be known as the Anaconda plan. This plan, although it was never technically adopted, ended up being extremely successful and

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

In the mountainous Shah-i-Khot region south of the city of Gardez in Eastern Afghanistan, Operation Anaconda took place early March 2002. Operation Anaconda, to this day, stands as the largest reported ground action in the Afghan war. This 17-day battle led to eight U.S. casualties and over 50 wounded. Operation Anaconda is viewed as a success due to coalition forces being able to kill and root out several hundred Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, which left U.S. and coalition forces in control of the Shah-i-Khot Valley. Originally intended to be a three-day battle with light resistance, a seven-day battle ensued with intense fighting and was finally

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

Many elite forces from around the world came together for operation Anaconda. The focal point of the operation was the Lower Shahikot Valley, which housed and protected a large number of foreign fighters – “Afghan Arabs” from al-Qaeda, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens from the Islamic Movements of Uzbekistan (IMU) 5. Takur Ghar was the highest point overlooking the Shahikot Valley and was a key terrain to capture for the mission. A noted Afghanistan specialist, Lester Grau, believes there were initially 600 estimated enemy fighters in the valley, which tallied with other credible sources6. The valley was protected by multilayered defenses. At the entrances to the valley, the insurgents maintained checkpoints, which allowed an early warning system of attempted ground attack7. The valley was “classic guerilla terrain – easily defendable, controlled access, numerous routes of escape, and near a sympathetic border”8.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Intelligence gathering and collection in the United States has significantly increased over time. This paper examines how intelligence reporting and pre-mission planning was crucial to the success of the United Nations involvement at The Battle of Inchon during the Korean War. By examining how intelligence played a role in this battle, you will be able to understand why it is important to gather and collect intelligence prior to every mission executed. Intelligence collection should be the baseline for all military operations. Inchon Landing has an ample amount of actionable intelligence; collected and disseminated appropriately we will discuss how it played a role in a low probability mission accomplishment to the last great amphibious assault in history. This paper provides detailed explanations on why The Battle of Inchon was a success and what could have been the outcome had it gone the other way.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain (10th Mountain Division), was assigned command and control (C2) of Operation Anaconda. In early 2002, CJTF Mountain initiated the joint

The purpose of this paper is to argue that Allied commanders failed to utilize credible intelligence information prior to Operation Market Garden. Additionally, if the commanders of the operation appropriately used the intelligence at hand, Operation Market Garden would have been a success instead of failure. This paper examines how the Allied commanders failed to properly take into consideration credible signals intelligence, human intelligence, and imagery intelligence. If the Allied commanders would have not discredited multiple discipline intelligence reports, Operation Market Garden would have been able to capture all of the key objectives of the mission. The success of Operation Market Garden would have forced Germany to surrender as much as six months earlier, saving countless lives.