Operation Anaconda Unity Of Command

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

During arduous combat operations coinciding with a high OPTEMPO unit cohesion may flux toward a detriment of mission success. This report will focus on the 56TH Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in order to address the critical leadership problem. In addition, focus will center on relevant facts and assumptions that led to the critical leadership problem and rectify the issues. Furthermore, a new ABCT vision will be published in order to restructure the organizational culture toward a unified purpose and an increase in esprit de corps. (Verify with lesson for correct purpose)

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that understand their commander’s intent to accomplish missions by adapting to the situation and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 2). Various battles throughout history provide examples of the application of the principles of mission command as well as the failure to adhere to them. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is an example of the latter and marks the “most decisive Native American victory and the worse U.S. defeat during the long Plains Indian War” (History.com Staff, 2009).

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

However; MG Hagenbeck was only given operational control of certain ground elements that were slated to be involved in the mission. He was not given command of the U.S air component from the Air Force, Navy or Marines, who were slated to support Anaconda ground operations. MG Hagenbeck also did not have command authority of the friendly Afghan forces who were to play a major role in the operation. Afghan forces coupled with U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were the “Hammer” that would drive al Qaeda and Taliban fighters toward the “Anvil” composed of U.S. forces and Afghan forces. Anaconda nearly became a crushing defeat for the U.S forces, because of the number of competing commands that were assigned major roles of responsibility in the operation.

10th Mountain Division’s Commander, General Hagenbeck became the Combined Joint Task Force Commander. CJTF Mountain would be operating out of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan. Colonel Mulholland was the Special Forces Commander also located in Afghanistan. They both agreed that a cordon was needed around the valley and slowly tighten in on the Taliban forces. The mission was appropriately named Operation Anaconda.9

Mission Command: The unity of command principle favored Colonial forces and their allies. General Washington refined his command climate through years of troubled multinational operations. He painfully understood the importance of synergy towards an end state. General Washington’s clear communication of intent and subordinate leader empowerment contrasted his adversaries. General Clinton’s combative command climate with Lord Cornwallis exacerbated their demise. Clear intent allowed the Colonial coalition to seize a fleeting opportunity at Yorktown.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

Operation Verbal Image is an exercise based on command and control. It used many leaders who used command and control to accomplish their assigned mission. This command and control shaped the battlefield and took the fight to the enemy. This paper will discuss, how important command and control is, what is command and control, what does command and control do, and command and control in the information age. This paper will also discuss how command and control was used, how it affected the outcome of the battle, and my personnel opinions on how command and control could have been done differently.

Generals Franks and Mikolashek made the decision to deploy the staff of the Army’s 10th Mountain Division under the command of MG Hagenbeck to Bagram Air Base (2007). In an attempt to fix, joint planning problems CENTOM designated the 10th Mountain as Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain; CJTF Mountain took command of a large portion of the ground forces. However, CJTF Mountain did not receive tactical control (TACON) over supporting U.S elements or Afghan forces to be involved in the operation. Aviation elements supporting the area of operation remained under control of CFACC and special operations forces remained under the command of COL Mulholland at Task Force Dagger.

Chain of command is very important in modern day society and military. Without a proper chain of command set up, everything would fall into chaos. Chain of command allows government, legal systems, and the military to function as they do. In our military, the chain of command decides who gives the orders, with the President being at the top and the Secretary of Defense being next. Orders from the top flow all the way down through the generals and officers to the soldiers that make it happen.