Operation Cog

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

The 1986 revision of the US Army, FM 100-5 “AirLand Battle” doctrine introduced the Clausewitzian concept of culmination point as a “key concept of operational doctrine.” Moreover, the new manual adopted the traditional German notion of Auftragstaktik, a decentralized command system with the commander devising a mission and then leaving the methods and means of achieving it to his subordinate

Clausewitz who was convinced that no theory of war could be taken seriously unless it included the psychology of commanders and soldiers and their relations to one another (Peter Paret, Napoleon and the Revolution in War, pg. 134). The human factor within the nature of war is the most complex and difficult to predict a sure outcome without addressing psychological state of the enemy and environment in with you are about to conduct operations. Boyd integrates the key ideas of two primary theorists, Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, and hypothesizes that making sense of one’s environment, making military decisions, and acting on those decisions is a respective, competitive process (OODA loop) in which one seeks to make faster and better decisions than one’s adversary, overwhelming his ability to make sense of his environment and cope with change. (Module 3, John Boyd and A Discourse on Winning and Losing, pg. 6). This thought process is relevant today through our military war games, operation plans, and TDG’s providing an opportunity for multiple levels of outcome based scenarios fundamentally rooted in understanding the

In support of my capstone project, I assessed and will submit a redesigned proposal with developmental recommendations for reformation of a solid POI for the SPCC that takes place at the Army Logistics University. In this, I have identified the foremost purpose for this redesign as the following: The investment in the education and training of rising leadership is vital to the long-term success of our sustainment support staff and the services provided. With this course providing training in modular force operations for newly selected command designees that enables them to function effectively throughout their command tour it is very important to make sure that the training is substantive. Therefore the main focus is to assure that training is current and emerging sustainment doctrine and leadership topics for commanders on the National Guard, Reservist and Active Duty levels is most essential.

1. (15 pts) Review the Operational Approach Student Aid Slide #7 for this question. Operational Design and the Operational Approach is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns.” (JP 5-0, III-1). In the context of the Mediterranean/North Africa Theater of Operations (M/NATO), using the contextual background notes and material provided for this exam in Parts 2 and 3, apply operational design thinking as described in JP 5-0 chapter III to answer the following.

At the close of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US military ended with varied to questionable results. This is because US policymakers and military leaders did not adjust to the emergence of new conditions due to their dependence on medium structure problem framing. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) is a tool military organizations should use in adaptive environments to develop solutions for complex problems. To understand why the ADM is a critical tool for military organizations, military professionals need to understand the impacts of ill-structured problems on planning and execution and the potential influence the ADM will have on their organization. Once military professionals understand the influence the ADM has on ill-structured problems, they can begin to consider how to integrate the ADM into planning.

Force management, or what is really otherwise known as planned comprehensive change, is in reality a complex and interwoven process. Though it was designed within the confines of a systemic approach referred to as the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel and Facilities), in reality it is meant to enable both dutiful and well-thought out change as well as faster, more urgent adjustments in accordance with the evolving nature of war and information gathering tactics. The Army, as one branch involved in this initiative, focuses most of its attention in this regard on the organizational sector because of the way it facilitates an adequate and democratic step-by-step system of review (Student Reader, F102:2). But the fact is that even this initiative remains multi-faceted and appears to be rather bureaucratic in nature (it has five phases, which seems antithetical to an urgent change process), which might not be surprising since implementing the type of changes that are demanded can have major implications of all sorts. Still, it does appear that this concentration is being well received and that it will eventually serve its goal even if it does not appear that way when detailed on a point by point basis.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

As stewards of our profession, commanders ensure that military expertise continues to develop and be passed on to aspiring professionals through operational development. It is during this developmental phase that Professional Soldiers put their knowledge and skills to the test. Operational Army units certify and recertify their Professional Soldiers through repetitive and realistic training events including the Combat Life Saver Course, platoon live fires, and exercises at the National Training Center. In the course of these challenging and realistic experiences, the Army’s operational units develop Soldiers and leaders prepared to maintain high standards, discipline, and operational readiness. Operational development and adaptability will continue to drive changes in Army doctrine, organization, leadership, and education as we enter the post-war era. Without this kind of development, the Army could not maintain a well-disciplined professional fighting force.

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)