Operation Deception: Media Release Effectiveness
Mark Miller
INTL-653
Dr. Kirvan
16 June, 2015
Audience This confidential report is written for upper level Taliban leadership and is presented by Mark Miller, Taliban media agent.
Introduction This report discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Operation Deception, a completed maneuver. Taliban operatives purposed Operation Deception to stage a fake military attack on civilians and use a media alert as a tool to blame the attack on the United States.
Background The Taliban has been fighting the righteous fight to reclaim Afghanistan since the American 's unlawful invasion of 2001. Opposition to the United States and the current Afghan Ghani
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(2005, 7). The falsehood of Operation Deception was a delight to Allah. While Islam requires a pure heart and dishonesty is a sin against Allah, the Hadith (Bukhari 84:64-65) confirms that lying is permissible in order to deceive an "enemy?, therefore the planned deception against the enemy was justified as it forwarded the cause of Islam.
The Purpose of Operation Deception Operation Deception was conceived, designed and implemented by a Taliban group called the Organization to Promote Afghan Freedom (OPAF). The purpose of the discretion was to dishonor and discredit the United States and their military forces, and critically damage US peace agreement attempts with the Taliban. Muslims who are true to the faith do not seek agreement with infidels. However, it is in the best interest of the Taliban for the world to believes OPAF wishes to establish such a peace agreement. Enemy countries actively championing peace agreements on the world state are effectively distracted. The bravado of the enemy provides the Taliban time to put further plans into place without scrutiny.
Operation Deception Operation Deception was a two-part operation. On June 25, 2015 the OPAF successful executed a staged military attack which prominently featured the bodies of dead women and children. On June 26th witnesses were taken to the site and a media alert was released assigning blame
Theoretically, it holds that the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan as a self-defense strategy following the 9/11 attacks. Practically, however, as US foreign policy is about conquest, self-protection and resource-extraction, it seeks strategic dominance of geographical space to sustain its global relevance. The rationality of the US suggests the need to continuously accumulate capital, resources and military proficiency to ensure autonomy. Therefore, a pragmatic reading into the motivation behind the invasion of Afghanistan negates the self-defense theory. Rather, the shifting coordinates of power within central and southern Asia crafted the perfect criteria for US intervention. This work explores the motivations and systemic cover-ups designed by the Bush administration in ordering military troops into Afghanistan in 2001. It will hold that this invasion was not just a War on Terror, but rather a tactic to ensure US prevalence within the region, and henceforth, the rest of the world. Thus, why did the US invade Afghanistan?
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D-Day Deception was written by Mary Kathryn Barbier in 2007 and focuses on Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. Barbier draws almost exclusively from primary sources, such as the military reports leading up to, and right after, D-Day and then analyses the effectiveness of the individual aspects of Operation Fortitude and the operation as a whole and determines it’s
The Taliban, also known as The Afghan Taliban, is a terrorist organization that occupies large areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban rose to power after the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989. By 1996, an extremist group by the name The Taliban had established themselves, enforcing a rather strict and brutal for of Sharia law. This was the beginning of what would seem to be a lifetime of horror for much of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the United States and the United Nations.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran, is a Washington Post reporter and editor. He has spent three years in Afghanistan and reported extensively about the operations conducted by the ISAF and NATO forces in the post troop’s surge period. He is also the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City: inside Iraq’s Green Zone, one of the New York Times’s 10 best books of year 2007. Interestingly the author was a guest speaker at the USAWC and presented his thoughts to the students of class of AY 14. His talk at the USAWC and relevance of situation in Afghanistan to Pakistan prompted me to select his book “Little America” for writing the critical book report.
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The U.S. War in Afghanistan is the longest war in U.S. history. After the September 11 attacks in New York, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan followed, supported by a collation of all NATO members and other countries, the war’s fundamental goals were clear, with the primary objective of dismantling the Taliban government, bring Osama bin Laden to justice, and attempt to curb the growth of terrorism (CITE). Now, 16 years later, the war calls for hot debates. Many argue about the status of the war, is it too long? Is it worth the cost of lives? In short, the US did achieve the fundamental goals of the war. But if the unpredicted length of the war and the astronomical cost of the war, both in money and lives were added into the deciding factor,
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During combat operations, success can take on many definitions. Seizing the objective, destroying the enemy or defending the hill are all examples of military operations that are assigned a task and purpose that must be completed. Within each task could lay hidden problems that must be identified and mitigated to facilitate mission accomplishment. Should a problem be misinterpreted or ignored, mission failure coupled with unwarranted friendly casualties will be the inevitable outcome.
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Firstly, intelligence gathering and common perception of U.S. planners for the operation will be examined. Then lessons learned from the planning process will be discussed. Lastly, the preparation of the operation will emphasize deficiencies in conducting such an