Operation Eagle Claw : A Learning Experience

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

The book The Ugly American clearly demonstrates several of the established Special Operations Force (SOF) imperatives outlined in ADRP 6-22. As a Special Forces soldier I can relate these imperatives to stories illustrated in the book and apply them to real life situations that I have experienced in the field. The Ugly American is a goldmine of wisdom and a handbook for special warfare. All Special Operations soldiers should read it.

Michael Durant is a notable former 160th Black Hawk pilot. He is most recognized for his role in Operation Gothic Serpent, in Mogadishu, Somalia. During this operation his helicopter was one of two that were shot down with RPG’s, and he was the only survivor, who, consequently was taken captive by the Somali warlord. Mr. Durant’s career has spanned decades with the Regiment, even after retirement as the owner of a consultant firm specializing in special operations aviation. Steven Hartov is both an American and Israeli Army veteran, who has co-authored two books on the 160th with Mr. Durant. Mr. Hartov was the former editor in chief of “Special Operations Report,” and his writings are on the recommended reading list of the Army War College.

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

Special Forces soldiers work in foreign lands with situations which are not always completely clear from its beginning. The Special Operation Imperatives serve as the base for success by providing the framework to develop and assist the host nation in achieving their desired goals. Through this essay I will use the novel “The Ugly American” (William J. Lederer & Eugene Burdick) to provide context to the benefits of applying such imperatives and the consequences of improper application. I will bring to light the actions of the characters and depict the reasons why the application of the imperative made the character succeed or fail in his desired goal.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Perhaps the number one event, that will cost Jimmy Carter his reelection for president was the Iranian Hostage Crisis that went on for approximately 444 days and held 52 American diplomat citizens hostage in Iran. Several Iranian students, stormed the American embassy on November 4, 1979. This had all occurred because the former, exiled, Shah of Iran had been permitted entry into the United States to receive medical treatment for cancer. In the 1950’s the Shah of Iran was appointed by the United States. He was a dictator, who ruled with violence and cruelty. The people of Iran, are traditionally Shiite Muslims and the Shah was taking Iran towards a more progressive society. This further upset the people of Iran who did not want their conservative

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

Iran took 52 Americans hostage on November 4, 1979. The resulting failed rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, was an international embarrassment for the United States. No single event or decision resulted in the mission’s failure; instead, the failure resulted from a chain of poor decisions. This single operation highlighted the need for a dedicated special operations aviation unit dedicated to the rescue of American citizens and their repatriation. This paper discusses the global situation and some of the poor decisions that were made throughout the entirety of the mission from planning through the crash at Desert One.

The purpose of this paper is to examine a historical battle and apply the four steps of battle analysis to provide an alternate outcome. This paper will define the battle, review the settings, describe the actions, and assess the significance of the actions for Operation Ivory Coast. The operation took place during 1971 in Northern Vietnam by United States Special Forces operators. The

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

Tragedy stuck America on November 4th of 1979, when 52 hostages were seized at the American Embassy in Iran during the midst of the Iranian Revolution. Different policy approaches prompted a vast range of potential actions, and ultimately “Operation Eagle Claw” was carried out between April 21st and 25th of 1980. The two primary executive divisions in dispute during decision process were the National Security Council (NCS) and its advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of the Department of State (DOS), Cyrus Vance. The decision for the use of military force, rather than continuing economic sanctions and diplomacy, was due to Carter’s attempt at re-election and a lack of resistance from Congress.

This paper provides an evaluation of the command and control and integration of joint functions associated with the invasion of Sicily, known as Operation HUSKY. The Allies achieved a positive outcome despite the fact that key leaders demonstrated ineffective command and control capabilities and poor integration. The paper will first evaluate the joint function of command and control, using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. An evaluation of the integration of intelligence and fires joint functions at the Operational level will follow.

While today the Special Forces Operations Units are seen as heroes and the highest caliber of enlisted men in the Army, they were not initially seen as an elite group. Perhaps the Special Forces did not receive the recognition they deserved because their successes in psychological and counterinsurgency warfare strategies were immeasurable during World War II and the Korean War. President Kennedy’s administration would lead the way for the Army’s Green Berets and later the Navy SEALS. However, it wasn’t until the Vietnam War that unconventional warfare, or guerilla warfare as it became known, was utilized in a capacity that would expand the effectiveness and duties of the Special Forces Units.