Operation Husky Case Study

In this lesson you will continue to review the key agencies and major force management processes used in developing warfighting capability provided to combatant comman

When Halstead was given this mission in Iraq, she never anticipated the challenge she would soon face. She had one year to plan her operation, train and certify her units for deployments and after months of painstaking preparation and training, Halstead was confident her soldiers and unit were ready to be certified for deployment. However, certification had to be issued by her superior, a three-star general recently back from Iraq—and the most challenging boss Halstead had ever encountered in all of her years of services.

Training objectives must support the mission profile and meet the commanders desired end state. Prior to the 56TH train up at the National Training Center (NTC) the deployment location changed from Iraq to Afghanistan (case study). Changes to mission essential tasks were not identified prior to NTC, resulting in the BCT training on collective tasks and validated during MRE based on the Iraq mission profile. However, the shift to the Afghanistan mission profile created gaps in training not identified until units arrived at Bagram Air Field (BAF). i.e. the BCT had to establish an MRAP drivers training program at BAF extending the RSOI process. Training gaps were not limited to company level shortfalls as battalion and brigade staffs were not able to anticipate potential threats and capitalize on opportunities. (case study 2)

In 2012, General Dempsey states “Mission Command is fundamentally a learned behavior to be imprinted into the DNA of a profession of arms.” The way Mission Command has evolved through the past years is indicative to the US Military adjusting to a new threat. The concept of Mission Command is not new, what is important is how General Dempsey states “Education in the fundamental principles of mission command must begin at the start of service and be progressively more challenging..” The General emphasizes the need for education at the start of the individual’s service. Additionally, this highlights the United States Army’s doctrinal adjustment to the new threat. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US faced an enemy whose creativity and adaptability are two of its greatest assets. The fast-paced situation changes in both of those AOs required tactical level leadership maintain the autonomy to “exercise disciplined initiative.” This type of initiative historically leads to mission success, specifically in fast-paced situations where a key to success is forcing the enemy to react.

The 99th Pursuit Squadron was assigned first to Tunisia in 1943, then to a combat mission in the German-held Island of Pantelleria and took part in the allied invasion of Sicily. In September, Davis was recalled to Tuskegee to take over a larger all-black unit preparing for combat in Europe, the 332nd Fighter

The main forces for the invasion of Sicily were the U.S. 7th Army under Patton and the British Eighth Army under Montgomery. The invasion began on July 10, 1943, with combined air and sea landings involving 150,000 troops, 3,000 ships and 4,000 aircraft, all aimed at the southern shores of the island.

Operation Anaconda was a subordinate joint combat operation, during Operation Enduring Freedom, (Lyle 2012) to be carried out in the Shahi Kot Valley located in southeastern Afghanistan. Operations planning took place in February of 2002 and was executed from 2-16 March. The operational purpose was to capture or kill, what was reported to be, “The largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan”. Operation Anaconda Case Study (2003) In order to undertake a mission of this magnitude and scope, unity of command would prove critical. The task organization of Operation Anaconda involved both joint and multinational assets. Operation Anaconda lacked unity

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

The Coalition Forces had an extreme advantage in equipment and the Soldiers’ preparation for the Battle of 73 Easting. The main U.S. unit in that battle was the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR), which comprised three ground squadrons 1st squadron (Ghost Troop); 2nd squadron (Eagle Troop); and 3rd squadron (Iron Troop). They also had the support of an aviation attack squadron and an aviation support squadron. In addition, each ground squadron had three cavalry troops, headquarters troop, a tank company, and a self-propelled howitzer battery. Moreover, each cavalry troop comprehended 120 soldiers, 9 M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, and 12 M3 Bradley fighting vehicles. The Regiment’s mission included repelling or destroying the Iraqi's forces

Many Americans make a choice to serve in the military, knowing they could have to make the ultimate sacrifice for our country. During Operation Anaconda, many great Soldiers paid this ultimate sacrifice. Further review many experts have deemed this as an unnecessary loss of life due to a multitude of factors we will explore. This Operation has been viewed as a great success in times of uncertainty and challenges. Ultimately, the enemy was defeated but what could have been done differently? The higher headquarters command structure for Operation Anaconda faced challenges planning, making timely decisions, and communicating which lead to mission gaps while developing lessons learned for future joint operations.

Within our organization we are consider the HMO for the residential benefits for T19 Husky D clients. Which means in order for a client to go into a rehabilitation center they have to obtain prior authorization. Therefore, I understand exactly what you are saying about getting clients the right level of care however insurance companies bottom line and job is to keep cost down which means saying no, more than approving the level of care the client is desperately needing. Additionally, the people who are turning down clients are clinician who are licensee and know exactly what clients need however their job is to suggest other alternative that have already been tried. As our book indicated it’s getting difficult to distinguish between manufacturers

Following their success in North Africa, the Allied decision to invade Sicily was an appropriate next step towards defeating Axis powers. Operation HUSKY, the first phase of the Italian campaign, supported the Allied strategic goals of opening Mediterranean shipping lanes, diverting German forces off of the Eastern front and encouraging Italy to exit the Axis. HUSKY resulted in Allied Forces securing the island, despite leadership failures and the ineffective coordination of joint functions at the operational level. A two part analysis of the Allied Force operational level joint functions during Operation HUSKY follows. The first will evaluate the joint function of command and control using the three attributes of mission command from joint doctrine: commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The second will evaluate the integration of two of the remaining joint functions using the definition of integration from joint doctrine.

On August 15th, the US 7th Army fired their last amphibious assault which led to Germans full retreat. Two days later the 3rd Division of the United States gave the all clear that “Operation Husky” was a success. The Allied powers had won and Sicily was in their hands. After the conquest of Sicily, the Allies had suffered over 23,000 casualties. The German forces sustained over 30,000 casualties while the Italians had more than 135,000 casualties.

The first troops deployed into battle were paratroopers. Over thirteen thousand U.S. paratroopers were dropped by an armada of C-47s behind German lines before dawn. Their mission was to seize bridges, disrupt communications, and prevent German soldiers from reinforcing the Normandy beaches as the Allied assault hit the coastline (Alberecht). Heavy cloud coverage made for difficult navigation and forced many of the paratroopers to jump “blind”. This resulted in them being scattered over a 100-square mile radius. Thirty-five percent of these soldiers landed at their designated drop point, while many others died when they landed in fields flooded by the Germans. Despite all of this, the remaining troops were able to secure their intended positions (Dry).

On 9 JUL 1943, the Allies initiated Operation Husky, one of the most significant combined operations of World War II (Birtle