The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating
planning efforts for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), using an operational design (OD) as a framework for the analysis, the overall strategic and operational planning process was deeply flawed and inadequate in addressing the complex security challenges posed by the Iraq situation. This essay will assess how well Commanders and planners understood the operational environment (OE) and refined their operational approach (OA) over time. In conjunction with articulating these assessments, it will also consider
claimed responsibility and their base of operations in Afghanistan was the initial U.S. target. Following early success in Afghanistan, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld determined security from future attacks required defeating the global terrorist network. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein became the next target in the Global War on Terrorism and CENTCOM began planning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Administration insisted that this operation involve the smallest force and shortest
of Iraq, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) provides an excellent case study to evaluate military campaign planning. OIF demonstrates the complexity of campaign planning, while providing relevant lessons for today’s planners and leaders. OIF was successful in achieving its initial tactical objective of capturing Baghdad. However, due to a insufficient understating of the operational environment (OE) and a poorly defined problem, OIF’s initial operational approach failed to achieve strategic interests
methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using
International Baccalaureate Extended Essay Operation Instant Thunder and the Persian Gulf War 1990-1991 Alexander Brooking Candidate Number: 001829-0003 Research Question: To what extent did the success of the coalition forces during the first gulf war rely on the events of operation 'Instant Thunder'? Word Count: 3586 Abstract This essay deals with the bombing campaign, more commonly known as operation “Instant Thunder”, conducted by coalition forces during the first Gulf War from 1990
In order to understand victory and defeat it is important to consider the national objectives that governed each conflict. Since World War II, the U.S. has participated in five major conflicts (Korea, Vietnam, Dessert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan). In each of these conflicts, the U.S. demonstrated military superiority. However, unlike previous wars, these wars resulted in mixed results based on the specific political and military objectives of the time
The failure to understand the operational environment and define the problem confronting the joint force at the onset of the joint planning process hampered the U.S. campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from 2002 to 2007. In support of this thesis, I will detail how planners and commanders initially misunderstood the operational environment and inaccurately defined the problem facing the joint force at the expense of missed opportunities and the misapplication of ways and means. I will
problems 2 4. Concept of Operation 3 5. The campaign 3 5.1. Air power 4 5.2. Ground operations and special forces 5 5.3. Iraqi strategy and tactics 5
Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts