Operation Iraqi Freedom And Operational Design

Over the course of history, the strategic environment has changed rapidly and is now more complex than ever before – it is currently characterized by unpredictability and disorder, and may yet manifest itself in the collapse of nuclear armed nations, destabilizing conflict in geo-politically vital regions, and humanitarian crises. A world of disparate actors – not all nation states – now exists. Unpredictable events will continue to cause strategic surprise. The widespread effects of past conflicts such as World War II, Vietnam and the Iraq war are still being felt and have created significant strategic repercussions. The failures of these conflicts are the result of our military and political leaders’ failure to quickly adapt to wartime conditions. This occurs because of a general refusal to commit to a military culture of learning that encourages serious debate, critical assessments of our military operations, and challenges to our doctrine in the face of emerging change. Additionally, leaders have struggled with the critical responsibility of forecasting and providing for a ready force, one that is well-resourced and prepared to conduct future operations. It is the responsibility of our military and political leaders to send our military to war with a ready force, and a strategy that will ultimately result in victory. But understanding war and warriors is critical if societies and governments are to make sound judgments concerning military policy.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

General Franks and joint planners identified various strengths in the Iraq pre-invasion planning efforts of the Joint Staff. For instance, throughout development of the Iraqi operational approach, planners recognized Saddam Hussain and the City of Bagdad as strategic Centers of Gravity (COG) as a major sources of Iraqi power and strength to the Hussain regime.5 (JP5-0, p. III-22) By comparison, Karl Von Clausewitz referred to the COG as the “the hub of all power and movement, which everything depends or the point at which all our energies should be directed.”6 (JP5-0, p. III-22) In addition, General Frank’s and planners’ operational approach acknowledged the Iraqi Army and the Republican Guard as key operational COGs targeted in pre-invasion

During 2003, General Petraeus and his soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division had no clue of the astounding role they were about to embark on. General Petraeus found the city of Mosul in complete destruction, and knew it would take a cohesive effort through mutual trust and teamwork to restore the city. The city of Mosul did not only need a complete make over, but also a regime that shared a mutual understanding as Petraeus. Lastly, with the city rebuilding changes would bring hostility and risk to the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. General David Petraeus was successful in Mosul, because he applied the mission command control principles of building cohesive teams, creating shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk.

Whether she knew it or not, Mother Theresa was talking about the Joint Planning Process. She best describes this process as teamwork. The use of teamwork, or the Joint Planning Process, by leaders of the Armed Forces during Operation Anaconda allowed for planning considerations critical to the success of the operation. This paper will explain the seven steps of the Joint Planning Process, and how these steps or the lack of these steps will dictate mission success or failure as seen in Operation Anaconda.

This paper was written by Dr. Richard L. Kugler from the National Defense University, Center of Technology and National Security. Operation Anaconda was a success, but taught many lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation that deserves to be remembered (Kugler, 2007). Even though the battle plan was complex and sophisticated, it was not followed by the Afghan forces, which left US ground troops to do the battle alone. US forces had to replan the battle at a moment's notice.

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

Does anybody recall Operation Desert Storm when the United States attacked the nation of Iraq? It was a quick and steadfastly triumph directed by the United States Military and their partners. US use of insight from utilization of SIGINT, HUMINT, SIGNINT, and Symbolism airplane perception empowered them to wreck the Iraqi's powers. Having this influence of operational insight played a huge element in the death of the Iraqi powers to in the end considering rout.

In response to the threat on American allies and partners in the regions of Iraq and Syria, the U.S. and over 60 nations and partner organizations created a U.S.-led global coalition, OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), aimed at degrading and destroying threats posed by ISIL. Combat operations alone will not result in the degradation and destruction of ISIL. Operation Desert Storm was viewed by military strategists as the first of a new generation of conflicts where victory is no longer ensured only by physical force, but also by the ability to win the information war and to secure information dominance. Given the long-war aspect of irregular warfare, enhancing and strengthening information operations is the key to mission success and

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

At the same time, some of the top brass had some difficulty adjusting to what they perceived to be Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's brusque hands-on management style. Normally, a regional commander in chief--the CINC--prepares a plan of battle and submits it to the Joint Chiefs for review. Only when the "package" is complete does it go to the secretary of Defense for approval. But Rumsfeld insisted on short-circuiting this formal, orderly process and getting involved in the planning at an early stage. Central Command's Gen. Tommy Franks was required to come up with "30 percent" solutions that would be further shaped and recast in response to Rumsfeld's probing and persistent questions. Some of the generals grumbled about Rumsfeld, but Pace

the majority of nations consider Al-Qaeda and other such groups to be evil, and US to be good to fight against bad.

The weaknesses with CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA involved the friction and the lack of the integration of the interagency in the planning of phases IV-V and the initial strategic assumptions that affected CDRUSCENTCOM’s OA. The first weakness was the failure of both CDRUSCENTCOM and interagency organizations to include the NSC, Departments of Defense/State, and the U.S. Agency of International Development to integrate and coordinate their strategic objectives into a comprehensive unified plan in support of OIF. This failure enabled the post regime change of Iraq to set the foundation for the insurgency that would start to grow in 2004.

Joint doctrine provides an excellent starting point for understanding operational art and its relationship with war and warfare because “Army doctrine exists within a larger set of doctrine publications.” The Army nested its doctrinal concepts with joint doctrine, which “provides the fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.” In the case of operational art, the US Army uses the joint term, which defines operational art as “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs…to develop strategies,

As military members we are educated to think very linearly about strategy. For many years we have been trained to have a strategic thought process based on the use of a methodology that espouses three major steps: Ends (Objectives), Ways (Strategic Concepts), and Means (Resources). (Barber 1997)